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ABSTRACT
Drawing out the deeper questions of pragmatism, professional autonomy,
separation of powers and cultural legitimacy implicated in the subject, this article
*Professor, School of Law, Roger Williams University. In pursuing the subject matter of
this article, I have benefited from discussions with Professors Detlev Vagts, Thomas DeLong,
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argues, contrary to the dominant academic opinion in the field, that the empirical
underpinnings of multidisciplinary practice (MDP) are weak as are its theoretical
justifications and overall compatibility with the policy imperatives of true
professionalism. The Article is in a sense a response to the observation of the
eminent scholar of the legal profession, Professor Charles Wolfram that, "shockingly
little has been written in opposition to MDP." See Charles Wolfram, ABA and
MDPs: Context, History and Process, 84 MiNN. L. REv., 1625, 1626 nn.3-4 (2000).
The Article critically examines and refutes the arguments deployed in support of
MDP, a subject that has attracted much attention in recent times as manifest in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which addressed the issue primarily from the
perspective of safeguarding the independence of the accountant. Unlike the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, this Article approaches the subject primarily from the
perspective of safeguarding the lawyers' independence and ancillary democratic
values.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "multidisciplinary practice" ("MDP") may be defined as joint practice
by lawyers and members of other professions, where their professional activities in
pursuit of such practice involve the offer of legal services to the public. Depending
on the context, the term may also mean the professional grouping or entity under
which or through which such joint practice is undertaken, i.e. a multidisciplinary
partnership.1
In the last few years, MDP has become a contentious aspect of the broad
discourse on the regulation of the legal profession, with its proponents and opponents
sparring on different dimensions of the phenomenon, particularly the primary
question of whether the Model Rules of Professional Conduct should be amended to
permit lawyers to share fees with non-lawyers,2 especially the Big 5 firms.3 A key
William Alford, Frederick Schauer, David Wilkins and David Logan, for which I am very
grateful. Equally beneficial has been contributions by participants at the Harvard Law School
Graduate Colloquia series, where some of the ideas were first presented, especially Professors
Hal Scott, John Coates, Frank Michelman and Anne-Marie Slaughter, all of whom I owe a
debt of gratitude. I am indebted to Virginia Wise, Lecturer in Law and Library Sciences at the
Harvard Law School, for facilitating my research on the subject
'The term will be used in this article in these two senses only, even though, generally, it
can also encompass joint practice by persons belonging to any two or more professions none
of whom is a lawyer. MDP is distinguishable from a situation involving an individual with
dual professional qualifications who is as such licensed to practice law and one or more other
professions. See American Bar Association's (ABA) MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.4; R. 5.7 (2002) [hereinafter "Model Rules" or "Model Rules of Professional Conduct"].
Model Rule 5.7, dealing with a lawyer's responsibilities regarding law-related (ancillary)
services, substantially governs such a professional, as distinct from MDP which primarily
implicates Model Rule 5.4.
2See Rule 5.4, which prohibits such fee sharing and thereby prevents partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers if the purpose of such partnership involves the rendering of legal
services. Rule 5.4, or equivalent provisions, is adopted by bar regulators in every state of the
Union, but not Washington, D.C. A sense of the breadth and intensity of this debate can be
obtained from an exploration of the testimony of the various parties who appeared before or
wrote to the MDP Commission established by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1998
[Vol. 56:533
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aspect of the argument against MDP is the point widely made by MDP opponents,
that the resultant structures and conditions of legal practice would be deeply
corrosive of lawyer independence and the associated ethical rules that support it,
especially the rules on conflict of interest and client confidentiality.' Proponents of
MDP counter with a set of arguments that has found resonance in important
segments of the public.
Three classes of argument are discernible among the arguments made by MDP
proponents. The first class encompasses those arguments which claim that MDP and
its incidents are largely compatible with the independence of the legal profession and
related rules such as the rules against conflict of interests; in essence, that there is no
real tension between MDP and the rules that undergird the independence of the legal
profession. Arguments in this class tend to relatively side step any value judgment
on the ethical rules undergirding professional independence as well as related rules.
They typically involve an assertion that MDP does not raise any new problems or
that such problems as may exist, especially with regard to potential conflict of
interest and breaches of client confidences, can be managed by the use of various
techniques, especially Chinese walls.' This class of arguments is by far the most
to help chart a course for the legal profession on the issue. The testimonies and submissions
are available at: http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
3The term "Big 5" or "Big Five" refers to Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst &
Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Notwithstanding the 2002 functional demise of
Arthur Andersen LLP in the wake of the Enron Corporation scandals, the term "Big 5" will be
used throughout this Article to refer collectively to the major global accounting firms. This is
done to maintain terminological continuity and consistency between this class of firms and the
existing literature on them, which largely identifies them as the Big 5 rather than the Big 4, the
latter term not having been in usage for long.
4See Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective
on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United States, France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 589, 599
(2002).
5This is the tactic usually taken, for obvious reasons of diplomacy and tact, by persons
associated with the accounting profession in advancing MDP. See, e.g., Remarks of Richard
Spivak (Mar. 31, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/spivak3.html (last visited June 29,
2004) (demonstrating Mr. Spivak's testimony before the MDP Commission in which he
emphasized that the ethical adjustments needed for the legal profession to permit MDP were
minimal); Oral Remarks of Kathryn A. Oberly, Vice Chair and General Counsel, Ernst &
Young LLP, (Feb. 4, 1999) (demonstrating Ms. Oberly's testimony before the MDP
Commission), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/oberly2.html (last visited June 29, 2004);
Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1627, n.7 (2000) (citing a discussion of Big 5 representatives who emphasized that the
core values of the legal and accounting professions are essentially the same). For other
instances of this line of argument outside the accounting profession, see Gary A. Munneke,
Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to Own Professional Services, 20 PACE L. REv. 73, 87-
88, 90 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 1083, 1087, 1093 (2000); James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of
Core Values: A "Radical" Proposal to Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms of Legal
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1159, 1200 (2000). For a judicial consideration of the threat that
MDP poses to client confidentiality, see the decision in Bolkiah v. KPMG, [1999] 2 A.C. 222,
235-40 (Eng.). This is a British House of Lords decision involving considerations of whether,
as argued by the accounting firm KPMG, the internal processes (ethical screens or Chinese
2008]
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pervasive among MDP proponents. It is indeed reflected in the pro-MDP
recommendation of the MDP Commission set up by the American Bar Association
(ABA) in 1998 to assist the legal profession in charting a course on the matter.6
The second class of arguments made by MDP proponents concedes that MDP
may be significantly incompatible with aspects of professional independence, but
contends directly or implicitly that the benefits that flow from MDP, especially that
of enhanced client choice, outweigh its costs in terms of lost professional
independence and the impairment of related ethical rules.7 Arguments falling within
this class significantly reflect the liberal idea of client or party autonomy as an
overriding good that transcends the ethical costs entailed.
The third class of arguments in support of MDP substantially or totally
discountenances the ethical norm of lawyer independence and or the ethical rules
that undergird it, contending that they lack much value and should therefore not
constitute an impediment to the de-proscription of MDP.8 This class of arguments
dovetails into the broader critique of lawyer ethics and regulatory regime, which is
sometimes anchored on the methods and ideologies of law and economics and less
directly, critical legal studies.9 At its core, this argument is a largely political one,
walls) of the firm were truly sufficient to mitigate the risk of breach of client confidentiality,
in its practice as a global accounting firm which combines accounting with litigation support
services.
6See Report of the MDP Commission, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpreport.html
(last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
7Apart from the intrinsic value of enhanced client choice, other benefits sometimes
claimed in support of MDP include cost reduction and service quality improvement through
the upward pressure exerted on lawyers' practices by the divergent ethos of professionals
working within MDPs. On service quality enhancement, see, for example, Peter C. Kostant,
Paradigm Regained: How Competition from Accounting Firms May Help Corporate Attorneys
to Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20 PACE L. REV. 43, 44-46 (1999) [hereinafter Kostant,
Paradigm Regained]. Enhanced client choice, however, provides the most persuasive and
overarching benefit here, encompassing somewhat the benefit of improved service quality,
since such improvement is predicated on lawyers' consciousness of and sensitivity to the fact
of alternative choices being available to clients.
In relation to this class of arguments, see Letter from Robert Gordon, Professor, Yale Law
School, to Sherwin Simmons, Chair, ABA MDP Commission (May 21, 1999),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/gordon.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2004); Carol A. Needham,
Permitting Lawyers to Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business As Usual or the
End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1331-32 (2000) (pointing out
the appeal of the notion of client choice as a primary value); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better
Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1213, 1216-17 (2000) (emphasizing that the existing model of legal ethics is flawed and that
MDP by transcending it, would make lawyers in the corporate context better able to serve as
corporate watchdogs or gate-keepers-a function they are unable to perform effectively under
the existing model of legal ethics).
8See, e.g., Charles Wolfram, supra note 5, at 1626-27, 1652-53; Kostant, Paradigm
Regained, supra note 7, at 47; Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development and Some Implications for
the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1115-18, 1144-45 (2000).
9See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 33, 47-56 (1995) (describing the legal
profession's history as one of cartelization in which many of its ethical rules are
[Vol. 56:533
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inviting an inquiry into how society should make choices as to values deserving of
endorsement and, following from that, whether the legal profession's independence
qualifies as a value worthy of continued endorsement by society. This argument is
rendered even more potent in the MDP context by the fact that MDP presents an
opportunity, not just for abstract futuristic posturing and speculation, but also for
broad and immediate transformative action in the theater of professional regulation.
The MDP debate is nothing less than a plebiscite on the future of law as an
independent profession. Arguments that totally discountenance the profession's
independence thus acquire an immediacy and potency that they hitherto lacked.
As indicated above the arguments made by MDP proponents have found
resonance in key segments of the public, such as consumer advocacy groups.'0 This
anticompetitive instruments of professional monopoly). See also Richard L. Abel, Why Does
the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 653-57 (1981) (characterizing the
legal profession's quest for self-regulation as supply control); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the
ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 681, 692-706
(1981) (arguing in a similar vein). Roberto Mangabeira Unger, a leading voice in the critical
legal studies movement, as part of the broader project of social transformation through
deviationist doctrine, questions the very character and necessity of a distinct legal profession,
and by clear implication, the rules of the profession on independence. His words are
instructive:
As legal analysis approached deviationist doctrine and society came to execute the
institutional program described earlier, the character of professional expertise in law
would change. The contrast between lawyers and laymen would give way to a
situation of multiple points of entry into the more or less authoritative resolution of
problems that we now define as legal. If legal doctrine is acknowledged to be
continuous with other modes of normative arguments, if the institutional plan that
decrees the existence of a distinct judiciary alongside only one or two other branches
of government is reconstructed, and if long before this reconstruction the belief in a
logic of inherent institutional roles is abandoned, legal expertise can survive only as a
loose collection of different types of insight and responsibility. Each type would
combine elements of current legal professionalism with allegedly nonlegal forms of
special knowledge and experience as well as with varieties of political representation.
This disintegration of the bar might serve as a model for what would happen, in a
more democratic and less superstitious society, to all claims to monopolize an
instrument of power in the name of expert knowledge.
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 111 (1983). If
society were to endorse the program of deconstruction and deviation that lies at the center of
the critical legal studies movement, the independence of the bar would indeed be a moot
question.
'lt is instructive that the positions of several consumer advocacy groups on MDP were
correlated to the position taken by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) and the major accounting firms. For instance, notwithstanding the rather radical
recommendation by the MDP Commission that MDPs be permitted, the AICPA, among other
reasons, rejected the Commission's report as being too restrictive and thus constituting an
impediment to the development of MDP, especially by way of its imposition of lawyers'
ethical rules on all professionals working in MDPs. See Letter dated July 30, 1999 from
Olivia F. Kirtley, Chair, AICPA Board of Directors, to Arthur Garwin, ABA MDP
Commission (transmitting AICPA Board resolution of July 15, 1999), http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/aicpa2.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). Subsequently, six
consumer advocacy groups issued a joint statement expressing misgivings similar to the
AICPA's, seemingly taking little stock of the bigger point that the MDP Commission had
come out firmly in favor of the consumer groups' long-standing position by recommending
2008]
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has left MDP opponents operating from a defensive position," especially prior to the
Enron accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002. That scandal had the effect of
neutralizing MDP proponents by politically and socially delegitimizing the major
accounting firms that had been at the forefront of the quest for MDP. The arguments
made by the opponents of MDP have historically proved ineffective in general
appeal relative to those of MDP proponents. Their ineffectiveness may be read as
suggesting that the case for MDP is intrinsically strong. Contrary to this suggestion,
however, this Article is aimed at exposing the weakness of the case for MDP by
subjecting the arguments made in its support to critical analysis from empirical,
doctrinal and policy perspectives. The Article's thesis is that, contrary to the
apparent strength often ascribed to it, the case for MDP is weak, not just on account
of the contingent circumstances that de-legitimized accountants and the quest for
MDP in the post-Enron environment, but rather as a fundamental conceptual matter,
the assumed conceptual rigor and coherence of the arguments deployed in favor of
MDP being borne of error. The conceptual strength of the cases for and against
MDP is an issue likely to receive policy making and legislative attention in the
future, given that nothing in the Enron scandals or the legislative response thereafter
fundamentally addressed the basic issue of competing visions of professionalism
raised by MDP. In this regard, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and allied regulatory
responses constitute but mere stop-gap measures. The situation thus invites deeper
inquiry towards the ultimate resolution of the difficult questions of professionalism
implicated.
Looking more closely at the classes of argument deployed by MDP proponents, it
is observed that the first and second classes of arguments are differentiated only by
the degree of tension they ascribe to the relationship between the ethical norms of the
profession and the realities of MDP, and their concomitant treatment or disposition
of those ethical norms in the circumstances. As against the third class of arguments,
the first and second classes are unified by their admission of the value of the ethical
norms of the profession (or at least their neutrality regarding the value of those
norms). Arguments of the first and second classes therefore implicitly or expressly
assume:
1. That there are immense benefits to be obtained from MDP
generally, and
2. That any tension between the ethical norms or core values of the
legal profession, especially the independence norm, and the
imperatives of MDP are manageable or tolerable.
In Part II of this article, I question these assumptions, and in so doing challenge
the first and second classes of argument. I show in particular that the envisaged
benefits of MDP flow not from MDP generally but rather from one narrow form of
MDP only-the fully integrated form-to the exclusion of intermediate MDP forms
the de-proscription of MDPs. See Joint Letter from Various Consumer Groups to the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (July 15, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/
consumer2.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
"See, e.g., Written Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, You've Got the Soul of the Profession in
Your Hands (Feb. 4, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/foxl.html (last visited June 29,
2006).
[Vol. 56:533
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advanced by MDP proponents. I additionally show that the imperatives of even the
fully integrated MDP are not easily manageable or tolerable. This is because these
imperatives necessarily make this form of MDP incompatible with the core values of
the legal profession, contrary to the assumptions that MDP proponents make when
they advance the first and second classes of arguments.
Regarding the third class of arguments deployed by MDP proponents, I show in
Part III the centrality of professional independence-in terms of the lawyer's control
of his work and the terms thereof-to the lawyer's being and professional essence
and attempt a reinforcement of the case for the independence of lawyers in the
context of the threat posed to that independence by MDP. In this regard, I do three
things in particular: First, I show that concern for the professional as a supplier of
services, as distinct from an exclusive focus on consumer interests, is legitimate and
that the literature on the sociology of professions evinces the legitimacy of that
concern as well as the centrality of workplace control to a profession. This is in the
context of an exclusive focus on consumer interests by both proponents and
opponents of MDP and the underlying view that only the interest of consumers, and
not the lawyers' as service suppliers, is legitimate in the debate. Second, I show that
MDP, as a threat to professional independence of lawyers, poses a threat to consumer
interests as well. This threat is not in the traditional sense in which the erosion of
lawyers' independence is perceived as inimical to their loyalty to clients, but rather
in the different sense of implicating exacerbated lawyer disillusionment with their
work: Such disillusionment portends ill for the consumer, in that it threatens to make
the legal profession progressively of little interest to the best minds who often have
alternative callings to choose from. Third, I make a case for the independence of
lawyers by revisiting and reinforcing existing arguments for lawyer independence,
especially the separation of powers argument, and also by deploying a cultural
argument for lawyer independence.
This Article is therefore a treatise against MDP and the arguments deployed by
its proponents. It proceeds by exploring the gaps and oversights in these arguments
and the limitations that these gaps and oversights impose on them. In so doing, the
Article attempts to show that the position taken by MDP proponents lacks the
normative and theoretical strength often ascribed to it, and that novel ways of
thinking about these issues throw light on such weaknesses and neighboring
concerns. In terms of methodology, Part II examines the factual bases of the
arguments made by proponents of MDP, testing them against empirical observations
and the conceptual imperatives and realities of professional service firms as a distinct
group operating within parameters prescribed by the peculiarities of their form,
function and environment. It indicates that many of the factual assumptions are not
empirically supportable nor are they in line with conceptual imperatives and realities
of the professional service firm, and following therefrom, that the claims made for
MDP by its proponents are not credible. Part III, adopting a largely sociological
framework, attempts a reinforcement of the argument in Part II, by showing the
social and political relevance of lawyer independence in the sense of control by
lawyers of their workplace, MDP being essentially a debate about the necessity or
otherwise of the legal profession's relaxation of control over its work.
2008]
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11. SUBSTANCE AS A FUNCTION OF FORM
The twelve-person MDP Commission tabled its final report and
recommendation 2 to the ABA House of Delegates in July 2000. Prior to that, it had
produced two other reports. The first report, with recommendation and appendices,
was released in August 1999.' 3 This was followed by a draft recommendation/report
released around March 2000.4 Related to these is a set of background papers
explaining salient aspects of the MDP Commission's work. 5 Cumulatively, these
documents not only encapsulate the thinking of the MDP Commission on the
important questions over which it deliberated, but also capture the essence of the
many-sided debate concerning MDP. They, therefore, constitute a fulcrum on which
an examination of the Commission's conclusions and--even more importantly-the
broad MDP debate can profitably be hinged. 6
In March, 1999, the MDP Commission, on the heels of its earlier publications,
presented the following five models, accompanied by various hypotheticals, of how a
multidisciplinary practice might be organized.
i.) Model 1: The Cooperative Model
12Regarding this Final Report and Recommendation, with the appendix, see Commission
on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org
/cpr/mdp/mdpfinalrep2000.html (last visited October 1 2008). The MDP Commission's
recommendation was essentially the same as its earlier recommendation in August 1999: that
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be amended, subject to certain restrictions, to permit
a lawyer to partner with a non-lawyer even if the activities of the enterprise consisted of the
practice of law and to share legal fees with a non-lawyer. The recommendation was in effect
rejected by the House of Delegates, which had similarly rejected the earlier recommendation
at its Aug. 10, 1999 meeting. The House passed resolution 1 OF on July 11, 2000, discharging
the MDP Commission, affirming the ethical restrictions against lawyer-lay combinations and
asking ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to examine
possibilities of accommodating less radical forms of association between lawyers and non-
lawyers, by way of strategic alliances and contractual relationships.
13Regarding the report, see Summary Report on the Study of the MDP Commission,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpreport.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); and for the
Recommendation, see American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
Report to the House of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdprecommendation.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
"See Draft American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report
to the House of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/marchrec.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2008). The final recommendation of July 2000 is essentially identical to this recommendation,
with minor variations in language and numbering of paragraphs.
'
5See Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments (Jan.
1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/multicomreport0199.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008);
Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/febmdp.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); Hypotheticals and
Models (Mar., 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/multicomhypos.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2008); PostScript to February 2000 Midyear Meeting, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdp/postscript.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
16The MDP Commission's report and related papers have been adopted widely as a
framework for the analysis of MDP structures. See Daly, supra note 4, at 593-99.
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This is the current structure. There would be no changes in Rule 5.4. of the ABA
Model Rules Of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules) which effectively bars
lawyers from entering into a partnership or other fee-sharing agreement with non-
lawyers. Collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers is still possible only in the
sense that lawyers are free to employ nonlawyer professionals on their staffs to assist
them in advising clients and are also free to work with nonlawyer professionals
whom they directly retain or who are retained by the client. In essence, lawyers and
law firms can still work collaboratively with, but independently from, non-lawyer
professionals and firms.
ii.) Model 2: The Command and Control Model
This model is based on the District of Columbia adaptation of Model Rule 5.4.
This permits a non-lawyer to become a partner in a law firm, but only if (a) the firm
limits its activities to the practice of law, (b) all non-lawyers with managerial
authority or a financial interest in the firm agree to be bound by the Model Rules,
and (c) the lawyers in the firm accept responsibility for the non-lawyer participants
to the same extent as if they were lawyers.
iii.) Model 3: The Ancillary Business Model
In this model a law firm operates an ancillary business which, pursuant to Model
Rule 5.7, makes sure that its clients know that the ancillary business is distinct from
the law firm and does not offer legal services, and that the protections of the lawyer-
client relationship do not apply to dealings between the client and the ancillary
business. (The clients of both the law firm and the ancillary business would very
likely be cross-cutting.) Lawyers and nonlawyer professionals are partners in the
ancillary business, sharing fees and jointly making management decisions. The non-
lawyers are however not members of the law firm and make no decisions concerning
it.
iv.) Model 4: The Contract Model
In this model the lawyer or law firm remains independent, but enters into a
contract relationship with another professional or professional services firm. The
contract provides for such things as joint marketing (including identification of the
affiliation), reciprocal referral, and the provision to the law firm of management
services, communications technology, non-lawyer staffing, and office space and
equipment by the professional firm.
v.) Model 5: The Fully Integrated Model
In this model there is no free-standing independent law firm. There is a single
professional service firm which has lawyers as well as nonlawyers as members on
equal footing. Lawyers are partners or employees of this single professional services
firm, which provides a number of services to clients, including legal services. 7
These models have justifiably elicited substantial attention from the MDP
Commission and other interested parties, for they evince the potential future shape of
practice structures, with attendant implications for both practitioners and clients.
17See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 15.
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A. Conflict of Form and Function
A pervasive but overlooked aspect of the discussion of these models is the
tension between them and the justification given ex ante in support of MDP. The
discussion of the MDP Commission's reports have tended to focus largely on the
question of whether there is a demand for MDP, and the capacity of MDP to erode
the ethical fabrics of the legal profession, especially its tradition of loyalty to clients.
This focus led the MDP Commission to seek, rather late in the process, expert advice
on whether there exists a demand for legal services provided through MDP firms. 8
The fit of the models or structures themselves to the envisaged benefits of MDP has
however been ignored.
The fundamental reason given in support of MDP by its by proponents is that
MDP would make possible "one-stop-shopping," defined broadly to mean the
seamless provision of several professional services to consumers at one point, a firm,
through multidisciplinary teams of professionals working without structural
boundaries. 9 Such one-stop-shopping, it is argued, should come with synergies
18See Center for Professional Responsibility, https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/flbar
rec.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). This embodies the text of the ABA House of Delegate
Resolution of August 10, 1999, the so-called Florida recommendation, which decreed:
That the American Bar Association make no change, addition or amendment to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to offer legal services
through a multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates that
such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising
lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients.
Id
The MDP Commission subsequently responded to this resolution in its final report,
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 12,
under the sub-heading titled: "The August 1999 House Resolution." The Commission
reported therein that it consulted with the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan as well as top economists appointed by the American Bar Association on the
question of determining consumer demand for MDP. See also New York County Lawyers'
Association Special Committee on MDP, Resolution Regarding Multidisciplinary Practice
Adopted by the New York County Lawyers' Association, http://www.nycla.org/publications/
multi.htm#resolution (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). In the subsection titled "Lack of Evidence of
Professional or Societal Advantage" this Committee addressed the question of demand for
MDP.
19See Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker (Feb. 4 1999), https://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdp/tuckerl.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). In Section II (Summary), Mr. Tucker spoke of
"sophisticated clients seeking advice on increasingly complex matters, often involving an
inextricable mix of finance, accounting, law and other disciplines." Id. He went to speak in
Section IV of the common client belief that they benefit from 'one-stop-shopping,' from
looking to one source," insisting further that "[we] recognize that there is often little, if any,
real distinction or variance between business or financial advice and legal advice, and, in fact,
the two are inextricably intertwined." Id. Finally, in Section V he declares that MDP has
evolved in response to an increasingly consumer-driven, global economy, which presents
fewer and fewer "pure legal issues." Id. See also Letter from Haydee Velazquez Tillotson,
Tillotson Enterprises, to Arthur Garwin, American Bar Association (Feb. 19, 1999),
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/tillotson.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). Mr. Tillotson spoke
of the advantage of obtaining "several types of services 'under one roof,' instead of spending a
great deal of time 'consultant shopping,' and then bringing each of these consultants up to
speed on my particular needs at the time." Id. He added that "in addition to the obvious cost
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leading to efficiencies particularly cost reduction and higher quality services. As
shown below however, the suggested models or structures for MDP hold no
reasonable prospect of yielding the envisaged benefits, but are rather in tension with
such benefits.
Before examining how the proposed structures belie the envisaged gains, it bears
mentioning that, conceptually, there is some element of superfluity in the structures
themselves. Strictly speaking, there are only two models, Model 1 and Model 5.
Model 1 is a restrictive, narrow model that excludes Models 2 to 5. Model 5 is an
expansive model that excludes Model 1, while capturing Models 2 to 4. This is
readily realized once we note that if Model 5 becomes permitted, it would be
functionally unnecessary to prohibit Models 2 to 4. Models 2 to 4 may then be
viewed as a progression of liberalized practice structures leading up in a continuum
to Model 5.
The tension in the models vis-A-vis the envisaged benefits is discernible from the
following aspects of the proposed arrangements: While the structures exhibit
progressive liberalization, the envisaged benefits of MDP are not realizable pari
passu with the degree of liberalization, but rather seem capable of realization only in
the context of the fifth model, the fully integrated model. Thus Models 2 to 4 yield
little or no gains, when measured against the fundamental justification for MDP-
one-stop-shopping. Apart from reinforcing the lack of integrity of Models 2 to 4,
this observation is interesting in itself. For, it ties the benefits of MDP inextricably
to the costliest regime of all, viewing cost in terms of the degree of ethical risk to
both consumers and producers of legal services and ultimate adjustments necessary
to give effect to a model. In essence, the payoff for Model 5 is the highest, with a
correlated level of cost. Models 2 to 4 lead to some cost but yield sub-optimal or no
benefits.
savings of MDPs, there would be the added benefit of a seamless flow of information among
professionals who are all familiar with my business." Id. The MDP Commission subsequently
cited Mr. Tucker and Mr. Tillotson, among others, as evidence of the demand and need for
MDP and the nature of the structures necessary to satisfy such demand. Id. The MDP
Commission noted in particular "the inefficiencies in attempting to satisfy that need through
the coordinated advice of professionals in nonaffiliated firms," thus implicating seamless
services, not just stand-alone services obtained at one point as a necessary attribute of that
demand. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates,
supra note 12, at n.2 in the Appendix, (as distinct from note 2 to the primary text). Also
worthy of particular note is the MDP Commission's citation of America Corporate Counsel
Association's Board of Director's resolution of Feb. 6, 1999: "The America Corporate
Counsel Association supports a broader range of choice for clients to select from service
providers capable of formulating comprehensive solutions which address not only the legal
aspect of their problems but various other facets as well .... " See Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 12, at n. 18 of the
Appendix as distinct from note 18 to the primary text). The Commission also had the
following to say:
As the Baby Boomer generation ages, individual clients more than ever before need
coordinated advice from lawyers, financial planners, accountants, social workers, and
psychologists. As the global economy expands, both Wall Street and Main Street
business clients look to teams of professionals from different disciplines for
consolidated advice on complex commercial and regulatory issues.
See Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments, supra note 15,
at the subsection titled "Introduction."
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The foregoing propositions can be tested by a conceptual exploration of the
logistics of one-stop-shopping in the context of the peculiar demands of the modem-
day professional service firm, whether small or large. Along this line, we must
assume that best practices in management science will hold sway in the context of
the average MDP, given that efficiency is at the root of the quest for MDP.2° It
would be contradictory to legalize MDP in expectation of more efficient services,
while expecting antediluvian management practices and attendant inefficiencies from
the average MDP firm.
Specifically, one-stop-shopping functionally assumes a level of interaction and
collaborative freedom between professionals that is not possible under the current
regulatory regime for lawyers. A model is therefore meaningful only to the extent
that it can accommodate such interaction. As a corollary, a model is valueless to the
extent that it does not involve an enhancement in the level of interaction that is
possible between professionals, but rather maintains a level that is functionally
capable of attainment under the current regime. Second, even without showing that
the degree of inter-professional interaction afforded by a model in the work place is
capable of attainment under the current regulatory regime, such a model would still
be valueless if it can be shown that on its own terms it is not amenable to the
attainment of the promised ideal of one-stop-shopping and seamless services. This
two-pronged, disjunctive test involves a look at the manner in which professionals
would actually carry out their work under such structures.
A related point merits clarification: collaborative freedom is the test of
seamlessness of service and seamlessness of service is the true test of one-stop-
shopping. The idea of seamless services is therefore cardinal in the proposal for
MDP. How then is seamless service to be defined? Seamless service must be
defined with reference to the process by which a service is produced. This is
necessarily so because, excepting those occasions when services lead to the
production of tangible goods, it is almost impossible to objectively define the
parameters for measuring the quality of a service ex ante, without reference to the
process by which it is produced. Especially is this so in sensitive areas of socio-
economic life, such as legal, medical, arbitral and social work, where we cannot
obtain easily or without undue experimental risks and costs, a real-life sampling of a
professional's service ex ante. Hence, the frequent resort to licensure, as a form of
ex ante, process-based assessment. Otherwise than through an assessment of the
process involved, it is well nigh impossible to test this sort of service ab initio before
consumption, which, unlike the scenario with goods, occurs simultaneously with
production, given the intangibility of services, and the consequently unmediated link
between their production and their consumption. In any case, the argument for such
a test is stronger in the context of the debate on MDP, since we cannot truly get a
real-life sampling of such services before MDP is permitted.2 Accordingly we may
20The discussion here relies in part on the writer's field experience in the course of five
years of work from 1993 to 1998 with an international professional service firm, as well as
discussions with other professionals who had worked both in managerial and other capacities
in similar firms. Many of the latter discussions occurred in the context of a Harvard Business
School professional services course, which the writer took in the spring of 2000.
21
"Real-life sampling" for this purpose clearly excludes samples from other jurisdictions
with their distinctive social and economic circumstances far at variance with the U.S.
situation.
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define seamless service as service that is produced through a process that affords the
producers full freedom to collaborate in seeking out optimal solutions to the client's
problem, with no restriction on this freedom of collaboration except such restriction
as is prescribed or permitted by the client.22 Seamlessness is then primarily a style of
service production which should yield a certain level or quality of service. In line
with the foregoing, seamless service is produced when there is complete freedom of
collaboration between the professionals in a one-stop-shop environment. It is not
enough that the professionals operate under the same firm, in the same building or
under the same franchise or even without any structural boundaries. The key test is
the freedom and capability of the various professionals to collaborate unfettered
across disciplinarily lines.
Sydney Cone touched somewhat indirectly on the essence of one-stop-shopping
as elaborated here, when he questioned its value in relation to the purchase of distinct
services all at the same point. Such a purchase at one point, he argued, did not
necessarily in itself offer any prospect of enhanced value or reduced prices.23 This
observation being correct, the essence of one-stop-shopping must be sought
elsewhere, namely in the seamlessness of the process and the enhanced potentials for
efficiency that go with the admixture of expertise. It is this process, rather than the
mere purchase of services at one point that provides a unique prospect of synergy for
the one-stop-shop.
Following from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the seamless services of
one-stop-shopping, if it is to something radically new and incapable of realization
within the ambits of existing regime for lawyer regulation, must be something
flowing from an unrestricted interaction between professionals; an interaction of
such a nature as to permit a fully coordinated approach that necessarily cuts off
wastes resulting from the separate structures and restrictions that would otherwise be
maintained. The seamless services of one-stop-shopping admit of no half measures.
Using the foregoing framework, we easily observe that Model 2 has no prospect
of delivering the promised goody of seamless services provided through a
multidisciplinary team of professionals. This is because, strictly speaking, Model 2
by its very definition is restricted to the provision of legal services. It must have the
rendition of legal services as its only purpose, notwithstanding the presence of other
professionals within the firm. It cannot offer a web of services, seamless or
otherwise. It is however arguable that legal services just like the related term "law
practice," is incapable of precise definition, 24 so that some of the services regarded as
22Of course there may be restrictions, legal and otherwise, regarding the sort of results that
a client may seek. But once a client's results are not restricted along those lines, there should
be none regarding the extent to which professionals may collaborate in seeking to produce the
result efficiently.
23Sydney Cone, Comments during a session of Professor Bernard Wolfman's MDP
Seminar, Harvard Law School (Feb. 29, 2000).
24For the MDP Commission's ruminations on this issue, see Updated Background and
Informational Report and Request for Comments, supra note 15, at 7; PostScript to February
2000 Midyear Meeting, supra note 15, at Part II; Munneke, supra note 5, at 76-77; Statement
of James W. Jones, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/jonesl.html (last visited July 25, 2004).
See also Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our
Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1097,
1097 (2000) (noting the claim by lawyers practicing within the Big 5 accounting firms that
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legal services can also qualify as non-legal services. As such, when rendered jointly
with other forms of legal services in the context of Model 2, such services would
functionally constitute multidisciplinary services. A response to this argument
would be that it does rest on a contingency, by assuming that a disputed service
would ultimately be adjudged by a court or other relevant authority to be of a non-
legal nature; something that is very uncertain, notwithstanding the liberality shown
by the judiciary in the related question of permitting in-house corporate counsel, staff
lawyers for labor union members, lawyers in legal services organizations for the
needy and in-house insurance lawyers for the insured.25 A better response, however,
is that anything defined or regarded by lawyer regulatory bodies as a legal service is
service that is of such a nature that a lawyer by training and disposition can
comfortably render it, notwithstanding the possibility that other professionals may
also be able to do so.26 As such, functionally speaking, Model 2 does not afford
clients a range or type of service that is otherwise unavailable under the current
regime of lawyer regulation, a range that can be said to provide genuine
opportunities for one-stop-shopping.
Model 3, the ancillary business model, adds no new value. The model on its own
terms does not achieve the ideal of one-stop-shopping, since it effectively decrees a
functional separation of the lawyer's work qua lawyer from the work that the lawyer
performs with other professionals. The lawyer, though capable of rendering
seamless services to the client in every other area, working in conjunction with other
professionals, is effectively incapable of doing so with regard to legal services. He is
effectively barred from doing so through the stringent requirements, procedures and
safeguards which he has to implement in order to render legal services in the context
of Model 3. For instance, the joint interview of clients, unhindered exchange of
information between the lawyer and other professionals, and overall collaboration in
the rendition of legal and other services is compromised and impeded by the
requirements that attend Model 3. These include the need to constantly explain to
the client the nature of services he is receiving at any time and the capacity in which
the lawyer is operating as the lawyer moves between legal and non-legal services,
constantly calling a client's attention to issues of confidentiality and privilege.
Particularly vexing is the necessity of constantly distinguishing and bearing in mind
the three types of service covered by Rule 5.7 of the Model Rules, and constantly
charting a course accordingly. Each of the three types of service-legal services,
they are not practicing law but are rather practicing tax, ERISA, mergers and acquisition, etc.).
The issue is also reflected in the objection of the AICPA to the MDP Commission's definition
of legal practice, which the AICPA saw as too broad. See Letter from Olivia F. Kirtley, supra
note 10.
251n relation to most of these instances, the courts have made an exception allowing
lawyers to render legal services to third parties while working within organizations controlled
or run by non-lawyers. The MDP Commission appears to have been particularly impressed by
these exceptions. See Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for
Comment, supra note 15, at Part I and Part II item 2.
26An example would be tax services. By being permitted to render tax law advice to a law
firm's clients as a partner in the law firm, an accountant does not functionally add to the firm's
repertoire of services any thing new or incapable of being offered by a lawyer. Lawyers have
shown the capacity to render high quality advice in tax law especially at the high end, where
corporate clients are involved.
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law-related services and non-law-related services-dictates its own peculiar
requirements. Also conceptually, Model 3 need not even involve more than one
lawyer since a single professional in a solo practice can render some other type of
service as an ancillary to the legal services rendered. As such, many ancillary
business firms can exist without the promised ideal of multidisciplinary teams of
professionals working in tandem towards seamless services. Arguably though, the
lawyer could still qualify as a one-stop-shop of seamless legal and non-legal
services, given that the external, ethical safeguards notwithstanding, very little
separation can exist in reality in the mind of such a lawyer between the legal and
ancillary services rendered. He is therefore apt to conceive and treat a client's
problems holistically, bringing all his knowledge of the client's affairs to bear at
once on any client issues whether legal or non-legal. This sort of scenario does not,
however, present the same problem as a scenario involving more than one
professional, since the absence of other professionals means that the opportunity for
impairment of the solo practitioner's legal judgment and independence by his
professional collaborators is absent. This opportunity for impairment of the lawyer's
independent judgment by third party non-lawyer professionals is the crux of the
objections against MDP. Where the opportunity is lacking or largely diminished as
with the solo practitioner in question, most if not all arguments against MDP become
mute, so mute that the situation can hardly be described as one involving MDP. As
importantly, an element of multidisciplinary expertise attends every individual
lawyer's practice to an extent. This is because, besides strictly legal knowledge,
every lawyer is apt to bring his general knowledge of a client's affairs-whatever the
nature or provenance of such knowledge-to bear on any client issue. Indeed,
standard practice in many firms is to encourage lawyers to acquaint themselves with
not just the law but also relevant non-legal information concerning a client or
potential client's business and industry. The belief is that such non-legal knowledge
enhances the quality of legal services offered by the lawyer.
Model 4, the contract model, assumes an independent law firm, which enters into
contracts for several kinds of services with a separate professional services firm.
Given that the firms are required to be independent of themselves, this arrangement
does not by itself make for seamlessness of services, since unrestricted collaboration
is ordinarily impeded by the restrictions necessary to maintain independence.
It is in Model 5, the fully integrated MDP, that we encounter a structure capable
of appropriating the full benefits of one-stop-shopping by facilitating the unimpeded
interaction of multidisciplinary teams of professionals, working in sync to serve
client needs. With no functional separation between them, these professionals are
able to combine and collaborate in ever-evolving teams and styles to serve clients in
whatever way deemed necessary. To accommodate this sort of collaboration
between lawyers and other professionals, far more substantive changes would have
to be made to the current ethical framework for lawyer regulation beyond merely
permitting a sharing of fees under Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules. Among others, Rule
1.6 governing confidentiality would certainly need to be relaxed, and Rule 1.10 for
conflict imputation and Rules 5.1 to 5.3 regarding lawyer supervision of lawyer
subordinates would have to be adjusted to accommodate non-lawyer supervision of
lawyer subordinates. Indeed, a new administrative arrangement for the regulation of
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MDPs may have to be established, even if not direct supervision by courts as initially
suggested by the MDP Commission.27
It should be noted that the MDP Commission's subsequent adjustments to the
models did not ameliorate the tension between the progressively liberal MDP
structures and the exclusive location of the envisaged MDP benefits in Model 5.
Perhaps this tension is not amenable to attenuation. For instance, if we attempt to
adjust Model 2 to accommodate more than legal services, the result will simply be a
merger of Model 2 with Model 5.28 Similar results occur when we attempt
meaningful adjustments to Models 3 and 4. Perhaps in recognition of this, the
Reporter's Notes prepared by the MDP Commission's Reporter Professor Mary Daly
admitted that Models 2 and 4 did not qualify as MDPs under the Commission's
definition of an MDP, namely:
a partnership, professional association corporation or other association or
entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of
its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the
organization itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing
nonlegal, as well as legal, services .... and there is a direct or indirect
sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.29
If so, one wonders why Models 2 and 4 are retained in the mix of possible MDP
structures. In the introductory section of the MDP Hypotheticals, the MDP
Commission had clearly stated that "many different models for the delivery of
multidisciplinary services exist."3 Proffering the five models, it went on to invite the
public and all interested parties to "comment on the following models for the
delivery of such services."'" Discussions have subsequently proceeded, both within
the MDP Commission and elsewhere, prior as well as subsequent to the Reporter's
27See Appendix A, Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
https://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpappendixa.html (last visited Oct. 14, 1999). This
contained, among other proposals, a provision for court certification, inspection and
sanctioning of MDPs controlled by non-lawyers.
28See PostScript to February 2000 Midyear Meeting, supra note 15. In Part I the MDP
Commission contemplated a major modification to Model 2 to "provide for greater flexibility
in the structuring of MDPs and lead to expanded choices for MDP clients." Id. It specifically
contemplated a relaxation of the restriction of Model 2 to one sole purpose-the provision of
legal services, so as to permit it to provide a range of other services. Id. Realizing perhaps
that this would effectively convert Model 2 into Model 5, the MDP Commission sought to
qualify the modification by suggesting a slim fifty-one percent lawyer control of the MDP. Id.
In this way, the whole arrangement became nothing more that a fully integrated MDP under
lawyer control, a sub-specie that the MDP Commission had expressly dealt with in its August
1999 report under the rubric of Model 5. See Appendix A - Possible Amendments to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 27, at proposed Rule 5.8.
29See Appendix C - Reporter's Notes - Center for Professional Responsibility,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdpappendixc.html (last visited Oct. 14, 1999).
30See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 15, at Introduction.
31See id.
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Notes, on the assumption that Models 2 and 3, not just 4 and 5, are alternative
structures for MDP.3
An aspect of the MDP Commission's report that merits attention at this juncture
is the contradiction between Model 5, for which the Commission seemed to have a
preference, and the proposed changes to the legal profession's ethical framework.33
This is particularly important given the divergence between some of the changes
highlighted above as necessary incidents of Model 5, and those highlighted in the
MDP Commission's report. Specifically, while the analysis above assumes a
relaxation of the rules relating to confidentiality, conflict imputation and lawyer
supervision, the Commission's proposed amendments to the Model Rules assume
that these rules can be maintained or strengthened in the context of the MDP.34 In
this wise, it may be said that the MDP Commission, having proposed Model 5, chose
to understate the costs, in terms of the inherent ethical risks implicated by the
envisaged degree of collaboration between lawyers and non-lawyers. In so doing,
the MDP Commission exhibited a certain degree of word fetishism-the belief that
words, once promulgated as law, have an inherent capacity to regulate action without
reference to the specific context and milieu in which action is sought to be regulated.
Repeatedly, the MDP Commission would respond to a specific risk by proposing a
32See PostScript to February 2000 Midyear Meeting, supra note 15; see also Updated
Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments, supra note 15 (discussing
models in Part III).
33See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra
note 12, at Appendix A.
34See Appendix A - Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
supra note 27 (discussing the MDP Commission's proposed amendment to the respective
rules). In relation to confidentiality of client information for instance, the MDP Commission
proposed three new comments to Rule 1.6:
[23] A lawyer in an MDP who provides legal services to the MDP's clients may
encounter confidentiality problems that require special attention. The lawyer should
scrupulously observe the rules of professional conduct relating to the protection of
confidential client information.
[24] A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to the MDP's clients and who
works with, or is assisted by, a nonlawyer in the MDP who is delivering nonlegal
services in connection with the delivery of legal services to a client should make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer behaves in a manner that discharges
the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality. (See Comment, Rule 5.3)
[25] In the context of an MDP, there is a particular concern about the potential loss of
the attorney-client privilege, arising out of the possibility that the MDP's clients might
not be properly informed as to the separate functions performed by the MDP and that
the members of the MDP would not treat legal matters in a fashion appropriate to the
preservation of the privilege. A lawyer in an MDP should take special care to avoid
endangering the privilege by either the lawyer's own conduct or that of the MDP
itself, or its nonlawyer members, and should take such measures as shall be necessary
to prevent disclosure of confidential information to members of the MDP who are not
providing services in connection with the delivery of the legal services to the client.
Id. at Rule 1.6, Comment. Indeed, the MDP Commission's August 1999 recommendation
proceeds on the basic principle that the legal profession can maintain its core values while still
permitting MDP. American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 13.
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rule, with sanctions, aimed at those persons who have incentives to actualize those
risks, without an assessment of the nature of the incentives and the capacity of the
rule to displace the incentives in the context of the MDP.
The MDP Commission's treatment of the relationship between a non-lawyer
superior and a lawyer subordinate is a case in point. Model Rule 5.2(b) absolves a
subordinate lawyer of responsibilities for rule violations if he acts in accordance with
a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional
duty. The MDP Commission's proposed Comment 3 to this rule, however, attempts
to reverse this position when a non-lawyer supervisor is involved. The proposed
comment provides that "[t]he exception contained in paragraph (b) does not apply to
acts of the lawyer in accordance with the instructions of a nonlawyer supervisor. 35
In making this prescription, which seeks to place responsibility for a subordinate's
decisions or actions squarely on such subordinate's shoulders, MDP Commission
was clearly oblivious of the internal dynamics of organizational management,
especially in multidisciplinary professional service firms, and indeed of the
workaday demands of employment in such environment, these dynamics and
demands being aspects of such firm's competitive postures without which their
survival becomes threatened. A subordinate lawyer in a professional service firm,
especially a large, modem firm, is often not in a position to dispute ethical
determinations made by superior non-lawyer partners. First is the fact that given the
typically high associate-partner ratio, contact with partner-level superiors is limited.36
The immediate superior with whom an associate has substantial contact is often a
transmitter of ethical rulings handed down from above, and is in no position to alter
these even if the subordinate lawyer were to bring things to his attention. Second is
the fact that the immediate supervisor would himself often not be a lawyer. A very
well oiled multidisciplinary team does not need any particular type of professional at
its head. The leader could as likely as not be a non-lawyer, or even more likely so in
very large organizations. In that case, the ethical remonstrations of the lawyer
subordinate with his non-lawyer supervisor may often be lost on the latter. Last is
the homogenizing culture of the average multi-service firm, which exerts substantial
pressures towards conformity with group objectives, thus stifling individual
tendencies towards dissent on workaday issues, ethical or otherwise.
.The problem with the MDP Commission, and indeed many other proponents of
the fully integrated MDP, is that it seems incapable of coming to terms with the idea
that a lawyer could work, in the context of such MDPs, in scenarios in which the
composition of the multidisciplinary team is so often in a flux that the lawyer's sense
of himself as a professional distinct from his other colleagues disintegrates, receding
far into the background. The MDP Commission seems to assume, without stating so,
that multidisciplinary teams in the context of an MDP would-whatever else the
scenario-involve distinct groups or departments of lawyers working qua lawyers,
coming together as occasion demands to collaborate with groups of other
professionals in the same MDP, also working in their distinct capacities, and that the
35Appendix A - Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra
note 27.
36The associate-partner ratio in major law firms is in the neighborhood of 2:1, which is
much less than the ratio in large consulting or accounting firms, which can be in the
neighborhood of 15:1.
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assignments would involve major projects, the terms for which would have to be
negotiated jointly by the leaders of the various groups or departments.37 This is a
possibility, but only one in a myriad of possible scenarios under which a lawyer may
find himself in an MDP, many of which scenarios do not afford him the luxury of
constant ruminations on ethical considerations, notwithstanding the accentuated need
for ethical caution in such an environment.
This brings us quite close to a related, also unspoken, assumption of the MDP
Commission: that the lawyer will often have de facto control of his immediate work
environment, even if other professionals have de jure control of the wider MDP firm.
Indeed, to some extent, it is this perhaps subconscious assumption concerning de
facto control that provides a basis for the idea that an MDP lawyer would likely work
in sufficient sequestration from non-lawyers in the MDP to afford him room to
contemplate the ethical demands of his position as an officer of the law. Thus in
comments 5 and 6 to proposed Rule 5.8 on "Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a
Multidisciplinary Practice Firm" the MDP Commission said:
[5] . . . The lawyer should communicate to the client receiving the
nonlegal services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the client
understands the significance of the distinction between nonlegal and legal
services and that their relationship will not be a client-lawyer relationship.
The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for
the provision of, or providing, nonlegal services and preferably should be
in writing.38
[6] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken
reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired
understanding and that the client understands that the MDP is not
rendering legal services in this matter. A sophisticated user of the
services offered by an MDP, such as a publicly held corporation, may
require a lesser explanation than an individual client seeking advice from
a lawyer-accountant or lawyer-social worker. The failure to take
reasonable measures to insure that the client understands the nonlegal
nature of the services constitutes a material misrepresentation of facts in
violation of Rule 7.1.39
In making these comments, the MDP Commission assumes that the lawyer,
whether possessed of dual professional qualifications or not, would always or often
3 7See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra
note 12, at "Control and Authority" sub-headings 1, 3. See also Appendix A - Possible
Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 27.
38The portion of comment [5] preceding the part cited here indicates that the MDP
Commission intended to address MDP lawyers with dual professional qualifications. But this
makes no difference to the analysis here, as every other lawyer in an MDP is susceptible to
such problems when he renders services to a client who may be out to purchase several
services in a composite way, with the lawyer perhaps as the primary contact person for such
composite services.
39Appendix A - Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra
note 27.
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be in a position to address the sort of concerns covered by the comments; more
specifically, that the lawyer would be at the forefront of receiving client instructions
and screening same. As such the lawyer would readily be able to administer the
prescribed cautionary statement to prospective recipients of the MDP's services,
much in the manner of police administering Miranda warnings.
None of these assumptions holds true for the variegated structure and practice of
any sizeable professional service firm. Even in a small-town MDP firm, it will
rarely be functional to limit the client's first contact to the lawyer member, or insist
on the lawyer's participation in the screening of every client before the client's
assignment is accepted by the MDP, at least not without some sort of power
imbalance in the lawyer's favor. Generally, the demands of an integrated practice
would have a lawyer come into contact with a client's assignment at any of several
stages. The lawyer may come in at the initial stage in which case, depending again
on his stature within the firm, he may be able to bring the necessary ethical issues up
and have them addressed. As likely, or even more likely, a lawyer may come into a
client's problem in the middle or towards the end, after the assignment has been
accepted and worked on by another professional with little or no consideration for
the lawyer's position, beyond a knowledge of the lawyer's fee rates which would
have been factored into the client's fee schedule ahead of time, assuming the billing
arrangement demands such up-front specificity. The lawyer may as easily spend two
hours on a client task, as he could several months, depending on the nature of the
assignment, among other factors. The lawyer could easily spend months without
direct contact with clients, his services being used only as input into an array of
consulting and other projects big and small, the complete details of which he may
never fully comprehend. So also could he spend several months working solely on a
single client's assignment.
Indeed, the lawyer could receive supplementary training of such a nature as
would enable him to fill in for other non-lawyer professionals in moments of
shortage for such professionals, or simply enable him to be deployed to sectors of the
MDP's work experiencing an unanticipated upsurge in demand.4" A lawyer could as
easily be rustled up at a moment's notice to join a team several hundred miles away
on an urgent project, as he could have several weeks' advance notice of an
anticipated project. The possibilities are endless, and necessarily so, as a corollary of
the flexibility inherent in the very idea of producing seamless, efficient services. To
40Cf ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 1, 65 (1988). Discussing the reality
of the organization as a multi-professional workplace, Abbott states that in an organization:
[t]he standard interprofessional division of labor is replaced by the intraorganizational
one. More often than not, this locates professionals where they must assume many
extraprofessional tasks and cede many professional ones. To be sure, the
organizational division of labor may be formalized in job descriptions that recognize
professional boundaries, but these have a rather vague relation to reality. In most
professional work settings, actual divisions of labor are established, through
negotiation and custom, that embody situation-specific rules of professional
jurisdiction. . . . They are extremely vulnerable to organizational perturbations.
Professional staff are often replaced by paraprofessional or untrained staff without
corresponding change of function. The division of labor must then be renegotiated,
with the common result that boundaries of actual professional jurisdiction change to
accommodate organizational imperatives.
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insist that the lawyer's services be restricted to major projects, to which he would
likely come at the initial stages when he can better iron out ethical concerns, is to
jeopardize the very essence of the MDP: efficiency resulting from unimpeded inter-
professional collaboration. So also would be an insistence that the lawyer raise
ethical concerns with non-lawyers regarding the myriad workaday assignments or
questions that may come his way. All these are further exacerbated by the
difficulties of arriving at a generally accepted definition of legal practice, a difficulty
of such a nature that questions which may be treated by a lawyer as involving legal
ethics might with some justification be regarded by other professionals as involving
a different body of ethics.4' In this milieu, independent professional judgment and
other ethical considerations easily become contingencies for the lawyer-subordinate,
notwithstanding assurances to the contrary.
Concerning the possibility of having lawyers work largely or only in their own
distinct division or captive law firm, we may pause at this stage to examine a related
paradox. While such separation marginally increases lawyers' capacity for
independence, it also diminishes their long-term potentials for attaining the heights
of the MDP's leadership hierarchy, in the context of the large non-lawyer controlled
MDP. For it shields them from participating in firm-wide initiatives on the same
terms as other professionals. In so doing it not only diminishes the opportunity for
them to acquire a full knowledge of the ways and workings of the firm, but as
importantly, entrenches the impression among other professionals that they are
hybrids that do not fit in squarely within the parameters of the organization. Against
the background of the pervasive need of the modem firm to build a cohesive,
unifying internal culture as a major component of competitive strategy, this situation
is fundamentally disabling and inauspicious for any group of professionals
sequestered into a near-hermetic division within the organization. This possibility is
amply demonstrated by the genesis of the feud between Arthur Andersen and its
41See Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments, supra
note 15. This issue is already foreshadowed by the objection of the AICPA to the MDP
Commission's definition of legal practice:
The AICPA objects to the definition of the practice of law proposed by the
Commission. This definition is a dramatic expansion of the current understanding of
the practice of law, and captures within its ambit services-in particular tax related
services-that historically and properly have been performed by AICPA members and
their firms. Under this new definition, accountants may find themselves suddenly
charged with the unauthorized practice of law in areas of their practice which, under
federal law, they have specifically been given the right to practice. Additionally,
individuals licensed as lawyers, and those who are both lawyers and CPAs, would be
regulated as lawyers even though they do not hold themselves out as lawyers and do
not create any client expectation that an attorney-client relationship is created. We
understand that the Commission based its definition "in great part" on the rule in the
District of Columbia, but we take issue with the Commission's exclusions of the
exceptions and commentary to the D.C. rule which would have ameliorated much of
our concern in this regard.
See Letter from Olivia F. Kirtley, supra note 10. Even though this AICPA Board resolution
speaks in terms of apprehension over the risk of accountants being prosecuted for
unauthorized practice, the Board's objection to the MDP Commission's definition of "the
practice of law" is consistent with the need to maintain flexibility in the resolution of ethical
issues by a non-lawyer superior in the context of an MDP with lawyers. Id.
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consulting arm, Andersen Consulting. In the early period prior to the feud, both
consultants and accountants worked together, with consultants mandated to spend at
least two years working as auditors. In the 1960s, this practice of having newly hired
consultants work as auditors for a minimum of two years was rescinded, creating a
hiatus between the auditors and consultants that would grow into a huge schism as
the years went by. Following the separation of the two functions into different
divisions in 1989, the consultants began to create their own distinct identity and
priorities. Ultimately a situation arose in which partners' votes on leadership
questions were cast along divisional lines. With the accounting partners
outnumbering the consulting partners, the consultants had little hopes of ever
attaining the heights of leadership within the wider firm. This, along with the
question of income distribution, ultimately led to a formal dispute and consequent
arbitration between both sides.42
In summary, not only are the benefits of seamless services possible only in the
context of fully integrated Model 5 MDP, it is also in that context that lawyers as a
group have a meaningful chance of rising to the commanding heights of these
organizations in the long-term. Lawyers' assumption of positions of authority in
such firms should have the salutary effect of raising the profile of ethical concerns,
but it is unlikely to do much to effectively attenuate the problems involved, since
they flow from the very nature of such organizations.
Similar to the MDP Commission's position on non-lawyer supervision of lawyers
within an MDP, is its position on confidentiality of client information and imputation
of conflicts. Its proposals on confidentiality and conflicts display a sanguine belief
that lawyers would have the opportunity to insist within an MDP that due regard be
given to lawyers' ethical concerns.43 However, the same operational realities
discussed above in relation to lawyer supervision by non-lawyers militate against any
such belief. The myriad circumstances in which a lawyer may find himself in an
MDP, sometimes for a few fleeting hours, often under the control of non-lawyer
4 2See ASHISH NANDA & S. LANDRY, FAMILY FEUD (A): ANDERSEN VERSUS ANDERSEN, 1-
12 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Nov. 17, 1999). See generally Andersen's Android Wars, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 2000, at 12 (speaking of a time before the 1989 creation of a distinct
consulting division, when the two practices "were sufficiently similar to share the name
'androids' in honor of their robotic qualities").
43See Appendix A - Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
supra note 27, at Rule 1.10, Comment. Concerning imputation disqualification for conflicts of
interest, the MDP Commission's proposed comment [4] to Model Rule 1.10 is particularly
instructive. The comment is as follows:
[4] With respect to an MDP, imputed disqualification of a lawyer applies if the
conflict in regard to the legal services the lawyer is providing is with any client of the
MDP, not just a client of a legal services division of the MDP or of an individual
lawyer member of the MDP.
Id. The phrase "legal services division" in the above comment indicates clearly the mindset of
the MDP Commission towards the MDP. It is ample evidence that the MDP Commission
conceived of a lawyer in an MDP as inherently operating from a legal division, which though
not a separate firm, would be capable of insulating him and his values, de facto, from the
vagaries of MDP practice. The reality is, however far at variance with this conception, no
such legal division is necessarily guaranteed. Moreover even if it exists, it may be an
administrative center for coordinating lawyers as a group rather than a locus within which
their work as MDP lawyers is focused.
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superiors, some of whom may come from far-flung branches of the MDP firm,
indicate that detailed attention to these kinds of ethical concerns is not feasible if
seamless services are envisaged. Regarding MDP-wide imputation of conflicts in
particular, the MDP Commission did not rigorously articulate a basis for going
against not just the jurisprudence of several courts, but also the factual findings
implicit in such jurisprudence, both of which at best indicate a case by case
assessment of ethical screens or Chinese walls as a cure for conflicts, and at worse
discountenance their efficacy.' Chinese walls or ethical screens are clearly not a
sure-fire cure for imputed conflicts. The decision of the British House of Lords in
Bolkiah v. KPMG 5 is particularly instructive in this regard, in the context of the
intertwined practices of a multi-national professionals services firm. Recognizing
the perpetual ebb and flow of personnel in a large MDP firm, with employees
constantly combining and recombining in an endless possibility of arrangements as
well as the incentives and forces at play in an MDP, the court denounced ad hoe
Chinese walls, as distinguished from those established as part of the organizational
structure of the firm. Field experience shows however that whatever the nature of
the Chinese wall-whether ad hoc or standing-in a multi-service professional
service firm, it can be penetrated with ease once there is an incentive, particularly on
the part of any management-cadre personnel, to do so.46 Truly, "there is no Chinese
wall over which a grapevine cannot grow"'47 and "those who live in that real world
know the inevitability of Chinese walls being breached, as long as human beings
continue to talk and socialize with each other and their employees continue to chase
the last buck." 8
44See ABA Comm'n on Multi-disciplinary Practice, Testimony of Sydney M. Cone, III, at
Part c (Mar. 12, 1999), http://abanet.org/cpr/mdp/conel.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
41[1999] 2 A.C. 222, 239 (Eng.). The court's deprecation of ad hoc Chinese walls is
particularly significant, for these are the sort of firewalls implicated in the range of services
likely on offer at the average MDP and the ever-evolving teams necessary for efficient
rendition of these services seamlessly. See also ASHISH NANDA, COMPETITION BETWEEN THE
PROFESSIONS: LAW FIRMS vs. ACCOUNTING FIRMS 1, 7 (Harv. Bus. Sch. June 20, 1999)
(quoting the deprecating remarks of Justice Ipp of the Western Australian Supreme Court in
connection with the use of Chinese walls, even by sedate law firms: "The derivation of the
nomenclature is obscure. It appears to me to be an attempt to clad with respectable antiquity
and impenetrability something that is relatively novel and potentially porous.").
46An informal survey conducted on Feb. 17, 2000, in the course of the professional
services course at Harvard Business School, involving about fifty graduate business students
with varied experience as employees and managers in professional service firms, especially
consulting, investment banking and auditing, indicated about seventy percent acquiescence in
the proposition that Chinese walls are liable to be easily breached. Instances of partners
specifically asking lower-level cadre to traverse the boundaries of such Chinese walls were
recounted.
47Robert Kingston, Law: Invasion of the Bean-Counters; Are the Ethics of Accountancy
and Law Too at Odds for a Shared Practice?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 11, 1999, at
12, cited in ASHISH NANDA, THE SAGA OF PRINCE JEFRI AND KPMG (D): WHEN ARE CHINESE
WALLS ENOUGH? 1, 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch. May. 7, 1999).
48Lords Storm Chinese Walls, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 19, 1998, cited in ASHISH
NANDA, THE SAGA OF PRINCE JEFRI AND KPMG (D): WHEN ARE CHINESE WALLS ENOUGH? 2
(Harv. Bus. Sch. May. 7, 1999).
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To further explore the overarching sanguineness of the MDP Commission's
hopes regarding ethical integrity in the context of the fully integrated MDP, we need
to look at the reaction to its proposals by another key player in the MDP debate, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The AICPA Board of
Directors reacted to the MDP Commission's report with the following resolutions:
RESOLVED that the AICPA applauds and supports the vision of the
American Bar Association's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practices
(the "Commission") in recognizing the need to broaden the choices clients
have in choosing their professionals and to make available to clients fully
integrated multidisciplinary solutions to their problems; and be it
FURTHER RESOLVED that the AICPA Board of Directors supports
amendment of the ABA Model Rules to allow lawyers and non-lawyers to
form partnerships and share fees with one another; and be it
FURTHER RESOLVED that the AICPA Board of Directors objects to
and opposes the regulatory approach to multidisciplinary practices
recommended by the Commission. We believe the Commission's
approach will have the exact opposite of its desired effect by significantly
restricting client choice and impairing the formation of multidisciplinary
practices. Specifically:...
The AICPA further objects, as clearly inappropriate and overreaching, to
the Commission's proposal to unilaterally impose the legal rules of
conduct on accounting firms that include lawyers. This in turn has the
potential to subject any accounting firm that employs an individual
licensed as a lawyer to the rules of the legal profession, including the legal
profession's rules concerning conflicts of interest and solicitation of
clients, for all firm engagements. This would create conflict situations in
the same circumstances where none existed before.
The AICPA further objects to the Commission's disregard of the
extensive ethical codes applicable to other professionals, including CPAs
and to its unilateral imposition of the legal rules of conduct on firms
governed by such other ethical codes....
FURTHER RESOLVED that the AICPA strongly believes that the
Commission's proposal creates significant barriers to the development
and operation of multidisciplinary practices and unnecessarily limits
consumer choice in the purchase of professional services.49
The AICPA thus leaves no one in doubt that while it is amenable and indeed
desires the liberalization of the legal profession's restrictions on MDP, it has no
inclination towards accepting the restrictions implicated by the core ethical values
regarding conflicts of interest, among others, which the MDP Commission believes
are capable of maintenance within an MDP. The AICPA position is very significant
49See Letter from Olivia F. Kirtley, supra note 10.
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and revealing, not just because accountants are the chief protagonists of the demand
for MDP, but more importantly, because it represents the opinion of a group with
perhaps the most extensive experience within the United States and globally on the
operation of MDPs. It represents the opinion of those who will shape the contours of
the modem MDP, not just through their own internal practices but-perhaps more
importantly-through ideas transmitted to other entities in the course of
disseminating management education as aspects of their general practice. What this
opinion reveals is the minimum operational freedom necessary to sustain a one-stop-
shop offering seamless services. In insisting on the inapplicability of the legal
profession's ethical rules and in highlighting the significant barriers to the operation
of MDPs which these rules implicate, the AICPA underscores the contradictions
inherent in the MDP Commission's position, thereby setting the stage for a realistic
confrontation of the difficult choice that must be made between the maintenance of
these ethical rules and the operation of the fully integrated MDP.
In effect, the seamless services envisaged as a result of one-stop-shopping are
feasible in the context of Model 5. But its corollary is a relaxation, beyond fee
sharing, of key aspects of the ethical restraints that constitute the substratum of the
legal profession and its mission. Like the two sides of a coin, Model 5 and the
related ethical relaxation cannot be separated. The challenge is to determine which
of two possibilities-Model 5 seamless services with relaxed ethics on the one hand,
or undiluted ethics without seamless services on the other hand-would prevail. The
MDP Commission's efforts to show that Model 5 can be had without the implicated
ethical dilution go to no avail.
B. The Source of Competitive Edge in the True MDP and the Question of Lawyer
Control
Having isolated Model 5 as the true MDP, capable of providing the seamless
services of a one-stop-shop, we may well pause to ask what the true source of this
capability is. In essence, how and why is it able to produce seamless services to the
exclusion of other structures? In this wise, we undertake an inquiry similar to that
undertaken by Hammel and Prahalad in their seminal work, The Core Competence of
the Corporation.50 This question is important because, if we are able to isolate the
50See generally C. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation,
HARV. Bus. REv. 79 (May-June 1990). Tracking the performance of several corporations over
the years, the authors posit that the true source of competitive and strategic advantage no
longer lie in the competitive quality or price of discrete products. Id. at 81. Rather, it lies in
the capacity to identify competencies that lie across the several units of a corporation and
blend these into a distinct, inimitable source of products uniquely dependent on such
competencies. Id. at 82. A truly competitive modem corporation would be a portfolio of such
competencies rather than a portfolio of businesses. Id. Protecting these competencies and
leveraging on them, such corporations will be able to continuously evolve in line with the
demands of the market. Id. Thus Honda, by focusing not on cars or motorcycles, but rather
on the capacity to design engines and power trains using resources from across various of its
divisions, is able to maintain a leadership in the fast changing world of cars, lawn mowers,
generators, etc. Similarly, Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging and microprocessor
controls have been the source of its dominance in seemingly diverse markets: photocopiers,
laser printers, cameras and image scanners, even when its research and development budget
was a fraction of Xerox's. Core competencies are therefore:
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essence of Model 5-its core competence so to say-we will be able to appreciate its
real strengths and limitations and the imperatives that attend it as a structure for the
delivery of legal services. This question is also important because if we are able to
isolate the essence of Model 5, we may well be able to modify other structures in
such a way as to make them approximate, if not attain, the capabilities of Model 5,
while repudiating its major costs or risks.
When we come to contemplate the true source of value and competitive
advantage for the fully integrated MDP, we are drawn inevitably to concentrate on
the point where its operational details diverge from those of other structures such as
the regular single-disciplinary firm. In this wise we note that an MDP could to a
large extent be viewed as the result of the merger of two or more firms, each
representing a different profession, much as the various departments of a corporation
can be viewed as distinct entities combined through a merger. This view of a
corporation's departments comes into greater relief when we picture the relationship
inter se among various departments in a large corporation. Such departments usually
synchronize their activities. However, they also compete among themselves
discreetly for leverage within the organization, and are often sufficiently independent
to permit their being spun off and sold to another entity. As with corporations, so
with professional service firms, especially Model 5 type MDPs. One of the Big 5,
Ernst & Young, has for instance had to spin off and sell the consulting arm of its
business to Cap Gemini of France. Similarly, KPMG sold a significant portion of its
consulting branch to Cisco Systems amidst talk of further divestment. These
developments mirror Arthur Andersen's forced spin-off of its consulting arm,
following an arbitration award delivered on July 28, 2000.1 Excluding other
common factors, such as technology and quality of management, how do these
divisions, which are so easily independent and separable, achieve coordinated
service, especially with regard to a specific assignment? What is the means by which
firms achieve synergy across these divisions, many of which could in other
circumstances simply equate to distinct firms? The answer lies in their use of similar
or unified methodologies in cardinal areas of client service, especially personnel
training and product presentation. Firms, including MDPs, achieve synergy across
boundaries through a honed harmonization of their Work approach. Of course, such
harmonization is facilitated by being under a unified ownership and chain of
the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse
production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies .... It is also about
the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is
miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that
technologists, engineers and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs
and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in
services as in manufacturing .... Core competence is communication, involvement,
and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves
many levels of people and all functions.
Id.
51See The Ties that Bind Auditors, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 2000, at 71, chronicling
these developments. A discussion of the circumstances leading up to this spate of divestments
is also given in Elizabeth MacDonald & David Woodruff, Ernst & Young May Sell Unit to
Cap Gemini, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A3. See also the final award in: Andersen
Consulting Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms, Case No.
9797/CK/AER/ACS (Int'l Ct. Arb. July 28, 2000).
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command, but such ownership and command are not a sine qua non for the desired
degree of harmonization. Two distinct entities harmonizing their procedure for an
assignment or series of assignments can achieve synergy of a sort that may elude the
distinct departments of a single entity in similar situations. This does not necessarily
have anything to do with ownership structures. 2
The foregoing analysis holds significance for the argument in favor of MDPs,
and the concomitant relaxation of ownership restrictions in Model Rule 5.4 as a
necessary aspect of the production of seamless services. For, what it suggests is that
such a relaxation is unnecessary, if seamless service is all that is promised thereby.
Such seamless services can be achieved by discrete groups of professionals each in a
separate firm, governed by its own management and specific ethical rules, if any,
working across firm boundaries using a harmonized methodology. Such a
methodology would, in particular, lay emphasis on joint training programs aimed at
getting the members of the different firms to internalize a single approach-in terms
of the logistics of shared assignments, task distribution, information sharing,
command structure on assignments and the style of packaging and presentation of
results or work products to client. The aim of such a program would be to get the -
members of the various firms to hit the ground running on given assignments, much
in the manner of team members from different parts of a far-flung Model 5 MDP.
It may be argued that the absence of formal control between two different firms
of lawyers and non-lawyers intent on offering seamless services through a
coordinated approach would ultimately bring the arrangement under strain, rendering
them inefficient. The response to this argument would be that this is precisely the
point at which the invisible hand of the market should intervene to prune away the
parties to such arrangements, by making them unable to compete in a market
populated by other groups having a similar design and strategy. A more potent
criticism of the program would be that it contemplates only the deployment of
professionals on major assignments that are in the nature of projects, but not the use
of a professional, say a lawyer, in meeting the myriad workaday requests of clients
which can be readily fulfilled in a Model 5 MDP by immediately pressing the
professional into service on short notice for a few hours. Such short-term service can
add immense value either by itself or by contributing to a broader assignment
regarding which its necessity was previously unanticipated. A response to this
argument would be to admit that some of the most routine and menial instances of
professional deployment possible in a fully integrated MDP may not be possible
under the proposed program of harmonized methodology among free standing firms.
52See Bente R. Lowendahl, Co-Operative Strategies for Professional Service Finns:
Unique Opportunities and Challenge, in COALITIONS AND COMPETITION: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS SERVICES 160, at 164-67 (Yair Aharoni ed., 1993). The author
gives the example of a twelve-firm engineering consulting consortium working together under
a cooperative venture. Though involving only a single group of professionals and engineers,
the consortium in this study evinces the degree of coordination that can be achieved by
different service firms across formal ownership boundaries in pursuit of a discrete purpose.
Though the arrangement ultimately became strained, it is significant to note that this strain
was a result of the tension between the need to maintain a focus on the original purpose for
which the arrangement was designed (i.e. the pursuit of joint engineering projects by free
standing firms offering seamless services across engineering lines) and the new desire of some
members to formalize and expand the structure.
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However, this is not the same as saying that the program is limited to major
assignments of the project kind, as it can be adapted to use in many situations
approximating the routine capabilities of a fully integrated MDP. This could be, for
instance, through the designation of a few lawyers within the law firm to handle such
routine inquiries and needs as may be referred to them by members of other
professional firms participating in the program.
It should by now be clear that the proposed structure of harmonized methodology
among free standing firms from different professions is a version of the MDP
Commission's Model 4, the contract model. What distinguishes it from the
Commission's prescription, however, is the fact that only one type of contractual
arrangement is permitted, namely an arrangement for the use of same methodology.
No arrangement for the sharing of fees for instance is implicated or necessary. Nor
would it be necessary to relax the rules of disqualification for conflict, each firm
being responsible for the implications of its past activities in the context of the usual
requirements of disqualification. Each firm makes a quote for its own services,
which quote goes into a package that ultimately constitutes the cost of the service to
the client. Upon payment by the client, each firm appropriates its own portion of the
fees. The detailed logistics of the arrangement can be worked out, but it would most
likely involve the use of a joint agent of the different firms whose main task would
be a coordination of certain routine administrative aspects of an assignment that
would ordinary not merit the attention of the different firms' partner-level or lower-
level employees.
An alternative to the structure suggested in the foregoing analysis is the lawyer-
controlled MDP. Without being conceptually related to the idea of synergy across
boundaries, it also provides an opportunity to attenuate the ethical concerns raised
within the broad MDP debate. It merits attention at this stage as a corollary of the
conclusion above that Models 2 to 4, simpliciter, do not fulfill the promised ideal of
seamless service in a one-stop-shop, and that Model 5, which does so, would be
pyrrhic in ethical terms. Others have put it forward as a middle course towards
satisfying the demands for MDP while maintaining the ethical fabrics of the legal
profession.53 Like the program of harmonized methodology the lawyer-controlled
MDP entails some loss of efficiency, but such loss is largely contingent, not intrinsic,
with the possible exception of limitations on its potential size, which limitation flows
from the wide conflict imputation rules of lawyer ethics. 54 There could for instance
53See New York County Lawyer's Association Special Commission on MDP, Resolution
Regarding Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 18. See also Bernard Wolfman, Comment
on Report and Recommendations of MDP Commission (July 21, 1999),
http://www.abanet.org/r/wolfman3.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008); Bernard Wolfman
Comments to the MDP Commission (Feb. 12, 2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
wolfman4.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
54A possible approach to getting around this could be to examine the international reach of
lawyer imputation rules. If it is accepted that U.S. legislation have no extra territorial reach,
even for international branches of U.S. firms with no U.S. licensed lawyer member (a
currently contentious point), then lawyer-controlled MDPs could transcend the limitations
imposed on them by conflict rules applicable within the United States and grow horizontally in
size on the international plane. Such expansion will be particularly helpful to lawyer-
controlled MDPs to meet the competitive challenges of other professional service firms whose
strength derives in large part from their international ubiquity.
[Vol. 56:533
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  560 2008
29
Nnona: Towards a Reformed Conception of Multidisciplinary Practice
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
TOWARDS A REFORMED CONCEPTION
be an initial incapacity to offer certain mixes of services potentially available at
MDPs involving larger professional service firms. But this would not be intrinsic, as
the lawyer-controlled MDP can grow to fill up the niches, in response to market
demand. Already, a few law firms adopting ancillary-business-type models have
developed novel approaches to meeting client demands in new niches."
A more fundamental problem could be the fee structure of the market for legal
services vis-A-vis other services that would constitute the mix in an MDP's
composite of seamless services. If, as is generally believed, legal services command
higher fees on average than some other services notably auditing services, the
incentives for a lawyer-controlled MDP firm to add such other services to its mix of
services may not ordinarily be there, unless partner and employee stratification of
some sort is effected within the firm to ensure that lawyers offering higher-margin
legal services are remunerated pari passu with this margin.56 This could of course
cause tension within the firm, given that the structural difference in earnings would
be along professional lines. The converse could also be the case, if there is an
attempt to maintain an even level of earnings across the board for all disciplines.
This was indeed a major factor precipitating the dispute between Andersen
Consulting and Arthur Andersen, the business consulting and general professional
services arms respectively of Andersen Worldwide Organization, leading ultimately
to a split between both arms " with Andersen Consulting becoming a new firm,
Accenture. This sort of problem may however not be a major concern for small
town MDPs involving a few professionals, where all the parties involved are more
likely to have a closer affinity to their joint clientele and an inter-personal
relationship transcending market-place considerations of profit.
As significantly, the difference in fee margins between law and other professions
is likely to be attenuated in the context of a small town practice, as distinct from big
city or international commercial practice. In essence, the lawyer-controlled MDP
seems, in this respect, well-adapted to the needs of the small town practice where the
bulk of America's personal legal services needs are still met. The position of small
town MDPs is particularly important because the most evocative and insistent calls
55See generally THOMAS DELONG & ASHISH NANDA, VENTURE LAW GROUP (A) I (Harv.
Bus. Sch. Feb. 24, 2000). An example is Venture Law Group, a Silicon Valley law firm that,
in the words of Craig Johnson, its founder and former law partner at Wilson Sonsini, is "part
investment bank, law firm, [venture capital] fund and consultant." Id. at 4. It offers both legal,
business and strategic advice to start-up technology companies. Id. at 14. Its many clients
include Yahoo, eToys, Netcentives and Chemdex. Id. at 15.
56On the low growth rate of audit and traditional accounting services vis-A-vis the other
disciplines into which accounting firms have recently begun to penetrate, see NANDA, supra
note 45, at 2 (citing Accountants and Lawyers: Disciplinary Measures, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
6, 1999). It indicates that, by 1998, income from traditional accounting services had shrunk to
two-fifths or less of revenue for the Big 5. Id. On the question of low margins and growth in
audit and traditional accounting services further, see Background Paper on Multidisciplinary
Practices: Issues and Developments, supra note 15; Colin Boyd, The Transformation of the
Accounting Profession: The History Behind the Big 5 Accounting Firms Diversifying into
Law, Can. Bar Ass'n, May 1999, at 8-17 (report prepared for the Special Committee of the
International Practice of Law); Fox, supra note 24, at 1098. See generally Michael Chambers,
American Lawyers Say No, 4 COMMERCIAL LAWYER 40 (1999).
57See NANDA & LANDRY, supra note 42, at 1-4.
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for MDP has come from solo practitioners and consumer groups most likely to
patronize their services.58 Such solo practitioners are most likely to be the ones
combining with other professionals in small town practices to form MDPs, and their
position is evocative not necessarily because of its overpowering logic, but rather
because a necessary test-indeed an index of legitimacy-for modem regulatory
schemes is the extent to which it considers and provides for less well-placed
members of the community, who without such consideration, may end up bearing the
brunt of a scheme. This indeed implicates the problem of externalities that has
dogged law and economics scholarship for long.59
We may well pause to ask why lawyer control attenuates the risk of ethical
dilution inherent in the Model 5 MDP. In essence, why is it that the minority non-
lawyer members in an MDP are likely incapable of diluting the ethical focus of such
a firm, especially since even with minority shareholding and vote, they can still
wield de facto control through several other means. Several responses are possible
here including the fact that the de jure illegitimacy of such de facto control would
exert considerable psychological counter-pressure on those intent on wielding it.
More importantly, in the absence of passive investment in such firms, 60 the majority
lawyer ownership, especially if they constitute a super majority, is likely to correlate
with a majority lawyer population in the firm. Such a majority ensures the
entrenchment of lawyers' culture, of which the formal ethics is but a subset. Thus
the ethics become internalized and pervasive in the firm, eliminating the possibility
of their being readily jettisoned in the heat of workaday pursuit of lucrative briefs.
Even without such a majority lawyer population, lawyer control in terms of majority
ownership by itself is likely to present a long-term bulwark against such corrosion of
lawyer ethics, given the ever-present possibility of legal challenge to such de facto
control as may be wielded by non-lawyers. The problem of ethical corrosion in a
non-lawyer controlled MDP is exacerbated by its capacity to become entrenched and
systemic given the location of de jure control in persons who do not by training and
association place an intrinsic premium on lawyers' ethics. As such, ethical
refurbishment of the enterprise is likely to come only from outside, say the
regulatory agencies, rather than being internally generated. Lawyer control, even in
the absence of a majority lawyer population is more apt to generate ethical
refurbishment from within, but the protection afforded would be of a weaker sort
absent reinforcement from the social impact within the firm of a majority lawyer
population.
Part of the coordinated methodology that lawyers bring to their work comes from
the culture inculcated through a uniform training scheme and indoctrination at law
school. This shared culture enables lawyers for instance to work seamlessly across
58See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra
note 12, at nn.8-17. See also Appendix A, Possible Amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, supra note 27.
59Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in
2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (P. Newman ed., 1998).
6°The MDP Commission in its various recommendations expressly rejected passive
investments in MDPs. Not even the AICPA in its resolutions opposing major aspects of the
MDP Commission's recommendations contested this rejection. Updated Background and
Informational Report and Request for Comments, supra note 15.
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jurisdictions and even across geographically separated departments in large law
firms. Both on account of its methodological significance as well as its intrinsic
aesthetic merit in an increasingly materialistic society,61 it is surprising that there has
been no focus on the cardinal place of lawyers' professional culture as a factor
which, beyond the formal ethical rules themselves, including the disparate common
law rules on lawyer regulation, shape the incentives that lawyers have to obey those
ethical rules and work in other ways towards the dictates of a shared ethos. The
absence of this culture in an MDP controlled by non-lawyers will mean the absence
of an essential control that mediates between the lawyer's other competing incentives
and the necessity to uphold the ethical values of the profession, shielding the latter
from the full glare of the former. When mergers of distinct corporations or firms are
contemplated, the cultures of the different entities are a major focus ex ante, given
that a clash between these can spell doom for the merger. It is curious that such
cultural compatibility has been downplayed or overlooked by the MDP Commission
and various commentators on the question of MDP which, in a sense, is a broad-
based merger of professions.
Chinese walls and related arrangements, such as the MDP Commission's
insistence that senior lawyers in MDPs retain exclusive supervisory oversight of
junior lawyer associates, ostensibly constitute alternatives to the lawyer-controlled
MDP. This is because they essentially try to carve out zones of autonomy or pockets
of control for lawyers in an MDP, in order to obviate the need for lawyers to control
the whole organization as an antidote to the erosion of lawyer autonomy. The futility
of such arrangements bear exploration at this juncture.
C. The Futility of Attempts at Attenuating Loss of Lawyer Autonomy in an MDP
The attempt to anticipate and ameliorate the effect of removing workplace
control from lawyers, has taken the form of suggestions for the creation of pockets of
control for lawyers in MDPs, as evinced in the pervasive insistence on some form of
ad hoc separation of lawyers from other professionals in the MDP. Whether such
separation takes the form of permanent, as distinct from ad hoc, Chinese walls or
otherwise, it is attended by inescapable tensions. This is quite apart from such
suggestions denoting the MDP proponents' misgivings about the resultant power
structure of an MDP. The tensions flow particularly from two points: (1) the nature
of the professional service firm and its organization, and (2) the character of a
profession's relationship with capital and the forces of the market.
1. The Nature of the Professional Service Firm and Its Organization
Regarding the first point, the modern professional service firm has peculiar
features that dictate its character as an organization. Chief of these is the nature of
61This dove-tails into Emile Durkheim's now overwhelmed conceptualization of the
professions as a hedge against the anomie of modem society, a benefit that results from the
creation of communities of people out of the occupations and professions. See RICHARD ABLE,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 4-7 (1988). See also EMILE DURKHEIM,
ANOMIE AND MODERN DivisioN OF LABOR reprinted in SOCIAL THEORY, THE MULTICULTURAL
AND CLASSIC READINGS 77 (Charles Lemert ed., 1993). Durkheim's may seem an overly
optimistic expectation from the professions but anyone with experience of small town practice
knows that it is not a completely misplaced expectation. But it is almost completely negated
in the context of the mega-million-bucks practices of the modem cosmopolis.
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the major input, professional expertise embodied and entrenched in experts from
whom they cannot be divested. These highly trained experts, especially the most
creative of them, tend to think independently, with a high measure of originality,
showing individual initiative in their activities. This scenario challenges the
managers of professional service firms, for while such originality and initiative are
conducive to individual productivity, they indicate an overarching attitude of
independence and may thus impede overall efficiency by inducing dissonance in
situations that demand joint action. Thus managing professionals has sometimes
been aptly described as akin to herding cats. The response to the challenges posed
by the professional's disposition towards independence has been not to dictate to
professionals at the individual level, but rather to seek to achieve some form of broad
cultural homogeneity within the firm, as a means of attaining the desired degree of
personnel alignment with the firm's objectives. This approach can in some cases
bother on intense indoctrination. Generally, its effect is to refocus the individual
professional on the firm as the major source of professional obligation.
Andrew Abbott captures this feature in another context, in relation to consultants,
when he writes that,
by hiring at the [Bachelor of Arts] level, these firms reserve the recruit's
loyalty to the firm rather than allowing it to an occupation. Training,
usually internally provided, may be exactly equivalent to some
profession's training-in computer work, accounting, information or data
processing. But the association of work with profession is broken, and
with it much of the professional association's power. In such settings,
jurisdiction must be contested within a supposedly single-function firm by
individuals whose attachment to the profession claiming their expertise
has been already broken at the very outset." He notes a similar approach
for accounting firms.62 Abbott's comments are made as proof of the loss
of associational power by the professions. His statement does not address
the primary managerial objective behind such hiring, since such a focus
was unnecessary for the point he was trying to establish. However the
primary objective is to achieve harmonization and efficiency within the
firm through intellectual and ideological realignment of the professional.
That other professions are gored in the process is a secondary, even if
necessary, consequence.
The implication of the foregoing for lawyers in an MDP is not far-fetched. It
indicates that the capacity of MDPs to uphold the fundamental principles and ethics
that guide the legal profession in its work will be seriously circumscribed, not
necessarily by the willful desire of other groups in the MDP to violate the rules, but
necessarily by the otherwise inevitable demands of MDP itself-the requirements of
the modem firm. Just as many firms have been compelled by forces largely beyond
their control to grow or risk atrophy, so also are they compelled by the very demands
of the MDP as a union of disparate professions to subvert the rules of these various
professions, including law, in order to achieve employee realignment and overall
cultural synthesis. The pockets of control-both ad hoc and otherwise--created for
62See Andrew Abbott, An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor, in THE SYSTEM OF
PROFESSIONS 154, 359 n.27 (1988).
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lawyers within such MDPs would be to no avail, ending up as hollow mementos of
the gallant effort to preserve a modicum of workplace control for them in the face of
overriding business realities. In the final analysis, no firm can in the long-run persist
with professionals who constantly throw the books at the firm and its set objectives,
especially if the books are the codes of one profession amongst a motley group of
several. It is significant that Andrew Abbott writes in the context of consulting and
accounting firms populated by professionals who by their college-level training can
be said to be really from different professions or occupations-essentially firms that
are multidisciplinary in the broadest sense of the term.
This point is significant because the need to indoctrinate and realign the new
recruit is heightened in such firms, as a basic requirement of constructing a common
culture. As significantly, indoctrination towards a homogenized allegiance to the
firm is further informed by the need to reduce the use of the professional workplace
by the disparate professions as a locus of inter-professional competition. In a firm
made up of professionals with same educational and professional background, who
perform broadly identical types of work, the need for such an approach is highly
attenuated if not eliminated, for the general ideology of the profession provides a
framework for interaction between the professionals inter se, and between them and
the firm. Such ideology consists of both the broad culture of the profession and the
specific ethical rules prescribed by its regulatory authorities, these having been
designed bearing in mind the peculiar needs of these professionals and their work
vis-A-vis the general public. Indeed, the relationship between the Big 5 professional
service firms-erstwhile accounting firms-and the professional regulatory body for
accountants is instructive in this regard, accounting being hitherto the primary
regulated profession within these professional service firms.
Colin Boyd suggests that the Big 5 have come to dominate the professional
regulators for accounting, the accounting institutes, via three avenues. The first is
through diversification into other services thereby inherently weakening the control
of the accounting institutes over the Big 5, since accounting contributes an
increasingly smaller percentage of their revenues. The second is the further loss of
control over that part of the Big 5's functions that involve accounting properly so
called, resulting from the requirements of due process and litigation, especially in the
context of a global business.63 The third is through the Big 5's dominant influence
within those institutes themselves, resulting from the sheer number of their
employees who are members of the institutes.' The first and third are particularly
63Accounting institutes are, in serious cases of misconduct involving the Big 5, effectively
unable to conduct disciplinary inquiry into the affair while litigation against a member of the
the Big 5 is pending in court. This is because the institutes would not be able to make their
own findings and discipline the firm before the conclusion of the lawsuits so as not to
prejudice, through such findings, the resolution of the legal case against the firm. Given the
long period between the commencement of such cases and their conclusion, the tempo for
disciplinary action by an accounting institute is often lost by the time the case against the
erring firm is concluded. Also, the spread of the Big 5 to several jurisdictions around the
world similarly constrains the capacity of individual institutes to reach them effectively. See
Boyd, supra note 56, at 28-29. It is instructive that following the Enron accounting scandals,
it took a federal indictment to bring Arthur Andersen to book, rather than action by state
accounting regulators who clearly lacked the reach to regulate a behemoth like Arthur
Andersen.
64Boyd, supra note 56, at 24-33.
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noteworthy, for unlike the second, they are necessary corollaries of the MDP
structure. In essence they would be replicated in any MDP setting involving the Big
5 and members of the legal profession. The regulatory authorities of the profession
would necessarily have a diminished jurisdiction over them, given that such of their
services as they admit to constitute legal services (as distinct from business
consulting)65 would form just a proportion of the overall activities of the MDP, while
their employees progressively constitute a growing number of legal professionals
and by virtue of this a significant block within the profession. The New York State
Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practice and The Legal Profession made a
pertinent point in this wise in its January 8, 1999 report. It declared thus:
The power of the Big Five to convince Congress to allow at least some
penetration has recently been demonstrated in the recent IRS reform act.
Whether they will be able to convince the state bar authorities to relax
existing ethical constraints is less obvious, since those authorities, be they
judges or state bar ethics committees, are lawyers themselves. Still, by
hiring ever more lawyers, the Big Five put themselves in a position to
claim with ever greater force that they represent the interests of a
substantial portion of the bar. This phenomenon was demonstrated in the
evident angst of the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, in
which lawyer-employees of accounting firms are heavily represented, in
deciding on its position on the IRS reform act.66
A similar scenario has been noted in relation to a portion of the French Bar, the
Bar of Nanterre (Hauts-de-Seine) where lawyers employed by the Big 5 represent
almost seventy percent of the individual membership, such that the legal practices of
the Big 5 are on the Bar's governing body Conseil de l'Ordre. Using their power,
the Big 5 have acquired the capacity "to dominate the Bar of Nanterre and to
influence the professional body in charge of monitoring them."67
From a sociological point of view, Keith Macdonald locates this tendency of the
Big 5 within the paradigm of the professional project. In this regard, he posits that
[i]t is the pursuit of the professional project . ..that has led to the
emergence of the big huge accountancy firms, who in turn have
disproportionately great interest in the direction that the professional
65Typically, accounting firms engaged in MDP claim that the services rendered to clients
by the lawyers in their ranks are consulting or similar services, not legal services. They have
thus been able to engage de facto in MDP, even in places like the United States where MDP is
prohibited. In this way, see Munneke, supra note 5, at 76 (emphasizing the difficulty of
defining legal services and the leeway it gives accountants to offer arguably legal services by
characterizing them as consulting or planning service). See also Fox, supra note 24, at 1097
(similarly noting the claim by lawyers practicing within the Big 5 accounting firms that their
activities do not amount to legal practice but rather the practice of tax, ERISA, mergers and
acquisition and the like).
66See New York Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary
Practice and the Legal Profession, Section XV Part D, (Jan. 1999), http://web.archive.org/
web/2000082315082 1/http://www.nysba.org (last visited July 26, 2000) (emphasis added).
67See Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession (Apr. 2000),
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/mdp.htm (last visited May 3, 2000).
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project takes. At the other end of the scale, solo practitioners in
accountancy are content if their professional body maintains the status
quo, provides them with the services they need and does not ask for too
large a subscription. The big firms by contrast are keen to see a pro-active
professional association, one that is sufficiently ahead of the game to
forestall any increase in state involvement in setting the accountancy
agenda, and to ensure that accountancy improves its position in the
competition for "jurisdiction[."] This leads to the interest that the large
firms show in having their partners actively involved in their professional
association: in consequence, the big firms have a disproportionate say in
its affairs, although this is partly due to their much greater ability to spare
the personnel to perform these duties. It is not much of an exaggeration to
say that in Britain the big firms-the worldwide finns--are the Institute,
both Scottish and English, and the same is true of other Western industrial
societies.68
Thus the expected efficiencies of the MDP, especially in the context of the Big 5
with their peculiar history and circumstances, demand such a control of the
workplace as is incapable of accommodating competing demands from professional
regulatory bodies. The structure, incentives and needs of such MDPs impel them
inexorably towards circumvention, if not elimination of such rules, which objectives
are achieved using mutually reinforcing tactics. For these firms, the alternative to
such an approach is painful atrophy.
2. The Character of a Profession's Relationship with Capital and the Forces of the
Market
The second source of tension circumscribing the attempt to ameliorate the legal
profession's loss of workplace control in the MDP through the creation of pockets of
control for MDP lawyers is the character of a profession's relationship with capital
and the forces of the market. Eliot Krause provides an apposite starting point with a
schematic:
Visualize a triangle, with the state, capitalism, and the professions at the
corners. The state influences and shapes capitalism and professions,
capitalism influences and shapes both the state and professions, and the
professions act to influence and confront the power of both capitalism and
the state. Who eventually gains or loses power in these relations will
eventually depend upon the particular profession and state studied, and
upon what the relevant sectors of capitalism are doing, directly or
indirectly through the state, to influence the power of each profession. 9
So, the professions as a group, and not just the legal profession as emphasized by
de Tocqueville, interpose themselves between the forces of capital and government
on the one hand, and the people on the other. In relation to capital, the professions
essentially embody ideals, going beyond the demands of the market, which ideals are
68See KEITH MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 203 (1995).
69See ELLIOT KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS STATES AND THE ADvANCE OF
CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 1-2 (1996).
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sustained and sustainable only to the extent that they control the organization of their
work, free from the authority of others. Yet the rationalization of such work through
forms of organization that emphasize commoditization and routinization is the aim of
capital, for that is the path to enhanced efficiency, at least when efficiency is defined
with reference to cost of services.7" To achieve such rationalization, capital
necessarily must take over control of the workplace and no pocket of control for
lawyers or any other group of professionals in MDPs can shield them from such
control.
The acquisition of such control is justified under dominant conceptions of the
relations of capital and other interests, in which the interests of capital as represented
by shareholders or other equity owners are supreme, notwithstanding recent inroads
in the areas of industrial democracy and corporate citizenship. Various approaches
suggest themselves for the acquisition of such control. But whatever the approach,
some professions seem readily more amenable to such control than others, and thus
may provide easy outposts for the advancing forces of the market. These professions
are usually those for whom the major corporations and institutions of the market
serve as the major clientele. Following on the heels of these are those that have a
great need for capital infusion, resulting from either the intrinsic nature of the work
or advances in technology resulting in enhanced appetite for new technologies. Thus
engineering has, given the major locus of its activities in modem times-the
corporation-gone far afield in the process of deprofessionalization. Indeed, it is
arguable that it was never allowed to professionalize, capital having assumed early
control in its area of work. It is no surprise that engineers qua engineers do not wield
much influence in the decision-making process of the corporations in which they
work, beyond matters of technical detail. Considerations of the social dimensions of
their work lie, for instance, outside their control, resting to the extent that they are
deemed relevant, in corporate managers. Medicine has more recently encountered
this phenomenon. As capital has become increasingly important to modem
medicine, so has its increased dependence on such capital weakened it.7 Witness the
influence of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and big pharmaceutical
companies on modem medical practice. The influence of HMOs has become so
pervasive and pernicious that a not insignificant number of physicians are finding
disillusionment in their profession.72
70Whether it enhances service quality is a more difficult question, which is perhaps
intrinsically value-laden and therefore ultimately amenable only to a political solution. For
one can validly argue that shorn of the ideals that should attend them, these services cannot be
of the same quality as those provided ordinarily by the professions. Following from this, it
can also be argued that the services are not less expensive, since their reduced price correlates
to their lower quality.
7 1See ABBOTT, supra note 40, at 154-56, 359 n.30. Abbott notes that "[tihe impact of
capitalization has been noticed most in medicine .... The boundary between physical and
intellectual capital is fluctuation rapidly, and corporations, as one would expect, are
emphasizing their right to as much turf as possible." Id.
72Lawrence Fox considered this a major factor in his opposition to MDPs, given the
potentials for other professions, both established and pip-squeak, to control lawyers' discretion
in such a setting. See Written Comments of Lawrence J. Fox (Jul. 8, 1999),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/fox4.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2004). See also Written
Remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, supra note 11. Fox's words in the latter piece are quite pointed:
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It is curious though, that while some of the clamoring for MDP has been
predicated on the need for the infusion of substantial capital into law practice in
order to fuel growth and competitive capabilities,73 no articulation of the basis for
this has been given, beyond the occasional mention of investments in information
technology (IT), the general cost of which has however steadily reduced in tandem
with improvements in technology. The day-to-day practice of law is still a largely
human-labor-intensive affair, and such capital as is needed has not gone beyond the
capacity of the traditional sources of capital for practitioners. This scenario is further
confirmed by the fact that the Big 5 have generally not had to expand through
reliance on external equity or related sources of capital. They have instead financed
growth through loans and internally generated funds, these being sources open to
lawyers currently. Indeed, further uses of capital beyond the acquisition of basic
operational equipment run against the grain of good management practice for
professional service firms generally. Capital expenditure (Capex) has been
recognized in management literature as inimical to the average professional service
firm when taken beyond the bare minimum required for a firm's operations. This is
on account of the nature of the sector and the factors underlying its noticeable
expansion in recent years, especially the widespread use of outsourcing by major
industrial concerns, which creates a need for external service providers.74 The
thinking is that in the event of a market contraction, service firms are usually the first
to be hit due to cut backs in industrial expenditure, and the last thing such a firm
wants to be caught up with during such a downturn are capital assets that it cannot
shed quickly. In this wise, it has been said of professional service firms (PSF) that:
First, look at our colleagues in the medical profession. A decade ago they relaxed the
rules on physicians working for non-physicians. Suddenly a flood gate of pseudo-
prosperity opened up and a tidal wave of cash spread across the land, offering the docs
thousands, even millions for their practices. I remember myself looking longingly at
my physician friends as they cashed out their patient lists. Why did I decide I hated
the sight of blood, I thought.
But where are the physicians today? Can you find a happy doc? Of course not and
why would one expect to? Having sold out to Mammon they now find themselves
acting as supplicants in endless phone calls with high school clerks who decide for the
physicians which medicine to prescribe, which procedures to undertake and how soon
their patients are thrown out of their hospital beds. If this is what happens to a
vulnerable value-professional independence-when literally matters of life and death
are on the line, can we expect a different result when the issue is the preservation of
important, if less cosmic values like loyalty, confidentiality and client autonomy?
Id.
73See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUsAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND
ETHIcs OF LAWYERING 1047 (3d ed. 1999). See also Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 12, at n.19.
74Outsourcing in this sense should be distinguished from the more politically charged
sense of the term which is used to refer to the relocation of jobs from the United States or
other countries of the west to countries with lower labor costs. In the present context, the term
is used to denote a situation in which one firm, without necessarily going outside the United
States, delegates an aspect of its production process to another firm which is paid to undertake
that process.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  569 2008
38
Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss3/4
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
[T]he life of a PSF is very different from its industrial counterparts. It
does not have to invest in [research and development] and new productive
capital other than IT to keep ahead of the curve. Nor does it have to
envision what will be the next turn of the technological road (although it
clearly can't ignore it either). What it has to do instead is make sure that
its energies are focused on serving the client with maximum effectiveness
and that it invests in the professional resource necessary to maintain
standards. This means that, instead of diverting resources into non IT
[capital expenditure] and suffering increasing depreciation charges
against earnings which may or may not translate into cash flow down the
road, the PSF can focus all its energies on keeping its clients happy."5
Related to the foregoing and the attendant otioseness of fixed costs, is the reality
that most service firms do not enjoy substantial economies of scale."6 All these
underscore the brittle nature of the argument about capital infusion into legal practice
as a justification for MDP.
It may be argued that given the increasing commoditization of aspects of the law
into products such as software packages and do-it-yourself kits, substantial capital is
required if lawyers are to produce and participate in that market. However, this
would be a mistaken view, at least in the context of the thrust of the argument here
about the nature of professionalism as an ideal involving the provision of services
under certain idealized terms, as well as the inherent nature of these products
themselves. The manufacture of these products is nothing more than a bare
commercial enterprise, notwithstanding that their function is ultimately to displace
legal advice by lawyers. Such an activity is the true province of capital, not the
professions. Along this line of reasoning, it should be conceded that when an aspect
of the law has become so pliable as to be amenable to routinization and
commoditization, say in the form of computer software, that aspect is no longer in
need of the special attention and approach that is the that aspect is no longer in need
of the special attention and approach that is the hallmark of professionalism, and
should as such be consigned to the general domain, unless a clearly-articulated
policy reason (such as cultural hallmark of professionalism, and should as such be
consigned to the general domain, unless a clearly articulated policy reason, such as a
cultural value," dictates that lawyers continue to tend such aspects.
75See MARK C. ScoTr, THE INTELLECT INDUSTRY 1, 32 (1998). Of course the picture here
is a general one since, for instance, a few of these firms justifiably engage in research and
development, as exemplified by the tax practices of some of the Big 5. This does not however
detract from the overall strength of the position, just as the position is not compromised by the
fact that a few firms such as investment banks may need substantial external capital to fund
expansion through acquisition of competitors as distinct from organic growth. The bulk of the
costs of a professional service firm consist of staff costs, a direct expense that pays for itself,
being directly correlated to revenue, at a staff-revenue ratio of not more than 60% for a
healthy firm, but ideally at no more than 40%. Id. at 57. Other major cost would be the cost
of leased office space, ideally at around 10% of revenue. See id. at 58.
76 d. at 13.
77For arguments on cultural value, see infra Part Ill(D), from the paragraph embodying
note 180 and onwards.
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D. Alternative Reasons Underlying the Quest for MDP
In concluding this part of the essay, it is tempting to explore the reasons behind
the MDP Commission's consideration and recommendation of MDP Models 2 to 4,
given that, as already explained in Part II(A), these models stand in tension with the
raison d'6tre of MDP-the attainment of seamless services via a one-stop-shop.
An ostensible reason for Models 2 to 4 could be that these models were put
forward in the hope that they would act as stop-gap measures catering to the demand
for MDP, while the professions involved worked out the parameters for instituting a
Model 5, full service MDP. 8 If this was the reason ex ante for these intermediate
models, it would be natural to expect the MDP Commission to clearly indicate so at
the onset. This was not the case, however. The MDP Commission did not articulate
the value of Models 2 to 4, in a way that shows, in relation to the capacity for
seamless services, any essential distinction in purpose between them and Model 5.
Any revealed or apparent distinction was one of degree rather than essence. Perhaps
terminological conflation of the Model 5 fully integrated MDP with other structures
for which there may have been some demand was a factor propelling the MDP
Commission towards such a uniform conceptualization of the models.79
Beyond this, however, there is an unstated but unifying thread that runs through
and explains all the models, except Model 1: They are all capable of sustaining a
78Comments by Professor Mary Daly, Professor Bernard Wolfman's MDP Seminar,
Harvard Law School (Feb. 29, 2000).
79Some of the testimonies before the MDP Commission, upon close inspection, indicate
that sections of the public and profession desire a liberalization of aspects of legal service
delivery, which, however, does not amount to an MDP. Such constituencies generally get
lumped together with those in favor of MDPs, and they do not object to that. This is so
because they either conflate their ideas with a Model 5 MDP or they see the latter as an
opportunity to get their basic demands, even if they thereby end up with a structure that is way
beyond their needs. See Oral Remarks of Larry Ramirez, Chair of the General Practice, Solo
and Small Firm Section (Feb. 6, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/ramirezl.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2008). In his testimony, Mr. Ramirez expressed his support for MDP. Id.
Upon close questioning by a member of the MDP Commission on the possible deterrent effect
of conflict imputations in such a small town MDP, Mr. Ramirez agreed that this could be a
deterrent to MDPs and that "an ad hoc relationship is the likely option." Id. Upon further
questioning, he stated that he did not think his section would have a problem with a separate
entity contractually related to the other professionals, such as would help serve as an
explanation to clients that different ethics rules apply depending on whether or not the non-
lawyer is working on a particular matter with the lawyer. Id. See also Letter from Michael
Homer, President, Tom Sawyer Camps, Inc., to Arthur Garwin, ABA MDP Commission (Feb.
19, 1999), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/homer.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). Mr. Homer
wrote to support MDPs. Id. In a paragraph of his letter he stated:
I'm a small business owner who currently uses several separate consulting firms to
handle a variety of my business needs. I share the lament of many of my fellow
business owners in that as issues come up where I must rely on two or more of these
services I'm forced to "ping pong" back and forth among these providers at
considerable expense of time and money. The other option is to rely on quasi-legal
advice from non-lawyers and simply hope for the best. Neither of these is desirable.
Id. This evinces a desire not necessarily for the seamless services of a true MDP, but for some
form of ad hoc coordination between Mr. Homer's service providers, such as would prevent
him from running from pillar to post on multi-sided issues.
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passive investment in the legal services industry by non-lawyers. Models 2 to 5 are
all capable of sustaining such a passive investment interest in a law practice, using
"passive investment" in a narrow sense to mean ostensible participation in the
provision of legal services by a qualified partner80 who does not however take part in
any way in the actual work-place rendition of services to clients. The capital
contributed to the practice is then the passive investor's principal input to the
enterprise. The difference between such a partner and the average investor lies
merely in the former's professional qualifications, which entitle him to participate in
the professional service firm to the exclusion of non-professionals. In the MDP
context, such "passive investment" would serve not just the needs of the "passive
investor," but also the need of those who wish to infuse capital into their law practice
or sell their law practices out right. The MDP Commission entertained testimonies
from several lawyers who were of the latter mind.
It should be noted that the sale of legal service by itself (i.e. without its being
seamlessly blended with other services into a composite), is consistent with the intent
of providers of lower margin professional services to move into higher margin ones
like legal services," an intent that is claimed by MDP opponents to be the major
impetus behind the quest for MDP. For then the idea is not necessarily the provision
of seamless service but rather the extraction of profit, an extraction that is possible
even if the MDP structures itself is along Models 2 to 4, since an essence of MDP is
the sharing of profits between different professionals notwithstanding the ultimate
choice of model. Indeed the possibility of passive investment in the provision of
legal services by all and sundry becomes heightened in the light of the dilemma over
the definition or delimitation of the range of professions and occupations that can
permitted enter into MDP arrangements with lawyers.8 2 If in response to the
egalitarian and pragmatic argument that it should not and practically cannot be
restricted to a definable class or type of professions, the door is thrown open to
arrangements with all legitimate professions or occupations, then it becomes possible
for almost anyone to make a "passive investment" in a law practice that takes the
form of an MDP. This could be through various multidisciplinary arrangements in
which the non-lawyers would ostensibly profess to practice a profession or an
occupation with the lawyers, while in reality making a passive investment in a firm
predominantly offering legal services. The definition of the range of professions or
occupations capable of forming MDPs with lawyers is therefore cardinal to the
resilience of the prohibition of passive investment, not because whatever definition is
chosen can seal off that possibility completely, but because the wider the definition
the more accentuated the potentials for the laity to drive a coach and horses through
it.
It is of course arguable that even now lawyers can make "passive investment" of
the sort in issue in a law firm in which they have no active participation, and that this
is not materially different from the other scenarios involving non-lawyer
80
"Qualified partner" here denotes a member of a partnership operating as an MDP who is
qualified to practice a profession other than law, and who by virtue of this qualification is
permitted to combine with lawyers in providing legal services to the public. This would be the
scenario if Models 2 to 5 were allowed.
8'See sources cited supra note 41. See also NANDA & LANDRY, supra note 42, at 8.
82See PostScript to February 2000 Midyear Meeting, supra note 15.
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professionals. Such argument would be remiss, in that it would ignore the cultural
capital that the lawyer by training and association brings with him even when he is
not actively in practice. This attenuates crass propensities in the practice of law
where these would otherwise be accentuated. As importantly, lawyers involved in
such "passive investment" are amenable to the regulatory reach of the bar authorities,
unlike non-lawyers; and so can answer for the consequences of their omissions or
commissions in a way that non-lawyers couldn't. This in turn exerts ex ante pressure
on them to show circumspection towards such investment. Finally, the pool of
lawyers amenable to such investments is relatively limited, vis-a-vis the general
population, even more so the pool of capital available to them.
III. CONTROL OF WORK AND ITS CENTRALITY TO THE MDP QUESTION
MDP is essentially about the control of work. The key questions posed by MDP
as such are: (1) whether collaboration by way of MDP detracts from lawyers' control
of their work and hence lawyers' professional independence; and if so, (2) whether
lawyers should indeed be allowed to retain exclusive control of their work and
thereby maintain professional independence. While the former question is in
significant measure the focus of Part II of this article, this part, Part III, will address
the latter question along several dimensions.
A. The Legitimacy of the Suppliers 'Perspective
A pervasive point of agreement between all sides in the MDP debate is the belief
that the interest of the consumers of legal services is the paramount and indeed only
legitimate interest.83 This line of reasoning has been a fountain from which all have
drawn for political legitimacy. The direct result of this has been a persistent attempt
by all sides of the debate to show that its own regulatory recipe is the optimal one for
the consumer.8 " This has been particularly so with market-minded analysts who insist
on enhanced competition as a desideratum of legitimacy. This focus on demand-side
imperatives has meant the neglect of supply-side imperatives, which is all the more
surprising given the necessary relationship between supply and demand. It seems,
83See, e.g., Kostant, Paradigm Regained, supra note 7, at 51; James C. Moore, Lawyers
and Accountants: Is the Delivery of Legal Services Through the Multidisciplinary Practice in
the Best Interest of Clients and the Public?, 20 PACE L. REv. 33, 35 (1999); New York Bar
Association, Report of the Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practice and the Legal
Profession, Section XV Part D, supra note 66, at § IlI, 5; Green, supra note 8, at 1158. But
see the statement of Professor Neil W. Hamilton to the Minnesota State Bar Association,
quoted in Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 1359, 1376, n.90 (2000) ("I urge you to make the decision regarding MDP not on the
basis of what 'customers' want. Make it on the basis of how we can preserve one [of] the
great learned professions that is committed (albeit imperfectly) to serving justice.").
8See generally Daniel Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, Bus. LAW. 951 (May 2000).
See also Moore, supra note 83, at 37. But see New York County Lawyers' Association
Special Committee on MDP, supra note 18. An exception is the New York County Lawyers'
Association's Special Committee on MDP which in its report stated, with no emphasis on
clients' interest: "The role of the bar itself in molding the future is to define its own goals and
to try to match these to the marketplace which in a free economy can opt to support or turn
away from the services of the Bar." Id. The statement did not however attempt a
reconciliation of this market-oriented statement with the bar's monopoly. Id.
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however, beyond question that though the consuming public through the political
institutions has the final say as to the nature of regulation it desires, it lies ultimately
with the suppliers of legal services to determine whether the terms of those
regulations are sufficiently attractive to merit their investment of time and energy in
the process of producing those services. This indeed is in the very nature of any
market, more so in the liberal socio-economic milieu of the United States.
This proposition can be characterized differently, in a less polarized manner.
Specifically, it may be said that it is in the interest of the consuming public that in
negotiating the optimal regulatory scheme for legal services, we take into account the
interests of the suppliers of those services, in terms of the conditions necessary not
just for their persistence in that market, but more importantly, the conditions
necessary for their persistence as producers of services that qualitatively accord with
basic public expectations. In the light of the foregoing, the interest of lawyers in
their work and the terms thereof constitutes a central issue in the MDP debate, one
that should be explored with more profundity and less embarrassment than has
hitherto been the case.
In exploring lawyers and their work a sociological approach seems apt, not
merely because sociologists are the group of scholars who have paid the most
attention to the study of the professions, but principally because it is an integrated
framework that enables a multi-sided analysis of the MDP debate as a contest
concerning the nature, loci and future of the lawyer's work. Sociology therefore
presents us with some interesting frameworks with which to assess the implications
of MDP for the professionals who constitute the supply side.
Sociological studies of the profession are divisible into two broad categories:
those that focus on the internal consequences of professionalism (i.e. consequences
affecting the area of professional work itself-healing, auditing, dispute processing,
etc) and those that focus on external consequences of professionalism (i.e.
consequences affecting not the area of work itself, but rather the social status and
power of the professions). The latter has as its preoccupation the external social
consequences that derive from professional status and activity, the professional
activity itself being of little importance. Each of these broad categories is further
divisible into two dimensions-the social and the individual-thus giving a total of
four quadrants as indicated in Figure 1. The individual and social dimensions of the
internal consequences involve respectively, a focus on how to structure the relations
between the client and the professional in order to attain the basic objectives of
professional work (healing, auditing, dispute processing, etc.) and the impact of the
existence as well as nature of professional groups on the overall social handling of
work. Similarly, the individual and social dimensions of the external consequences
involve respectively, the impact of professionalism on the individual professional in
terms of his status, income, social mobility, etc, and the impact on the professional
group as a body also in terms of enhanced status, income, social mobility, etc."5
85This builds on the basic structure of the sociological scholarship on the professions as
noted by Andrew Abbott. See ABBoTrr, supra note 40, at 6-7.
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Figure 1








(Internal Consequences) (External Consequenses)
The quadrant AX denotes the individual dimension of the internal consequences.
The quadrant BX denotes the social dimension of the internal consequences. AY
denotes the individual dimension of the external consequences while BY denotes the
social dimension of the external consequences. AX thus denotes the point of intense
focus on the individual professional and the issues that concern him in relation to the
attainment of the basic objective of professional work. The focus on the individual
professional is not and cannot be exclusive since it is a focus on him vis-A-vis the
client and the client's objective-a focus on the relationship between professional
and client. BX indicates the point of focus on professionals as a group vis-A-vis their
broader impact on the field in which they practice. It is a macro-focus on the
relationship between groups-professionals on the one hand and society (consumers,
government, etc.) on the other hand. AY and BY reflect a focus on aspects of the
professions that are theoretically secondary and incidental to work, even if
practically important, namely, issues of social status, income and the like-issues
that are not intrinsic to work and can thus be said to be external to it. AY focuses on
these issues from the perspective of the individual professional, while BY takes a
macro, group focus.
The trend thus has been to analyze the professions along multiple dimensions
which incorporate the individual professional as well as consumers of his services
(i.e. the society) rather than one without the other, as the exclusive focus of the MDP
debate on consumer interests seem to suggest. Neither the consumer nor the
professional is intrinsically antecedent to the other. Sometimes the prior existence of
a market for particular services leads to the rise of a profession to meet its demands,
while at other times an existing group of professionals propagates a new market for
professional services as was the case with the English accounting profession in the
area of financial audits.
B. The Relevance of Workplace Control
As with the phrase "practice of law," fashioning a rigorous, consistent definition
of the term "profession" has proved intractable, leading sociologists to adopt a
BX BY
AX AY
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functional and context-specific approach to the term. 6 One of the most popular
attempts is that of Roscoe Pound. Ever the sociologist, he defined a profession as
referring to "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit
of a public service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means
of livelihood. 8 7 Notwithstanding its high moral tone aspects of the definition,
especially the learned nature of the art practiced and the element of common calling,
admit an ambiguity that makes the definition susceptible to disparate, conflicting
application. It may thus be thought of rather as a description, capable of
accommodating more occupational groups than would ordinarily be thought of as
professions. Indeed, the debate over the proper delimitation of the occupational
groups with which lawyers may potentially enter into MDP arrangements in a sense
implicates this definitional problem. For at its core that debate is about trying to
sort out professions properly so called from non-professions, so as to foreclose the
possibility of integration with the latter, in the event of MDP becoming a permitted
feature of legal practice. However defined, a central feature of the definition of a
profession has come to be the capacity of such occupational group to exercise control
over its own work. This point is sometimes implicit and at other times explicit in the
works of scholars of the professions, as may be seen from a short survey of the
relevant sociological scholarship.
Eliot Freidson, following a survey of several writings which explore the control
of work as the factor distinguishing professions from other forms of occupation, even
over and above duration of education and level of skill, states that the single most
critical factor explaining differences in same or different occupations across time and
space is "the presence or absence of organized power of the workers themselves to
control the terms conditions and content of their work." The hallmark of those
occupations which become professionalized is the degree to which they achieve
control of their work, gaining at once for their members "a labor monopoly and a
place in the division of labor that is free of the authority of others over their work."89
Keith Macdonald traces the autonomy of English professions to at least Tudor times,
noting their characterization by Charles II, along with some other non-state agencies,
as "lesser governments" a reference to their capacity to share power with
government in some respects.9 ° He subsequently posits that "in understanding
professions, the starting point must be professional work. The content of
professional work, the control of that work, differentiation in types of work and the
notion of jurisdiction that the profession attempts to claim for its work are the heart
of the matter."'" Such control of work has several ramifications for the professional
86See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 68, at 1, 35 n. 1; ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM
REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY AND POLICY 101, 107 (1994).
87See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
88See PostScript to February 2000 Midyear Meeting, supra note 15.
89FREIDSON, supra note 86, at 114-15.
90MACDONALD, supra note 68, at 73-74.
9 11d. at 163. This emphasis on control of work conflicts somewhat with Macdonald's
definition of professions, which emphasizes the quality of knowledge and skill they possess.
Id. at 1. This conflict is however more apparent than real, for the term as defined was self-
confessedly not a "closely defined technical term" but a mere shorthand. This contrasts with
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project of market closure (monopoly) and social mobility, which constitute the twin
pillars of Macdonald's work, inspired as it is by that of Larson,92 and her theory of
the professional project.
Larson's theory accounts for the profession in terms of its intrinsic inclination
towards a project of closure or monopoly of occupational markets as a means of
attaining social mobility for its members. A profession's actions can therefore be
explained generally by reference to this framework. For Larson, professionalization
is "an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources-special knowledge and
skills-into another, namely social and economic rewards. To maintain scarcity
implies a tendency to monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of
status in a system of stratification."93 She further states that "[t]he process of
organization for a market of services ... has theoretical precedence: for indeed in
order to use occupational roles for the conquest of social status, it was necessary first
to build a solid base in the social division of labor."94 Clearly implicit in this
framework is the idea of control of work and its organization, though this is
subsumed under market monopolization, which is one of the pillars of Larson's
framework. Power, the locus of its exercise (the workplace) and the ends thereof
(workplace control) cannot be separated from the conflicts that constitute the main
focus of this line of analysis. Eliot Freidson is perhaps ultimately the most forceful
exponent of the centrality of workplace control in understanding and defining the
professions. He argues that "a fruitful way of developing theoretical coherence in
the field of the sociology of occupations lies in adopting as one's central problem the
analysis of the organization of control over work, and its consequences for work,
workers, organizations, and society." Part of the virtues of this approach, he posits,
lies in its capacity to co-opt other theories and bodies of information that ordinarily
run independently of the sociology of occupations (of which the sociology of
professions is a subset) such as organization theory and industrial sociology.95
Workplace control and the resultant autonomy therefore defines a profession, at
least in the classic common law jurisdictions where professions have for long had the
most robust existence. Most of the general value conferred on society by the
professions flow at least in part from this autonomy, from the famed capacity of
professions to modulate and temper state power to their potentials as a bulwark
against anomie. That liberal theory is increasingly being constrained to re-evaluate
its opposition to group-differentiated rights, especially cultural-group rights, and tone
down its exclusive focus on the individual, is an indication that the rights of groups
such as professions, can be strengthened under the aegis of a new liberalism; a sort
of liberalism that has come to terms with society's need for the communal ideals of
the subsequent exposition of work control as a defining characteristic of professional power,
which was an integral part of his exposition of the theory of the professional project.




95FREIDSON, supra note 86, at 126.
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the new civic republicanism. 96 The besieged autonomy of the professions seems
therefore renascent under more auspicious ideological and theoretical underpinnings.
Embedded in the foregoing analysis on workplace control is the idea of
monopolization, which standing by itself, without more, is a source of illegitimacy in
contemporary social and economic thought. It is therefore necessary to attempt a
separation of the idea of monopolization from the idea of workplace control, for
notwithstanding the pervasive conflation of both, there is no intrinsic reason why one
cannot conceptually exist independently of the other. In this wise, it bears
clarification that the type of control envisaged by the analysis here is simply control
of the terms on which a particular group works in producing the services offered to
the consuming public, in a market that is open or potentially open to other groups. A
monopoly to the extent that there is one, would exist only de facto not de jure, and
would not be the result of positive state prescription. While this scenario does not
eliminate the possibility of anticompetitive practices by way of occasional restraint
of trade among members of the professional group, that is clearly a more limited and
therefore less pernicious form of market control than a monopoly properly so called.
What is more, such market restraint is not inherent in the conceptualization of
workplace control, but is rather a mere possibility-indeed a possibility open to any
other professional grouping, including accountants in respect of whom there has
occasionally been speculation of antitrust action in the context of the domination of
the industry by the Big 5. In any case, were the legal profession's official monopoly
to be dispensed with as envisaged, such subsidiary anticompetitive effects as may be
attributable to the profession on account of the prohibition of MDP should
normatively be excusable on account of the professions' special role in justice
administration and the incidences of that role. 97 Beyond the normative, it would also
positively qualify for exemption under the current state action exception to antitrust,
given that the prohibition of MDP would be the result of judicial, and therefore
governmental, regulations in the context of the judiciary's regulatory powers over
the profession.
96See Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civil Republicanism and the Modern
World, in THE CITIZEN DEBATES: A READER 75-81 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998); Will
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, in THE CITIZEN DEBATES: A READER 167-69 (Gershon
Shafir ed., 1998).
9 7This line of thinking is one already accepted by the European Court of Justice in relation
to the Dutch bar's prohibition of MDP with accountants. Accepting that the members of the
Dutch bar carried on an economic activity and thus constituted an association of undertakings
as defined under Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 8 1(1)) and that its restrictions on
MDP with accountants was anti-competitive, the court nevertheless held that those restrictions
were justifiable. See Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten,
2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002) at 39, 49, 58, 71, 86, 90, 94. The court
concluded that the bar regulation prohibiting MDP with accountants did not infringe
competition (i.e. antitrust) rules because the Bar of Netherlands could reasonably have
considered that the regulation, despite its restrictive effects on competition, "is necessary for
the proper practice of the legal profession .... Id. 87-89. This was judicial recognition
at the highest levels of the European Court system, that the bar's rules, including those that
impede MDP, embody values that transcend market economics and are therefore normatively
deserving of protection from the full glare of market forces.
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While the legal profession in the United States is not currently free of state-
granted monopoly, the analysis herein proceeds on the assumption that such
monopoly is not necessary for the legal profession's control of its work in the
manner canvassed in this article. The absence of such monopoly is therefore
assumed for our purposes here, in order to forestall the weakening of the analysis
herein by the legal profession's monopoly-a monopoly that is really as unnecessary
for workplace control as it is delegitimizing. s That market power or monopoly is not
necessarily a corollary of workplace control is clear from the framework adopted by
Eliot Krause in his analysis of the professions. He posits that if we analyze the
history of craft guilds, we can develop a model of the specific dimensions of guild
power" that can be applied to any occupational group at any time and place. He then
proposes a model of guild power with the following four dimensions: power and
control over (a) the association (b) the workplace (c) the market and (d) the relation
to the state.' °° What is instructive about his model is the clear separation of control
over the workplace from control over the market. He thus breaks away from other
analysts in this regard, and his subsequent analysis of the American legal profession
is consistent with this separation.'' My analysis in this article would therefore be
consistent with a modified version of the legal profession's guild power where
market control by way of a monopoly is not an element. Though necessarily a
weaker form of guild power, it is also a more legitimate form given the absence of
market monopoly.
98The long-term implication of this in the context of this article is that, ultimately, a
maintenance of the prohibition of MDP would have to exist side-by-side with a loss of the
legal profession's current monopoly over legal services. This presents little problem
conceptually since MDP is properly definable not as a question of the legal profession's
monopoly over legal work or the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers, but rather in
terms of the right of any group of professionals (here, lawyers) to offer their services to the
public on terms that accord with those professionals' knowledge and experience concerning
behavior or arrangements (MDP) the avoidance of which is necessary for those professionals
to render high-quality service to the public. The country that most closely reflects this
situation currently is England, where lawyers have no monopoly outside the courthouse. That
MDP is still a contentious issue in England is indicative of the fact that it has little to do with
unauthorized practice of law. This is because given the absence of a lawyers' monopoly,
English accountants and other professionals have for long had the right there to offer legal
service to their clients, particularly in the lucrative areas of finance in which they are most
interested. Yet they continue to seek and insist on the chance to unimpeded collaboration with
lawyers by way of MIDP. It would seem then that the real issue in question is one of brand
name appropriation. The term "lawyer" and its variations constitute a veritable brand name
that has acquired through the centuries a dominant appeal in the legal services market, as
consumers of such services strongly identify with it and associate it with the highest quality
legal service. It is this brand name that MDP proponents wish to tap into for other
professions, rather than the mere opportunity to offer legal services.
"For Krause, "guild" is an apt if even if somewhat disparaging description for occupations
generally, including the four professions upon which he focuses: law, medicine, engineering
and the academia. "Guild power," then, is a term that describes the constitutive powers of the
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That workplace control is a central feature of the MDP debate is readily
observed, when we note that a major aspect of the debate has been the condition in
which lawyers would work within MDPs. The whole hoopla about the various
models of MDP discussed in Part IIA is no more than a negotiation of the structure
of the workplace, to which has necessarily been added the question of who calls the
shots in the negotiated workplace. It is in essence a negotiation of the terms of work
for lawyers vis-A-vis other professions and occupational groups whose interests are
implicated, and the tenacity that has attended it befits the strategic importance of the
issue. The resultant balance of power in the workplace ultimately shapes an
occupational group, determining whether it is elevated or demoted. In this wise, it
should be noted that the occupational groups whose interests are implicated in the
MDP debate are multifarious, some of them being incipient professions within the
legal profession itself. This explains why a sub-group like the ABA section on
taxation, whose members have expressed strong interest in working within MDPs
and whose members more than any other group already do so de facto, has incentives
that impel it consistently towards support for one side of the debate."°2 For, the sub-
group represents among other things, a nascent profession that is already beginning
to be accepted and treated as such in some quarters. The tax adviser is, for instance,
accepted and treated as a distinct profession by the revenue authorities, such that
even if a tax lawyer were to become disqualified from legal practice he may still be
able to practice before the IRS as a tax adviser, subject to certain qualifying
requirements being met. The professional distinctiveness of the tax adviser is even
more apparent in the context of the more disparate professional setting in many
countries of continental Europe. Thus we observe the willingness of Dutch lawyers
to form inter-professional alliances by way of MDPs with tax advisers, while
refusing to form the same with accountants.0 3 As such the whole environment of the
professions may be seen as a galaxy of sorts in which stars (ie various professions)
are constantly emerging and dying, the major determinant of survival being a
profession's capacity to control the workplace. Such control comes through a
negotiation or some other form of settlement with other groups, of which the MDP
debate is a prime instance.
10 2See Letter from Paul Sax, Chair, ABA Section on Taxation, to Robert J. Grey, Chair,
ABA House of Delegates (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with the author). The letter communicates
the overwhelming vote of the tax section in support of the MDP Commission's
recommendation for the approval of MDPs. The letter shows the same tension between its
acknowledged need for the legal profession's independence and the enforcement of the rules
that undergird that independence, on the one hand, and its proposal for fee sharing and the
consequent relaxation of related core values, on the other hand. This tension is resolved by
viewing the section as an embryonic profession with divided loyalties between its future and
that of the parent profession.
10 3This situation is reflected in the celebrated NO.VA. case in which Arthur Andersen
argued before the European Court of Justice for an invalidation of the rules of the Netherlands
bar regulators barring lawyers from partnerships with accountants, while permitting same
partnerships with tax advisers. See Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002). The court ruled against the
accounting firm, reasoning that though the rule complained of was anticompetitive. It was
nevertheless justified as a rule proportionately tailored to the achievement of certain legitimate
objectives.
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Indeed, this line of thinking is reinforced by recent developments in the
professional services industry. Management consultants as a group are a recent
addition to the professions, having emerged in the 1950s as an offshoot of the
auditing function performed by accounting firms. In the last few years, there has
been a spate of divestments involving the sale of their management consulting arms
by the major accounting firms. This sale has been rationalized in various ways: as an
attempt by the professional service firms to maintain auditor independence in the
face of pressure from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)"° as well as
an attempt to provide elbow room for unimpeded marketing and image-making by
the consulting arms.
However, another potent rationale for these divestments is the realization that
management consultants as a group have come into their own, and that absent such a
separation from the parent profession, their quest for independence and control of the
terms of their work will be a constant and embarrassing feature of their relationship
with the accounting firms.
These divestments were then the best-case scenario for the accounting firms, for
ultimately a distinguishing feature of professional services is the volatility of the
major input-human labor. The management consultants can always walk out and
leave the mother firm behind with a shell-trade name and trademarks-taking core
expertise and clients with them, as the Andersen Consulting dispute with Arthur
Andersen amply demonstrates. Indeed, the Andersen case may properly be seen as
the war of independence for the consultants, the declaration of independence having
been made when Andersen Consulting partners resolved unanimously in a December
1997 meeting in San Francisco to break away from the mother firm, leading to the
immediate institution of arbitration proceedings before the International Court of
Arbitration, Paris. 5
As the facts surrounding the case show, the whole dispute was not just about
income distribution, but more importantly, about control of the workplace.0 6 It was
literally an attempt by an emergent profession to appropriate control of its workplace
as a component of true professionalism. The quality of its work product, public
image and personnel, among other essentials, are functions of such control, these
being issues the management consultants rather than the accountants are best placed
to decide upon for themselves. It is also significant for the purposes of our analysis
that management consultants have no professional monopoly and claim none. This
is a pointer to the reality that control of work need not be coupled with professional
10 4This rationale predates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However the enactment of that
legislation gave fillip to this rationale, given the strictures imposed thereby on accounting
firms, who with rather limited exceptions, were prohibited under S.201 from offering audit
and non-audit services contemporaneously to the same client. For the specifics of some of
these sales, see supra, note 51 and accompanying text.
05For the facts of this case and the surrounding circumstances, see NANDA, supra note 42,
at 1-13. For the text of the arbitrator's decision in the case, see Andersen Consulting Unit
Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member Firms, Case No.
9797/CK/AER/ACS (Int'l Ct. Arb. July 28, 2000). See generally sources cited supra note 42
and accompanying text.
1°rSee NANDA, supra note 42, at 1-13. See generally sources cited supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
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monopoly. As significant is the fact that the resultant consulting firms are essentially
not MDPs but free standing consulting firms, composed of people doing same type
of work, guided by same basic principles.
The legal profession's principle of independence and related rules such as those
on fee sharing primarily undergird workplace control. (Admittedly they may also
serve the purpose of monopolizing the market for legal services, but this latter
aspect, as already indicated,"0 7 can be eliminated without impairing the integrity of
the basic idea of workplace control.) The accounting profession's insistence on
independence-not just in the limited sense of auditor independence, but in the
broader sense of professional independence as enshrined in its rules of conduct'-
107See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
10 8This follows particularly from Rule 505 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct.
Writing about this provision, the New York State Bar Association's MDP Committee states as
follow:
Accountants already have confronted and resolved the issue of allowing persons who
are not members of that profession to become owners in and share the profits of
accounting firms. Accordingly, the requirements that the AICPA imposed when it
allowed non-CPAs to become owners in CPA firms may be instructive. Pursuant to
Rule 505 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, non-CPAs may become
owners in CPA firms only if:
(1) At least two thirds of a firm's owners (in terms of financial interests and voting
rights) are CPAs. Non-CPA owners must be actively engaged in providing services to
firm clients as their principal occupation. Investors or commercial enterprises not
actively engaged as firm members may not acquire equity stakes. Firms that don't
comply with these requirements have three years to do so.
(2) A CPA takes ultimate responsibility for all the services provided by the firm and
for each business unit performing attest and compilation services and other
engagements governed by AICPA statements on auditing standards or statements on
accounting and review services. (The term business unit applies to both geographic
units, such as regional offices, and functional units, such as divisions in the same
office that provide different services).
(3) Non-CPA owners do not assume ultimate responsibility for any attest or
compilation engagement.
(4) New non-CPA owners possess a bachelor's degree and, beginning in the year
2010, meet the AICPA 150-hour education requirement.
(5) Non-CPA owners do not hold themselves out as CPAs. Such owners may use the
title principal, owner, officer, member, shareholder or any other title permitted by state
law.
(6) Non-CPA owners abide by the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. AICPA
members may be held responsible under the code for all co-owners' acts.
(7) Non-CPA members complete the same work-related CPE requirements that
AICPA members must fulfill.
(8) Non-CPA owners at all times must own their equity in their own right and be the
beneficial owners of the equity capital ascribed to them. Provision must be made for
the transfer of such ownership to the firm or to other qualified owners if a non-CPA
ceases to be actively engaged in the firm.
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similarly undergirds the accountants' workplace control. Those professions that
have lost or are in the process of losing control of the workplace are necessarily in
the process of deprofessionalization. For, if professionalism is to mean something, it
must be something distinct from, or at least additional to, mere productivity and
satisfaction of market place demands. In line with Roscoe Pound's articulation of
the professions, it must embody some additional principles-say, ideals-that inform
its functions. A profession's control of its work and the terms thereof is a key
element of its capacity to define and incorporate this additional element. Such
control is therefore clearly a core attribute of a profession. It may well be that some
policymakers today are askance concerning this core attribute of the professions, to
the extent that it may impede efficiency in the market for services, but the choice
whether to deprofessionalize or not by depriving professions of this control is
ultimately a political question of sorts. Whatever may be the ultimate resolution of
that question through the political process, it is clear that at this stage
deprofessionalization is not an expressed policy towards the legal profession, and no
one has in the course of the MDP debate attempted a broad general theory of why it
should be.' °9 The fact that the law and lawyers have played and still play such a
cardinal part in the life of the United States dictates that such a result, if intended,
should emanate more directly through the political or governmental process, rather
(9) Non-CPA owners are barred from AICPA membership.
New York Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Multi-Disciplinary Practice
and the Legal Profession, Section XV Part D, supra note 66, at § 13(D).
The National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) which encompasses
the statutory bodies vested with regulatory power over accounting at the state level, without
taking a stand on the matter, approved guidelines for state boards that decide to allow
nonlicensee ownership of CPA firms. See NASBA Issues Guidance on Non-CPA Ownership,
J. ACCT., Nov. 1995, at 17. Issued in 1995, these guidelines largely reflected AICPA's 1994
position as embodied in Rule 505. In particular, it insists that "[l]icensees [accountants] must
control the firm in fact as well as appearance; two-thirds of the owners must be CPAs." Id.
See also IFAC Proposes Ethics Upgrade, J. Acct., June 1997, at 6, 24. Writing on the
exposure draft concerning proposed amendments to the International Federation of
Accountants' (IFAC) Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, this journal reports that:
The [exposure draft concerning the proposed amendment] also covers guidance for
accountants who employ the services of nonaccountants. Because increasingly
accounting firms are being called on to do nontraditional accounting work, they often
employ the services of other professionals, such as lawyers, actuaries and valuers.
According to the proposal, regardless of who actually performs a service for a client,
the accountant must take ultimate responsibility. Therefore, the [exposure draft]
emphasizes that accountants must communicate to nonaccountants their basic ethical
requirements by asking them to read the appropriate ethical code sections and to
request consultation when potential conflicts arise.
IFAC Proposes Ethics Upgrade, J. ACCT., June 1997, at 6, 24 (emphasis added).
09Puritan Massachusetts for instance banned lawyers because lawyers were seen as
capable of arguing both sides of a case, when only one side could be right and therefore
morally justifiable. See KRAUSE, supra note 69, at 49. Thus they took the side of the devil as
often as they took the side of God. Id. Also in many parts of the country, the profession was
laified in the 1840s, with no requirement of training or certification. Id. at 30-31. Similar
results were attempted in England around the time of the English revolution and also in
revolution-era France. See MACDONALD, supra note 68, at 74, 86.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  583 2008
52
Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss3/4
CLEVELAND STATE LA WREVIEW
than being subsumed under the question of MDP and the attendant question of
making lawyers amenable to lay control in a multidisciplinary setting.
C. Supply Side Dynamics
It is fitting that we examine in a more concrete way, the potential effects of MDP
on lawyers as suppliers of legal services who possess alternative options for the
investment of their time and energy. In this wise, we will focus on what lawyers
expect to gain from investing their time in the law, rather than alternative
professions.
The mantra that law is a business like any other, which is oft-repeated even
outside the context of the MDP debate, elides the reality that law involves features
going beyond a mere business. Part of what attracts aspiring professionals to the law
is this additional dimension, which clearly cannot be found institutionally in any
profession that is simply a business. What, then, is this additional dimension? If we
examine closely the sentiments of aspiring lawyers at the time they decide to invest
their energies in the pursuit of a career in law, we will discover that this extra
dimension is something in the nature of an ideal. It embodies the belief and faith that
in espousing the law as a career, one would find therein an opportunity for service to
the community quite distinct from, if not beyond, that available in those careers
founded primarily on the pursuit of profits. Those who come to the law therefore do
not come to it with the mindset of pursuing only a business endeavor."' True, they
hope to earn a living thereby, but beyond this they hope to pursue an ideal involving
the engagement of the legal and political processes in the advancement of the varied
interests and causes begging for channels of orderly articulation and expression in
society. The profession to which they aspire is one within whose confines they hope
to find conditions most conducive to the pursuit of this mission, by reason of the
profession's avowed focus on the propagation of that mission. When the
profession's focus becomes diverted from maintaining that balance between its
business side and its ideals, as MDP necessarily entails given the proponents'
professed pursuit of efficiency gains and the attendant implications as explored
above, the essence of the profession for aspiring lawyers would have been grossly
impaired if not lost, and the incentive to take to the law grossly diminished. The
1 1°See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 1 (1983). Professor Kennedy wrote, albeit in the broader
context of a leftist Marxist critique of legal education, that:
A surprisingly large number of law students go to law school with the notion that
being a lawyer means something more, something more socially constructive than just
doing a highly respectable job. There is the idea of playing the role an earlier
generation associated with Brandeis, the role of service through law, carried out with
superb technical competence and also with a deep belief that in its essence law is a
progressive force, however much it may be distorted by the actual arrangements of
capitalism.
Id. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 75 (1988) ("The
legal profession attracts, along with a lot of fairly venal and opportunistic types, a large
number of the most public-regarding, socially-conscious people in our society. It's a total
waste to define a lawyer's role in a way that will deny such people the chance to act on
altruistic intentions."); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv.
801, 866 n.296 (1992) ("Many students go to law school precisely because they seek a way of
life that places public commitments at least on a par with the pursuit of private profit.").
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idealism that students bring to law school is the key to personal and institutional
fulfillment, and any arrangement that portends the complete erosion of the
institutional principles and arrangement on which they hope to hinge their pursuit of
this animating ideal is one that directly threatens the profession. Were these ideals
and their pursuit to be dislodged, the profession would hold less attraction to the
broader audience from which it has hitherto drawn its membership. Atrophy should
be the consequence.
To understand the full possibilities here, it must be recalled that professional
education in the United States, to the extent that the law is involved, is usually
contemplated in the broad context of the various possibilities presented to candidates
contemplating a professional career. Unlike the approach in some other countries
where a college degree is not a prerequisite for admission to law school, the U.S.
approach implies a relatively limited number of good candidates-i.e. basic college
degree holders-for professional education. The best of these have a choice between
the several established professions. This is in addition to the broader choice of
whether to pursue these classic professions or go into something entirely different,
especially by way of entrepreneurship, for the business-inclined. MDP and the
erosion of control which it implies for members of the legal profession would
effectively dampen interest in law as a career. A profession, for many members of
the consuming public, may simply appear as a source of services, but for the
professional, it is certainly something more. It is among other things an identity, an
identity that shapes the professional both within and without the work environment.
When this identity is impaired through loss of control, the professional becomes
compromised, not just in his work but in other respects. The negative impact on
lawyers of the increased stress and partial compromise of ideals flowing from
specialization and undue focus on the bottom line, even within the existing structure
of practice-especially corporate law practice-has already been noted."' The de-
proscription of MDP would mark the complete abandonment of the very struggle to
rescue the legal profession from this claim which commercialism has staked in the
territory of the law. In this final phase of law's decline, it would be wishful thinking
to expect that the brightest minds would invest their efforts in the vestiges of the
profession. Indeed, it would make sense to pursue a business career directly in the
circumstances, than to approach it indirectly through the backdoor as law would then
have become. Certainly, the law inevitably would still attract aspiring candidates,
but these would be candidates of a different hue from those which have graced its
courts in the past.
Writing of the heightened commercialism-which took an official character with
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s and 1980s in important aspects of
professional regulation-Mary Ann Glendon states that:
" 'See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 18-19, 34-36 (1994). Glendon
specifically reports the "marked rise since 1984 [of] symptoms of physical and mental distress
in the lawyer population as a whole." Id. at 87. The incidence of alcoholism and drug abuse
among lawyers as a group, 13% to 18%), is reported as being significantly higher than in the
population at large by a margin of between 3% and 5%. Beyond this all segments of the
profession report a decline in work satisfaction and overall fulfillment, except to some extent
solo practitioners who report a greater sense of personal accomplishment, notwithstanding
their having more anxiety about money. See id. at 87-88.
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no one can deny that economic changes have transformed the legal
landscape. Beneath intensified pressures attributable to competition,
however, simmers a deeper misery rooted in meaning. The stories
lawyers have always told themselves about professionalism were not just
self-serving facades. They were efforts to answer Holmes's question of
questions (by no means unique to lawyers): Does all this "make out a
life"? But the old incantations aren't as comforting as they once were.
Routinization has increased the drudgery that has always been inherent in
most legal work. Many lawyers are suffering alienation akin to that
experienced by manual laborers whose crafts were superseded by mass
production. How can we maintain that we belong to a "learned calling"
when so many of us are so narrowly specialized that we work on only one
part of a large task? How can we claim to be learned in a broader sense
when long hours scarcely leave us time to read a novel or attend a
concert? The traditional claim that we pursue a livelihood "in the spirit of
public service" often has a hollow ring." 2
This dissatisfaction, borne of erosion-in the context of free-wheeling adherence
to economic imperatives-of the meaning derivable from the pursuit of the
profession, would necessarily rise to new heights in the MDP context. Surprisingly,
proponents of MDP seem to make an argument that questions the relevance of
lawyers' ideals based on this very malaise currently plaguing the legal profession.
They contend that the law is already commercialized and as such it is hypocritical
and selfish to use its protection from commercialism as a basis for prohibiting MDP.
This indeed presents a paradox whereby previous errors and the perceived
irreversibility of their negative consequences on the profession become the
justification for advancing those very errors or enthroning new ones. Mistakes then
become self-replicating and self-legitimating, the fact that the system has managed to
absorb and survive them being taken as evidence in itself that what was done was
correct after all, or at least that lawyers resisted them merely to protect their turf and
economic self-interest." 3 Supreme Court decisions along the lines of Bates v. State
12Id. at 91.
113The MDP Commission responding to the concern about unforeseen ethical problems in
relation to MDPs, stated:
[T]he Commission does not believe that the question carries enough weight to bar a
relaxation of the present prohibitions on fee sharing and partnership with nonlawyers.
If a similar concern had carried the day with respect to the provision of legal services
by in-house counsel to corporate clients, by staff lawyers to union members, or by
lawyers in legal services organization to needy clients, important innovations in the
delivery of legal services would not have occurred.
Updated Background and Informational Report and Request for Comments, supra note 15, at
pt. 2 2. That these developments are all to the good is, however, a contested matter.
Especially is this so in relation to the innovations in advertising and provision of legal counsel
by insurer to the insured. And even if they are all good, that does not by itself show that
lawyer resistance to them was ab initio, ill-motivated or ill-advised. The current shapes of the
innovations would owe in-built structural and other safeguards to the fact of their having been
tried and tested through such initial resistance.
Robert Gordon notes the early attempt of the profession to stanch a section of the
profession's nascent alignment with the interests of big corporations whether as independent
practitioners or general counsel. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 16. He also notes the bar's
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Bar ofAriz."4 have been blamed for worsening the negative public image of lawyers,
thus contributing to declining prestige for the profession and loss of public respect
for it in the last three decades."' Yet these decisions are latched upon as bases for
canvassing further "liberalization" in line with the dictates of the market, with little
reluctance over permitting group legal services for labor unions, especially the "closed panel"
type. Id. 18. He ends up concluding that notwithstanding the sincerity of those who believe
that MDPs pose a threat to professional independence of judgment, the historical background
of that ideal and the bar's reaction to change indicate that "a lawyer's lofty conception of
professional ideals often conceals what is also a narrow factional or guild interest." Id. 28.
One must note that Gordon's posture in this debate is somewhat at variance with the
fervor and enthusiasm shown in an earlier oft-cited work towards the independence of lawyers
and lawyers' capacity for transformative rejuvenation and meaningful-even if cautious-
political activism and action. See Gordon, supra note 110, at 68-83. In that work he presented
a robust defense of lawyer independence based on both historical and current realities. He
asserted for instance, that:
The vision of lawyering as a public profession has real historical content, even if the
"republican" tradition that gave it content happens for the moment to be in recession.
It even has a real current content, meaning that in some forms it is (and as I'll argue
must be) actually though differentially instantiated in the conventional practices of
lawyers. Finally the vision has tremendous-though mostly as yet unrealized-
potential to transform lawyers' practical conceptions of their work in constructive
ways.
Id. at 13.
Further in the article, he mentions nascent transformative changes among corporate
lawyers, expressing the belief that such changes portend greater ones; every context including
that of corporate law presenting opportunities for positive social and political action. Id. at 80-
83. Though the quoted remarks were made in the immediate context of lawyer independence
from clients, the remark is set within the wider context of Gordon's work, which is a general
argument for the relevance of lawyers' political independence. Id. at 9-10. At the very least,
one can say that such fervor about law and law practice sits uneasily with support for MDP
with its potentials for further constraining lawyers through a subordinated role, in which role
the capacity for transformative political involvement of the sort previously articulated by
Gordon will increasingly become chimerical. Although in his letter to the MDP commission
Gordon cites his article as evidence of his expertise and work on lawyer regulation, he seems
impervious to this tension, or perhaps his views simply have shifted without his noticing.
1 4Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-85 (1977); see also Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975).
15After analyzing an extensive range of data sourced over an extended period, professors
of government Amy Black and Stanley Rothman conclude that:
At the same time that public perceptions of lawyers have been declining, the role of
lawyers and the legal profession has undergone dramatic changes . . . . The legal
profession in this country (aided and abetted by various court decisions that changed
its professional parameters) seems, to many, to have lost its moral bearings. Our data
suggest that lawyers realize this trend and are ambivalent about it, even as they
correctly recognize that their public prestige has declined substantially.
Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider
Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 835, 858 (1998) (emphasis added);
see also Gordon, supra note 110, at 5 (blaming the decline of lawyer independence on, among
others, "the growth of lawyer advertising, soliciting and plain hucksterism") (citing Peter
Megargee Brown, The Decline of the Lawyers' Professional Independence, in THE LAWYER'S
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 23, 25-26 (1984)).
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attention to the impact on the individuals who presently and prospectively constitute
the corps of the profession. The same goes for attempts by the profession in the past
to accommodate the pressures of the market through concessions and amendments in
the ethical rules. Each concession becomes further evidence of its own inherent
goodness and the need for more concessions. In so asserting, the proponents
comfortably forget the cost to the service providers in terms of receding control over
their increasingly rationalized and routinized work, and the attendant loss of meaning
and essence for the professional at a personal level. That polls consistently report
high dissatisfaction by lawyers with their declining profession, with as much as
twenty-five percent of those polled contemplating an abandonment of the
profession,"' is no cause for concern for those who see the profession as purely a
business. For them, MDP is but another logical step in the march of the market,
where the consumer holds sway, and the service producer is but an inconsequential
adjunct in the grand scheme of consumer empowerment.
It is instructive however that the full implications of regulating the economy in
line with free-wheeling economic principles are not lost on some of the best minds
among its proponents. In this wise, they implicitly recognize the stark choice that
must be made between the morals of the market and the ideals of the law. Richard
Posner, for instance, recognizes that competition, while serving the customer, can be
a disservice to the court and the wider community, for "competition implies the
subordination of every other interest to those of the consumer.""' 7 It should be added
that one clear way by which it disserves the community-in the peculiar context of
the legal profession-is through disillusionment of the very professionals on which
the community ultimately relies for the provision of the desired services. Their
progressive psychological and emotional impoverishment bodes no good for the
community as a whole. For Posner, the personal disillusionment of many lawyers in
the wake of the competitive pressure unleashed on them is only a natural
consequence of the pressure to work harder. The practice of law "naturally ... is
less fun. Competitive markets are no fun at all for most sellers; the effect of
competition is to transform most producer surplus into consumer surplus and in more
or less time to drive the less efficient producers out of business.""'
In tandem with the acclaimed benefits to the enthroned consumer, Posner quite
realistically recognizes that the implications of this scenario for legal ethics are
complex. In this wise, he distinguishes between two types of ethical obligations.
The first type is owed to the client, and includes the rule against conflicts of interest
and above all the rule that the lawyer must recognize himself as a fiduciary of the
client who should be treated as the lawyer would treat himself. The second type is
owed to the court and community, and includes the duties not to suborn perjury or
abuse pretrial discovery. Competition would not erode the duty owed to the client
but could, however, significantly erode the duty owed to people and institutions that
are not clients." 9 In making this distinction, Posner recognizes that other than
1"6See Glendon, supra note 111, at 85; see also DEBORAH ARRON, RuNNING FROM THE
LAW: WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETTING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9-22 (3d ed. 2004).
117See POSNER, supra note 9, at 93.
."
8See id. at 92.
9See id. at 92-93.
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customers or clients, there are important constituencies implicated in the debate
concerning superimposition of the paradigm of competitive markets on the legal
profession, of which the MDP debate is to a significant extent the latest and clearly
most important dimension. Thus the question becomes one open to value judgment
and amenable at best to a political solution. Posner's distinction, however, loses
sight of the fact that consumers are not a homogenous group, and that even with
regard to ethical obligations owed to clients, intense competition can lead to the
disservice of the lowest-paying clients and breach of the duties owed them vis-a-vis
wealthier clients. Widely recognized aspects of economic analysis such as the
doctrine of efficient breach would ordinarily support such a result.
That Posner does not expressly recognize legal professionals themselves as a
constituency whose interest merit attention in the envisaged market framework may
be viewed as a failing or oversight. Though he recognizes that the market would rid
itself of inefficient producers of legal services, he ignores the potential that the
market may indeed ultimately eliminate not just those who are unable to measure up
to the exigencies of competitive markets, but also those who are capable of
competition but who see such an approach to the provision of legal services as
pernicious and unflulfilling, even if economically rewarding. This would include a
large portion of the current group of lawyers and aspiring lawyers who attend to the
law in the hope that there would be something to it beyond market place profits-the
group recorded by Mary Ann Glendon as seeing in the law only dashed hopes for the
attainment of long-held ideals of self-accomplishment through service unfrosted by
the cold breath of the market. 2 '
To view Posner's position as mistaken rather than deliberate would however be
oblivious of Posner's broader, even if unstated, project of deprofessionalizing the
law, '2 of which the foregoing may be seen as an aspect. Posner has, for instance,
120A response to this might be that the customer is better off when this group of lawyers
exit the market, so that the customers can obtain cheaper and better quality services from
others willing to offer them under the new terms. But there is no assurance that cheaper and
better services necessarily result from the new scenario. This is against the background that
many of those who would exit the profession would not be doing so on account of monetary
considerations. Indeed, in this category could be public service lawyers willing to accept very
lowly pay under current circumstances. Also in that category would be lawyers whose pay
should be discounted by the amount attributable to the pro bono work they perform. Indeed, it
is possible that those exiting the profession would include many who would-barring antitrust
concerns-be willing to accept a general cap on chargeable fees, were such to be prescribed.
Besides this is the more general point made earlier in relation to determining whether the
quality of services in such a context is necessarily better. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text. For one can validly argue that shorn of the ideals that should attend them,
services under the new dispensation are necessarily not of the same quality as those provided
ordinarily by the profession. Following from this, it can also be argued that the services are
not less expensive, since their price correlates to their diminished quality.
12'Posner opines that the transformation of the legal profession in the direction of
competitive enterprise "does not signify the deprofessionalization, let alone the
proletarianization, of the legal profession." POSNER, supra note 9, at 64. This perhaps is a
function of his focus on esoteric knowledge and its abstraction as the defining characteristics
of professionalism, Id. at 37; see also RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY 186 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY], a factor whose
independent significance is misplaced, since ultimately, esoteric knowledge is only an
instrument in the service of the profession's goals of which autonomy is a key aspect. He,
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argued that legal education should be reduced to a two-year affair, eliminating the
third year of studies. This, in his view, would not only reduce the cost of legal
education and lead to quicker returns on a student's investment in legal education,
but also stanch the propensity of law professors for research lacking in pragmatic
value, which tends to find an audience among students only because of the forced
extended stay for the third year. 2  He goes on to posit that, "[l]aw is fast becoming a
business, and law schools cannot reverse the trend. As business ethics are not clearly
inferior to legal ethics, the trend is not greatly to be regretted on moral grounds, and
law schools ought therefore to adjust to it rather than fight it.' ' 23 Yet in a surprising
twist of circumspection and ambivalence, he immediately concedes that:
the concern about the trend is not entirely misplaced. Some important
tasks in society require the use of highly specialized skills to produce
services that are difficult for outsiders to evaluate. This is true of such
disparate professions as law, medicine, and military leadership. Because
the evaluation of these professionals (given their esoteric skills) is
difficult, we want them to be inculcated with values of service and
integrity that will give them internal incentives to provide reliable, honest,
high-quality service. In short, we want them to have not only the requisite
however, cites Sharyn L. Roach Anleu in support of the position that "specialization, large
firms, advertising and other trends in the legal profession need not result in
'deprofessionalization' in the sense of loss of autonomy and status, though it is likely to alter
the distribution of rewards within the profession." POSNER, supra note 9, at 64 n.45 (citing
Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, The Legal Profession in the United States and Australia:
Deprofessionalization or Reorganization, 19 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 184 (1992)). This
proposition certainly depends on how one defines deprofessionalization, and is therefore to
some extent value laden. Unless deprofessionalization is an "on or off' i.e. all or nothing
phenomenon, it is bound to be a continuum, and the point in that continuum when it can be
said definitively to have occurred is once again open to judgment.
Whatever the case, if loss of autonomy is the major index (as canvassed by this writer and
apparently by Anleu in the quoted portion of her piece), then one is constrained to insist that
the effect of Posner's much-cherished transformation of the legal profession in the direction of
competitive enterprise has, at the minimum, been to set the profession on its path towards
deprofessionalization. As shown by the empirical work of Black and Rothman, advertising
and related trends towards liberalization of the market for legal services in the last three
decades or so have done much to substantially diminish the status and social standing of law
as a profession. Black & Rothman, supra note 115. It is thus significant that in referring
approvingly to Anleu's statement, Posner apparently endorses the significance of status in the
definition of a profession. Of course this endorsement is not relevant to the threshold
(political) question whether law should continue as a profession, but it does indicate an
acceptance that enhanced social standing-and not just protracted training and the possession
of esoteric knowledge-stemming from control of its work, is of the essence to a profession.
And in this wise, status need not be seen as denoting a pernicious non-egalitarian social
phenomenon, given that the profession is open to all and sundry subject to the satisfaction of
minimum guidelines. Indeed, many aspects of social life inherently involve status in this
egalitarian sense, from owning a nice car to obtaining a university education.
122See POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 121, at 281, 286-88. See also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 433 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE].
123See POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 121, at 289.
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skills but also an esprit de corps, a sense of being different and special. A
prolonged period of specialized training is one method of imparting such a
spirit. Truncate the period, and the spirit may flag.'24
One is tempted to rest on this admission regarding the limitations of enhanced
competition, as proof that this is a matter where human discretion and intuition-
perhaps aided in discrete aspects by insight from social science-should hold sway.
However the position bears further exploration, since Posner's concession seems to
focus largely on the "values of service and integrity" inculcated through this
elongated training, rather than substantive gains in skill levels derivable from such
extended training. Indeed such a partial concession is quite consistent with his
position that such extended training (i.e. the third year of basic law school education)
really does not add much by way of substance to bored students who are forced to
endure homilies from the priests of high theory. It is also consistent with his broader
point concerning the decline of law as an autonomous discipline, a discipline without
any distinctive method to impart to aspiring candidates.'25 One is therefore
constrained to point out that beyond the highly important values inculcated thereby,
an extended period of training is valuable, indeed indispensable at the substantive
level, due to the inherent nature of services as products which cannot be realistically
evaluated ex ante (as we would goods) before consumption. 2 6 The only reliable way
to ensure quality substantively, is to insist on extensive, even overly extensive,
training as a prophylactic against the dangers presented by the intrinsic character of
services.
The fact that this argument applies to all services, not just legal services, accounts
independently of other reasons for the extended training that is the staple of all major
professions. A related point is thus that, even if the extended training offers no real
substantive knowledge gains, it is in the nature of a placebo which can have real
substantive benefits to the customer. Faith in the competence of one's adviser by
virtue of his training, without more, is comforting and therefore inherently valuable
in and of itself. The values inculcated via extensive training and the extensive
substantive knowledge obtained thereby are therefore mutually reinforcing, since
they tend towards the same goal of quality assurance. The only difference is that
24See id. at 289.
25See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 122, at 111, 374, 424-32, 437. Posner's focus
is on the epistemology and general methodology of the profession, especially its academic
branch in its traditional mode, and the profession's lack of a core, distinct and autonomous
approach. The implication drawn however and made clearer in subsequent works, see, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 9, at 15, is that this absence of an autonomous approach goes with a loss
of professional autonomy at the level of the profession's organization and work. One may
accept the epistemological and general methodological point made by Posner without
accepting that it implies the loss of professional autonomy in the work place. Few
professions, if any, are methodologically distinct. Medicine may be said to be nothing other
than the confluence of other more basic sciences. Accounting is even worse, being a
cornucopia of everything from basic bookkeeping (the nearest thing to a core methodology) to
law and business management. If epistemological and methodological integrity were the
benchmark for professional survival, perhaps no profession would be left standing.
126This point was made previously in relation to the definition of "seamless service." See
supra text in the paragraph immediately preceding the paragraph embodying note 23.
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inculcated values as a means of attaining that objective is process-focused while the
other is substantive in character.
In characteristic fashion, Posner appreciates the limits of his own approach,
though he ultimately does not reconcile these limits-which he points out-with the
broad, sweeping recommendations he makes. In a critique of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, which could as well be directed at himself and his supersession of law
thesis, Posner posits that
if through the application of rational methods the practice of law is made
as routinized, as cut and dried, as the work now done by paralegals,
bookkeepers, inventory clerks, ticket agents, and medical technicians, the
legal profession may cease to attract the ablest people and the quality of
law may suffer.'27
His recommendations for legal education ultimately lead to (and perhaps even
assume) legal practice of such a denuded nature.
Incidentally, Posner believes that his prescriptions for the legal profession as well
as the enhanced competition in the legal services industry are the sources of true
professionalism, devoid of the mystique and other unnecessary encrustations with
which the profession has been cloistered for the sole purpose of intimidating the laity
and fostering the professional monopoly. 2 ' For him, increased competition and other
rationalizing changes in the organization of lawyers' work rescue the profession
from, and attenuate its recent history as, "an intricately and ingeniously reticulated
though imperfect cartel, held together against the dangers that beset and ordinarily
would destroy a cartel of many members by governmental regulations designed to
secure it against competition and new entry from without and centrifugal,
disintegrative competitive pressures from within."'29
Even while recognizing that the legal profession's history has not been
blemishless, one feels constrained to point out that this by itself does not justify the
profession's annulment through innovations like MDP that impair its autonomy and
ultimately lead to deprofessionalization. The ideals, especially that of independence,
pursued-albeit imperfectly-by the profession are worthy of societal support and
advancement both on account of their significance for the protection of basic
individual liberties, as well as their moral, aesthetic and cultural significance. The
ideal of the lawyer-statesman-sans the unsavory, inegalitarian Aristotelian
dimensions-for which Anthony Kronman has provided a philosophical and
sociological grounding, 3 ° is both aesthetically and functionally valuable: Society has
127POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 121, at 209-10.
12Sld. at 190-97.
129See POSNER, supra note 9, at 33-34.
130See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4-6 (1993). Part One of the book entitled "Ideals" (especially chapters 1 and 2) is
a particularly bold attempt at philosophical refurbishment of the lawyer-statesman ideal and
vicariously, lawyers' ideals generally. Especially is this so in the attempt to rescue the ideal
from the inegalitarian dimensions of its Aristotelian antecedents-a dimension that has
alienated constituencies that would otherwise have found the ideal attractive and defensible.
Kronman also, without stating so expressly, addresses, id. at 109-62, 359-64, a criticism
earlier directed at him by Posner in The Problems of Jurisprudence, supra note 127, at 448,
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an interest in encouraging broad civic mindedness and the humane habits of
deliberation, expostulation and guarded social activism inherent in that ideal, and any
group that makes it a center piece of its philosophy deserve encouragement beyond
that afforded by competitive markets; more so for a profession like law which directs
human activities in relation to societal precepts, through advice provided at the very
threshold of individual and group action on critical issues. For, as Posner himself
has admitted, it is beyond economics to determine certain of society's goals and-
one should add-to support certain of society's identified goals.'3'
As significantly, through the pursuit of its ideals, with all the imperfections, the
profession makes a significant moral point concerning altruism, emphasizing that the
totality of human values are not comprehended by the rational, value maximizing
individual of economic analysis, a point that becomes all the more salient as
individualism and runaway commercialism threaten the foundations of American
society. It is immaterial for this purpose that the profession often falls short of the
ideals. There is inherent value in having these ideals as guiding beacons and in
posting a credible effort to attain them. As Archibald Cox wrote, even much-
maligned ethics codes are not completely useless, for we need them "both to express
our moral sense and to sharpen awareness of its applications."' 32
One can therefore surmise that the urge of efficiency proponents to expose the
legal profession to the full glare of the market of which MDP represents the apogee,
proceeds from the assumption that the profession does not embody values to which
efficiency should be subjugated. Whether it embodies such values is, however, an
inherently political question, quite beyond the ken and prerogative of economic
analysis.
The role of law in American society goes beyond its role in other societies. It
orders and regulates areas of life, which in many societies are consigned de jure or
de facto to other structures of social regulation. Naturally, the lawyers who, as a
group, administer it have come to perform functions beyond those performed by
lawyers in other climes, in terms of access to justice-for all manner and shades of
causes, whether economically viable or not-and broader social regulation-through
that "Kronman does not show how any of the traits he associates with the ideal legal
practitioner or judge is special to law-a product of legal training and experience rather than
of other training and experience-or helps to distinguish legal reasoning from other practical
reasoning."
1311n Posner's words:
The illiberal implications of typical utilitarian and economic thinking, implications
that seem to include condoning torture and gruesome punishments, enforcing contracts
of self-enslavement, permitting gladiatorial contests in which the contestants fight to
the death, enforcing Shylock's pound-of-flesh bond, and abolishing all welfare
programs and other forms of social insurance, cannot be brushed aside on the ground
that we ought to give efficiency priority over liberty. Why should we? Our liberal
intuitions are as deep as our utilitarian ones, and there is no intellectual procedure that
will or should force us to abandon them.
POSNER, supra note 9, at 23. It is significant that this statement appears in a portion of the
book "which contains the fullest articulation to date of [Posner's] overall theoretical stance."
Id. at viii-ix.
132 See Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust, 94 W. VA.
L. REv. 281, 300 (1992), cited in GLENDON, supra note 111, at 83.
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general advisory services to clients, engagement of the political process both
generally and on behalf of clients, and policy making or shaping through litigation
undertaken in the context of the country's peculiarly malleable constitution and the
fluid, activist interpretive approach of the courts. In the context of America's law-
dependent democratic experiment,
[1]awyers of all sorts, for better or worse, will continue to have much
influence on how America deals with the great issues of our time-the
deterioration of natural and social environments, crime, poverty,
education, race relations, the plight of child-raising families, decaying
infrastructure, intense international competition, and so on. Traditionally,
the country has depended on the legal profession to supply most of [its]
needs for consensus builders, problem solvers, troubleshooters, dispute
avoiders, and dispute settlers. The country's need for talented persons in
such roles is greater than it has ever been. The opportunities for
satisfaction and a sense of personal accomplishment are unparalleled.'33
To entrust the regulation of such functions to the full forces of competitive
markets is to further empower an already overly powerful market, assigning to it a
sort of sovereign power that it has not hitherto claimed or shown the capacity to
manage.
One senses an inability on the part of MDP proponents as well as proponents of
broader market-oriented ideas to transcend the legal profession's past failings, and
recognize its capacity-already shown-for transformation and evolution towards
enhanced social responsiveness, without being subjugated to the full force of
competitive markets.'34 It may be, for instance, that the ideal of the lawyer-statesman
had in the past a less-than-egalitarian connotation. But this need not be so, and
indeed is not necessarily so today as Kronman shows. The ideal is capable of
deployment in a manner not overly antagonistic to the dictates of modem day
liberalism. It is now an ideal rooted in the nature of lawyers' work, training and
general socialization rather than on any notions of class differentiation or the like. 35
We do know that institutions and ideas can evolve for the better, that they can
transcend their shortcomings and advance enunciated aspirations in a socially useful
way. The legal profession qualifies as one of such.
133See GLENDON, supra note 111, at 100-01.
134Thus for Gordon, supra note 7, at 28, the sincerity of those who believe that MDPs
pose a threat to professional independence of judgment does not attenuate the historical
background of the bar's ideal and the bar's reaction to change which indicate that "a lawyer's
lofty conception of professional ideals often conceals what is also a narrow factional or guild
interest."
135This echoes the point made by Robert Gordon, that an argument in favor of lawyers
playing an independent role in counseling and politics is the nature of legal training and
experience, legal education being to an extent,
an education in applied political theory. Lawyers are articulate in one of the major
media of public discourse, legal language. They often have diverse experience ....
They are professionally capable of detachment, able to see different sides of a problem
and analyze motivations . . . . Thus legal training and experience provide a firm
foundation for the exercise of independent judgment.
Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 110, at 74-75.
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D. The Legitimacy of Workplace Control and the Independence of Lawyers
An issue that must be addressed at this stage is whether the professions' claim or
quest for control of the workplace, even absent market control, does not involve an
arrogation of power to themselves in a manner that detracts from the prerogative of
government in a democratic society to order the organization of work for the general
good; in essence, whether the control of the workplace by itself is not intrinsically
delegitimizing. An immediate response would be that in the context of the MDP
debate, the relevance of this issue is circumscribed, given that MDP essentially
implicates the relationship of one profession to another and the terms of their
interaction, rather than the relationship of the professions or one of them to the state.
The whole question of MDP leaves largely untouched the perpetual tension between
the state and the professions that have classically tried as a group to interpose
themselves as modulators and arbitrageurs of power between the rulers and the
people.'36 This is not to say that the resolution of the MDP question may not hold
implications for this tension, since it can among other possible effects exacerbate or
ameliorate it by weakening or strengthening one profession vis-t-vis others, but
rather that such effects are tangential to the long-standing and broad issue of
government-professions relations. In another vein, it may be added that the MDP
debate can be seen as just an aspect of the broader discussion of the relevant factors
that should inform government in its regulation of the professions, one of which
would be the social value and relevance of professional autonomy and workplace
control.
Beyond this attempt to distinguish and separate the MDP question from the
broader, pervasive problem of professions-state relations, it is necessary to show
broadly the normative legitimacy of workplace control by lawyers. Unless such
legitimacy can be shown, MDP as a phenomenon that undermines that workplace
control would stand unimpeached and indeed reinforced. The legitimacy of lawyers'
control of their workplace is best advanced by addressing directly the issue of lawyer
independence, and attempting a more general justification of that independence, of
which lawyer autonomy is but an aspect. Such justification would further reinforce
the case for lawyer control of their work and the terms thereof, since genuine lawyer
independence is impossible absent such control. This point is not only basic (indeed
intuitive) but is also one that dovetails into the finest traditions of liberal thought.
Along this line of thinking, the professions' attempt to control their work can
properly be conceptualized as an effort at expanding the aggregate zone of private
autonomy in society, by doing so for both the individual professional and the
profession as a group. In exploring the normative dimension implicated in the issue
of lawyers' independence and lawyers' control of their work as a key element of that
independence, our primary question is essentially this: "Why is the independence of
lawyers valuable or necessary, and by extension, why does it make sense to maintain
136De Tocqueville captured this element for lawyers, especially American lawyers. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272-280 (Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1994)
(1835). For an exploration of the power of professions, especially the legal profession, as
encapsulated in the notion that English professions (unlike continental European professions)
are themselves lesser governments, see MACDONALD, supra note 68, at 72-74, 76-78, 97
(1995). Even continental European professions are not completely devoid of this dimension,
however. See id. at 85-86.
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the proscription of MDP in order to protect that independence from the threat posed
by MDP and related arrangements?" The analysis below can be fully appreciated
only when this cardinal question is constantly kept in view, since that analysis is
essentially a response to this question.
Robert Gordon in an oft-cited article develops a typology of independence for
lawyers. 137 Positing that lawyers may disagree on what independence means, he
identifies three types of independence, which encapsulate lawyers' contemplation of
the subject historically:
1.) Corporate self-regulation, meaning lawyers' freedom to regulate their own
practices and be free from outside regulation;
2.) Control over conditions of work, meaning discretion and autonomy from
outside direction in deciding the conditions of work, i.e. which clients and causes
to represent, how much time to invest in a particular matter, what strategy or
tactic to pursue, and so forth; and
3.) Political independence, meaning lawyers' existence as:
i) a separate estate or autonomous social force that is not subordinated to
external authorities, particularly the state, in their assertion and pursuit of
clients' rights (the liberal advocacy ideal); and
ii) as a public profession owing duties to the maintenance of the law and
its infrastructure, which duties demand that the lawyer be free of all the
particular factional interests of civil society including those of the clients
(the ideal of law as a public profession). 38
Gordon's article disavows interest in independence of the first and second type,
focusing on the third type for which he provides a nuanced defense, his main thesis
being "that the independence of lawyers has a social and political value going well
beyond the value of effective client service."'39 as implicated in the two prongs of
political independence: the liberal advocacy ideal and the ideal of law as a public
profession. Noting that the ideal of the law as a public profession is rooted in the
now diminished but abiding republican tradition of civic virtue, Gordon shows the
tension between that ideal and the liberal advocacy ideal. The former tends towards
broad duties to the legal and political framework as a justification of lawyer
independence, while the latter emphasizes the dedicated vindication of client rights -
even if ostensibly inimical to the legal framework-as a justification of lawyer
independence. 4 ' Focusing on the idea of purposive lawyering, which ameliorates the
harshness of the most radical interpretations of the liberal advocacy ideal, and the
tradition of civic virtue, Gordon justifies the political independence of lawyers on the
basis of the political judgments inherent in their counseling functions which are
137See Gordon, supra note 110, at 1. It may be noted that the forms of independence in
Gordon's typology falls within the quadrants AX and BX in Figure 1, supra text
accompanying note 77. Since each form of independence mentioned by Gordon implicates
individual as well as social questions, each one traverses AX as well as BX.
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norm-shaping and behavior-influencing activities. For, "though the form and content
of advice may vary, the choice of how to characterize the law to the client inevitably
implicates political judgment."'' As important is his justification of independence in
moral and aesthetic terms, emphasizing the lawyer's role in maintaining a legal
framework that is fundamental to a socio-economic system that is just, at least in the
aggregate. Overall, the justification for the lawyer's political independence is
functional and aesthetic, focusing on his unique political role in non-adversarial
contexts as well as his role in maintaining the legal framework and repairing the
damages to that framework that necessarily result from excessive use of the liberal
advocacy ideal.'42 On this line of reasoning, lawyers are a separate estate by virtue of
the role they play in society, which role demands such independence. "The very
language and tone in which lawyers speak of the law to their clients is a local
political action that subtly reinforces or subverts the legitimacy of the regulatory
state."' 43 Gordon thus conceives of lawyering in deeply political terms.
As further evidence of the intrinsic political character of lawyering, one may
point to the lawyer's gatekeeper functions. The lawyer often has to determine
whether a potential client's cause is worthy and hence, whether it should be let into
the stream of adjudication. This is not to say that lay persons may not enter the
stream of adjudication without lawyer involvement, but rather that they enter on
terms significantly less favorable than those whose access to the stream is facilitated
by a lawyer. Lawyer involvement therefore performs a strong signaling function
both to the opposing party and the public at large. To be represented by counsel is to
signal that one is most serious about the issues in contention and that this seriousness
is shared by a third party--counsel-who deems it worthy of his time and efforts.
While this signaling is most potent in class action suits and other contingency fee
cases where counsel invest their resources in pursuit of litigation for which there
could potentially be no remuneration, it is also present in non-contingency fee cases.
This because even when counsel's fees are assured rather than being contingent,
counsel has nonetheless a residual reputational risk in taking on any client's matter
Since this reputational risk cannot be completely met by charging high fees, counsel
needs to assess and carefully vet ab initio the merits of the cases he accepts. Because
this rigorous intake process is assumed to have been followed by a lawyer for each
case he accepts, a lawyer's acceptance of a client's brief thus legitimizes the client's
cause. The process of determining which causes thus merit legitimation and
1411d. at 29-30.
142For instance Gordon wrote that,
[e]ven economists once given to seeing in business life nothing more than the clash of
self-interest have again begun to recognize what their classical predecessors took for
granted and the Japanese economic successes have dramatized. That is, markets
cannot operate on purely self-seeking opportunism and strategic behavior; rather, they
require an underlying substratum of moral conventions-norms of trust, loyalty,
honesty, and reciprocity of dealing .... On this view, one purpose of legal advice is to
remind clients who may be tempted to ignore the infrastructure for the sake of short-
term profits of the usefulness of underlying business conventions.., as well as of the
explicit rules of the legal framework.
Id. at 18, 23-24.
1431d. at 29.
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admission into the stream of state-sponsored adjudication is itself no less an
adjudicatory and hence political function. In this function the lawyer is aided by
ethical rules such as the general doctrine against abuse of the judicial process, as
reflected for instance in the injunction against filing frivolous legal claims.'
It may be noted that the term "political independence" as used in Gordon's
classification is not quite precise to the extent that it can sustain the impression that
independence for political purposes is separable from corporate independence or
control over conditions of work. It is difficult however to conceive of political
independence without the other two. Gordon's typology can therefore be taken as a
rough context-specific classification that enables Gordon to isolate and focus on his
primary interest-the liberal advocacy and public profession ideals. While the focus
of the discussion in this paper are the first and second types of independence,
corporate self-regulation and control over conditions of work-the debate about
MDP implicating less the perennial problem of state-profession relations than that of
inter-professional relations, these forms of independence are inextricably linked to
that of political independence because, political independence in its ramifications
ultimately provide the raison d'etre for them. For, as David Wilkins has argued,
albeit in the more discrete context of defining the optimal approaches to the
enforcement of lawyers' compliance with professional norms,
[t]he common assertion that independence is synonymous with self-
regulation is, in this context, nothing more than a tautology. Without
some justification for why society should value a profession that is self-
regulating, the mere assertion that professions in general are thought to
have this power is of little consequence. Similarly, without more, the fact
that lawyers seek a certain level of control over the terms and conditions
of their work is entitled to little weight. Like most other people, lawyers
probably value the ability to decide how, when, and on what projects to
devote their professional skills.'45
Along these lines, it is arguable that corporate self-regulation and control over
conditions of work-at least as they relate to non-state parties "'--are justifiable as
extensions or corollaries of political independence, since it is inconceivable-at least
incongruous-that having claimed independence for the fundamental purpose of
influencing or resisting the state, the profession would risk usurpation of that
independence towards other ends by non-state actors who may assume corporate or
workplace control.
David Wilkins, noting that participants in various regulatory debates often seek
to link their arguments about professional independence to some more general
conception of the public good, proceeds to isolate two categories of such arguments.
The first is the position that an independent legal profession is necessary to maintain
the separation of powers among the three branches of government-the separation of
powers argument. The second is the position that an independent legal profession
plays an essential role in preserving the rights of citizens in a democracy-the
144See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).
145Wilkins, supra note 110, at 854 (citations omitted).
'"6To the extent that they relate to the state, they become largely coterminous with
political independence, not corollaries of it.
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democratic theory argument. Even though he adds that only arguments of the second
kind constrain the enforcement choices that are at issue in his article,'47 this does not
diminish the importance in the context of the present paper of the separation of
powers argument, for it highlights another generic rationale for lawyer independence
not captured in Robert Gordon's largely functional and aesthetic focus on lawyers'
ideals.'48 The separation of powers argument thus merits a more detailed examination
in the context of this paper.
Wilkins' argument is located within the context of his project, which concerns
the means of achieving greater compliance with lawyers' professional norms. His
suggested approach is to have different types of enforcement mechanisms going
beyond traditional enforcement by bar or court disciplinary committees. Wilkins'
approach presumably endorses lawyer rules and norms generally-or at least is
neutral towards them-these being the very end for which enhanced compliance is
sought. The problem he has to confront is that in seeking to strengthen professional
norms in this way, one of these norms-professional independence-stands in the
way, and his discourse is in part an argument for the relaxation or reinterpretation of
this norm, to facilitate better enforcement of and compliance with other lawyer
norms. In this regard, Wilkins specifically canvasses for the devolution of regulatory
authority over the profession to several bodies, legislative and executive,
notwithstanding the potential threat that such devolution poses to the lawyer's
independence in terms of his role in maintaining individual liberty in a democracy."
For Wilkins, a proper understanding of independence is not incompatible with such
devolution of regulatory authority over lawyers. His thesis is not an overarching
conceptual attack on lawyer independence as apparent or implicit in some critiques
such as those that conceive of the law as largely a monopoly that should be broken
through accentuated state intervention or otherwise.' 0 Indeed, Wilkins writes that,
"[t]he value of a legal profession that is prepared to defy state authority in the name
of individual rights, creatively advocate solutions to complex problems, and dissuade
recalcitrant clients from undermining long-term legal values cannot seriously be
disputed.''
Because Wilkins does not accept the separation of powers rationale for lawyer
independence, he sets out to deconstruct it and show its weakness. A very credible
147Wilkins, supra note 110, at 855.
148While Gordon's focus may be stretched to encompass a role for the lawyer in the
separation of powers, as distinct from the role of the profession as an independent estate unto
itself, that is clearly not Gordon's emphasis. This makes it unnecessary to dwell further on it
in the context of this article. Even the more basic role of the lawyer in preserving individual
rights and liberties in a democracy (the democratic theory argument) is not emphasized in
Gordon's analysis. See Gordon, supra note 110, at 7-83. However, it is clearly implicit in his
treatment of the liberal advocacy ideal-the second pillar of political independence. Id. at 9-
30.
149Wilkins specifically canvasses devolution of the powers to enforce disciplinary rules to
agencies outside the bar and the judiciary, fashioned along the same lines as the Securities
Exchange Commission or the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. See Wilkins,
supra note 110, at 844-47.
'
5
°See sources cited supra note 9.
15 'Wilkins, supra note 110, at 860.
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case can however be made-and this is the position canvassed below-that on the
contrary, the relevance of the separation of powers argument is undiminished. The
separation of powers argument remains abiding and resonant as a basis for lawyer
independence, lawyers forming in this wise a key aspect of the judicial branch
conceptually and practically.
Wilkins, adopting a typology of the separation of powers argument provided by
Wolfram,'52 distinguishes between two classes of arguments made in support of
lawyer independence from external regulation as an incidence of separation of
powers. First is the affirmative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine, which posits
that courts have an inherent power to regulate lawyers as an essential part of judicial
powers, even in the absence of specific statutes authorizing the court to do so.
Second is the negative aspect of the inherent powers doctrine, which posits that
courts have the power to regulate the legal profession to the exclusion of all other
branches of government. This negative aspect is bifurcated into formalist and
functionalist versions.
The formalist version of the negative inherent powers argument embodies the
basic assertion that regulation of lawyers is part of the judicial function, which
cannot be invaded by other branches of government. The functional version, on the
other hand, asserts that the courts need to retain exclusive regulatory power over the
legal profession because such exclusive power functions as a pragmatic buffer
against the usurpation of judicial power by the other branches of government.
Wilkins has no problem with the affirmative aspect of the inherent power doctrine,
which he sees as justifiable. He sees the negative aspect however as problematic
because it excludes the most effective enforcement systems, i.e. enforcement systems
administered by other branches of government.'53 Wilkins, therefore, proceeds to
deconstruct and lay bare the negative aspect of the inherent power doctrine in order
to arrive at a proper understanding of the separation of powers (and hence the
independence of lawyers); an understanding that is compatible with the joint exercise
of regulatory control over the legal profession by the judiciary and other branches of
government.
1. Exclusive Judicial Control Under the Formalist Version of the Negative Inherent
Powers Doctrine
Asserting that the claim of exclusive judicial authority over lawyers under the
formalist version of the negative inherent powers doctrine proves too much Wilkins
argues that
[a]lthough lawyers are essential to courts, they also play a crucial role in
many executive and legislative affairs. With respect to these matters, the
formal argument in favor of giving the legislature or an administrative
agency regulatory jurisdiction are [sic] as compelling as the parallel claim
asserted by courts in the litigation field.'54
"'Id. at 855 n.244 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The
Role of the Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LiTrLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 4 (1989)).
"'Id. at 856.
154Wilkins, supra note 110, at 856-57.
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Wilkins' position here is however unsustainable. There is a crucial distinction
between the role lawyers play within the judiciary and the role they play elsewhere,
including the legislature and executive. The roles lawyers play in these other
contexts derive from their primary role as actual or putative litigators. When lawyers
play roles outside the litigation context, the value they bring to the table derives
largely from their ability to anticipate what the courts would do and translate the
insight so obtained into guidance for others. The capacity to take in a situation,
process the key facts, isolate the key factors and authoritatively predict what the
courts would do if presented with the same scenario is the core of the lawyer's
expertise in the non-litigation context-his core competence so to say. Of course the
guidance provided by the lawyer to the executive or legislature is not often expressed
in terms of predictions of what the courts would do. However, at the back of every
lawyer's mind, whether he is drafting a piece of legislation or writing a legal opinion
on tax assessments, is a keen awareness of the centrality of the courts to his labors.
In essence, in all situations where his talents qua lawyer are called into play outside
the litigation context, the lawyer is trying to anticipate, prevent or prepare for
litigation. Litigation before the courts may then be said to be the operating system
on which lawyers run. It runs in the background, providing the platform for the
lawyers' non-litigation activities.
Consider the lawyer's non-litigation activities in the corporate law context, the
context in which the lawyer's connection with the judiciary is most easily
challenged. Here the lawyer's work is principally outside the litigation context,
being primarily transactional in character. Yet on closer examination, the nexus
between transactional practice and litigation is anything but tenuous. Viewed
critically, transactional practice or counseling constitutes a form of bargaining in the
shadow of litigation. In the course of their work, transactional lawyers essentially try
to anticipate what the courts would do were the transaction in question to come
before a court in litigation. With this in mind, transactional work from the lawyer's
perspective involves largely the amelioration of the litigation risks inherent in a
transaction, such amelioration often involving bargaining on behalf of one's client in
an effort to shift the most risk permissible to other parties to the transaction.
55
Litigation and transactional work are thus very intertwined.
To the extent that Wilkins' challenge to exclusive judicial oversight over lawyers
under the formalist version of the negative inherent powers argument is premised on
an attenuated nexus between the judiciary and lawyers in the non-litigation context,
the challenge fails in the light of the foregoing. The lawyer's relevance in the non-
litigation context derives directly from his cultivated acquaintance with litigation and
its paraphernalia (judicial precedents, the methods of statutory interpretation, judicial
attitudes, etc.). The difference between the lawyer as litigator and the lawyer as a
non-litigator is that the former deals with live litigation, while the latter deals with
potential litigation. Cases past, present and prospective thus constitute the proper
province of the lawyer in all instances in which his talents are called into play.
It is arguable that when the lawyer's talents are tapped outside the litigation
context, it is not his substantive knowledge of litigation and its processes that is
tapped, but rather a certain disposition of thought and temperament that is the result
1550f course such risk shifting may sometimes have the negative result of shifting
externalities to third parties who are unconnected with the transaction. That does not however
detract from the essential character of the transactional lawyering process.
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of constant engagement with the rebarbative issues of social life. This disposition, it
can be argued, is a quality of mind more in the nature of intuition than knowledge
and lawyers develop it because of the issues they deal with rather than the
framework (litigation) with which they deal with those issues. Along this line of
thinking, anyone who constantly grapples with difficult and practical issues of
human life ought to develop the capacity for tact, circumspection and over-arching
temperance that lawyers bring to the table. Lawyers' possession of this capacity
could therefore be said to be an accidental or contingent result of their work, rather
than an imperative of their method-cases. A response to this argument would be to
ask why lawyers, as a group, consistently remain the advisers of choice in the
various non-litigation roles to which they are pressed; why no other single group of
professionals has made the same impact on political life in American and lawyers
given that other professionals also grapple with difficult issues of social life. A
social worker, for instance, is no less confronted in his workday activities by the
vicissitudes of social life than is a lawyer. The difference between a lawyer's
situation and the social worker's, with the well-defined problems that he confronts
on behalf of his clients as well as the expectations held of him and the methods by
which he fulfills those expectations, would be apparent from the exploration below.
Anthony Kronman gives an articulation of the lawyer's expertise and its essence
that is apposite in the present context, as it explains why the lawyer's disposition is a
function of his substantive legal engagements and his training, rather than a
contingency. He states that
[a] disproportionate number of America's political leaders have always
come from the legal profession. If lawyers are especially well-equipped
to play a leading role in politics, however, it is not because of their
technical legal expertise. It is because their training and experience
promote the deliberative virtues of the lawyer-statesmen ideal." 6
But what is the lawyer-statesmen ideal and how do lawyers come to acquire it in
large measure? Kronman describes this ideal as the "character-virtue of practical
wisdom," "a wisdom about human beings and their tangled affairs that anyone who
wishes to provide real deliberative counsel must possess." '157 Lawyers come to
acquire it by training and experience of a type that the ordinary circumstances of law
practice promote in great measure. Implicit in the lawyer-statesman ideal is the
notion that the experience of lawyers promotes the trait of prudence-or practical
wisdom-and public-spiritedness and their professional duties require these traits in
some regular and important way. 58 The training that lawyers receive, especially
through the Socratic method of law teaching, is pivotal to the early cultivation of the
necessary deliberative virtues along several lines. It exposes them to the unsettled
regions of the law where there are no ready answers and certainty is an illusion, thus
forcing them to cultivate a capacity for bifocality and circumspection. Beyond that,
it forces them to attempt a reconciliation of the multiple dimensions of issues to
which they are exposed by making them sometimes consider the case from the role
'
56 KRONMAN, supra note 130, at 4 (emphasis added).
'Id. at 2, 109.
'5'ld. at 109.
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of a judge rather than an advocate. In this role of judge, they must take a stand and
decide between the competing perspectives of roughly equal weight presented in a
case.159
"The case method is largely an exercise in forced role-playing."'" In this
exercise, students re-imagine and play the roles of both the parties and the judge. Its
emphasis on the priority of the judge's point of view, however, habituates students to
the need for reasoned judgment under conditions of maximum moral
ambiguity, and by giving them practice at rendering such judgments
themselves. The result is a combination of attitudes in tension with one
another: an expanded capacity for sympathetic understanding coupled
with the ability to see every claim with the coldest and most distant, most
judicial, eye; a broad familiarity with diverse and irreconcilable human
goods coupled with an indefatigable willingness to enter the fray, hear the
arguments, render judgment, and articulate the reasons that support it,
even when all hope of moral certainty is gone. 6'
Overall, lawyers are able, through exposure to the Socratic method, to entertain
competing claims, not just in the sense of tolerating those who espouse such claims,
but also in the sense of making an effort to see each claim and sympathize with its
perspective "from the point of view of those who actually endorse it ... 162
Although few lawyers go on to become judges, this disposition inculcated
through the case method system retains a centrality in the function of lawyers in all
the settings in which their professional talent as lawyers are tapped. 63 To show how







161Id. at 121. Though Kronman hinges his argument in great part on the Socratic method,
there is evidence that attorneys elsewhere develop this same capacity even when they were
educated by means other than the case method which is a relatively recent pedagogical tool,
just as eighteenth and nineteenth century U.S. attorneys were able to develop the same skills
prior to the introduction of the Socratic system in the nineteenth century by Christopher
Langdell. (Actually, Kronman does not account for the prudence of the earlier American
lawyers who were not educated with the Socratic system. This potentially weakens his
argument, but I aim to reinforce his argument by noting here the capacity of exposure to law
practice to generate by itself, even absent Socratic education, the full complement of prudence
required of the lawyer.) Regarding the prudence and deliberative qualities of the accomplished
Victorian attorney (i.e. solicitor, as distinct from the then-more-accomplished barristers) see
W.J. READER, PROFESSIONAL MEN, THE RISE OF THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES IN NINETEENTH-
CENTuRY ENGLAND 69 (1966). The case method's overarching importance would then seem
to be that it nurtures prudence relatively early in law students, as distinct from other systems
of lawyer education that entrusts the propagation of prudence exclusively to experience in law
practice. The latter approach would however have been particularly appropriate in the context
of earlier forms of lawyer education that relied heavily on extensive periods of apprenticeship
to senior lawyers, during which the student lawyer was exposed to the prudence-cultivating
engagements.
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advocacy and counseling roles."M He posits that the law is not applied as an abstract
set of self-executing rules, but rather in social context, by human beings. From the
client's perspective, therefore, the most important part of the lawyer's expertise is his
knowledge of a certain sort of human behavior-the behavior of those who play a
role in determining how the law shall be applied. These include judges,
administrative agencies, and the client's competitors or adversaries. But of all these
people in whose behavior lawyers have an interest, it is in judges that they have the
most interest, since when any issue is pressed far enough, it must of necessity be
referred to judges who, in Ronald Dworkin's famous words, are the princes of law's
sprawling empire.'65 It is thus by a lawyer's knowledge of judicial behavior to which
his training in law school first exposed him, that his fitness for purpose is ultimately
to be adjudged.'66
Kronman views the above presentation of the lawyer's expertise as the narrow
view,'67 in which the lawyer adopts the narrow purpose of merely implementing the
client's untempered instructions, employing his expertise concerning judicial
behavior. However, even this narrow view is noteworthy in its presentation of the
strong nexus between the lawyer's work and the judicial department, a presentation
that is by itself significant in terms of our critique of Wilkins' argument regarding
the formalist version of the negative inherent powers doctrine, as well as our broader
argument for exclusive judicial control of lawyers.
On Kronman's broader and proper view of the lawyer's expertise, in predicting
and navigating the behavior of others who play a role in determining how law is
applied, the lawyer does not act as a passive instrument in the hands of a client. He
does not just take the client's interest as perfectly formed at the point the client issues
his instructions.'68 Rather the lawyer first helps to shape the client's wishes and
objectives in order to determine the client's best interest, regarding which interest the
lawyer and client further engage in a second level deliberation in order to facilitate a
wise choice or decision by the client.
The lawyer's role in thus probing and examining the client's interests (and even
motives) is an exercise in joint deliberation. In this exercise the lawyer tries to put
himself in the client's position, but not as the client would. Rather he approaches the
client's position with both sympathy and detachment, replicating the same calm and
equanimity that a judge brings to bear on a matter, rather than the passion that
usually extends to a client's definition of his own interest. On this account, the
lawyer, even when he is out to simply discover under the narrow view, what judges
and other arbiters of his client's interest would do, can only be effective if he
properly deliberates with the client about the client's avowed interests, in order to
164KRONMAN, supra note 130, at 123-24.
165Notice how Kronman's notion of the core expertise of a lawyer approximates Prahalad
and Hamel's concept of the core competence of the corporation, Prahalad & Hamel, supra
note 50, at 80-83, from which my notion of the core competence of lawyers, Wilkins, supra
note 110, at 856-57, is derived.
166KRONMAN, supra note 130, at 123-24.
16 7Id. at 123.
161d. at 129-34.
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first get the client to straighten out those interests and rid them of conflicting and
harmful dimensions.
Beyond straightening the client's interests in this way, the lawyer goes on, as part
of the second level deliberation, to assist the client in making a deliberately wise
choice or decision concerning these very interests, broadly engaging in the same
exercise of joint deliberation with the client.'69 This exercise exposes to the client the
conflicting dimensions of the available choices and the various dimensions
implicated. The need for deliberative engagement with the client thus exists at all
levels of the client-lawyer relationship. It is central to robust counseling. The
lawyer, whether as counselor or advocate, cannot be a mere minister to the raw and
untempered ambition of the client. He has to exercise deliberative judgment using
the practical wisdom that is the forte of the lawyer-statesman. It is thus the lawyer's
training and his constant involvement with engagements that peculiarly exercise his
deliberative qualities that imbue him with the quality of prudence. His possession of
that quality is far from being an accident or contingency.
Not being an accident, these qualities deriving as they do from his judicial
training and the judicial requirements of his workaday life, link him inextricably to
the judicial branch, which by virtue of such linkage has a supreme overriding interest
in the regulation of lawyers as well as the infrastructure to make such regulation
effective and efficient. 7° This overriding interest in lawyer regulation, in the context
of the lawyer's peculiar training and expertise, anchors the judiciary's claim to its
exclusive regulation as an aspect of the separation of powers.
2. Exclusive Judicial Control Under the Functionalist Version of the Negative
Inherent Powers Doctrine
Regarding the functionalist version of the negative inherent powers doctrine,
Wilkins asserts that the case based thereon for exclusive judicial control of the legal
profession is unpersuasive. This is particularly because its case for such control
assumes that rule-making as well as enforcement authority will be transferred to the
executive or the legislature-an assumption that Wilkins expressly removes from his
framework by accepting that rule-making power would remain exclusively with the
judiciary. Wilkins' argument thus assumes that "all enforcement officials are bound
by the current rules of professional conduct.'
' 7
'
In articulating his position, however, Wilkins seems not to have convincingly
accounted for the fact that enforcement powers are inherently norm-generating. This
omission makes unrealistic and unpersuasive his argument that all enforcement
agencies would be assumed to have accepted the ethical rules of the bar as expressed
in the Model Rules.' The decision about who and what to prosecute or not
'69. at 129.
170A key aspect of this infrastructure is the unique culture of the judiciary itself-a broad
culture of circumspection, neutrality, and decorum both in and out of court. This culture
inspires the lawyer since it reflects and reinforces, in a manner that no other secular institution
can, the qualities that the lawyer finds useful and essential in his own work.
''Wilkins, supra note 110, at 858.
1721t is practically unrealistic because once it is established that the legislature and the
executive have legitimate bases for regulating lawyers, there is little justification for restricting
such regulation to rule enforcement only.
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prosecute, what sanctions to impose, when to prosecute, among others, all go to
determine the power of an ethical norm, strengthening it or diminishing it over time
almost as effectively as direct formal adjustment of the rules by the authorities vested
with express rule making power. Indeed the process of deciding whether a particular
lawyer behavior merits enforcement action involves an initial act of rule
interpretation and adjudication by the enforcement agency, leading to a decision-
the decision to enforce or not to enforce. This process of interpretation and
adjudication is no less norm-generating than the decisions of judges. Witness the
reach and influence of SEC no-action letters in the area of capital market regulation.
Enforcement gives meaning and content to a rule.
Wilkins seems to have vaguely recognized that enforcement powers have an
interpretive and rule-shaping dimension. He therefore attempts to provide for the
vagaries and permutations of interpretation and enforcement of the profession's rules
by multiple enforcement agencies. This he does by allowing for the power of the
ABA to reign in aberrant results through express and exclusive powers of rule
amendments directed thereat.'73 In this regard, it is noteworthy that to the extent that
such ultimate power over substantive rules and the impact of their enforcement rests
with the ABA, the legal profession's independence remains intact, this being the key
factor for purposes of this Article. Wilkins does, however, recognize other
weaknesses in this approach. Using the Office of Thrift Services (OTS) as an
example, he acknowledges that an enforcement agency "might dispute the bar's
power to overturn the agency's interpretation."' 74 This is a problem of no mean
dimension, for it underscores the futility of attempting a separation of rule
interpretation from rule enforcement in an administrative context in which:
1. the rule maker (ABA/the judiciary) has no control over the rule enforcer,
and
2. the rule maker or its constituents (i.e. lawyers) are effectively subject to
the jurisdiction of the rule enforcer whose key function is to ensure
compliance by the rule maker or its constituents.
Indeed, quite apart from the agency with primary enforcement powers, other
agencies and interests might weigh in and contend against the bar's rule-making
power in the circumstances. The most effective agencies, such as the SEC, are
supreme within their own spheres of authority in the sense that they typically work
with enabling powers provided by the legislature under special statutes, being
statutes that give them a core exclusive jurisdiction and subsidiary rule-making
powers. When this is not the case, as in where rule-making or rule-interpretation
powers are split, the result is a relatively-weak agency. With this in mind, the
chances are quite high that the ABA as the rule-making agency would be challenged
in the context of Wilkins' framework. It is instructive that in relation to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), for instance, the Justice Department has argued that antitrust
considerations are implicated when the IRS defers to private agencies like the ABA
and the AICPA in rulemaking and decisions concerning tax practice before the
IRS.' 75 In a sense, the IRS can be said to possess a shared jurisdiction with the
'
73Wilkins, supra note 110, at 811 n.41.
741d. at 811 n.41.
175See Justice Department Comments on Report of IRS Chief Counsel's Advisory
Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct in Representation of Taxpayers Before IRS,
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Justice Department regarding those who practice before the IRS. It is therefore not
out of place that the Justice department insists on offering an interpretation of the
IRS rules, which challenges the IRS position.'76 Wilkins' ultimate decision to
"bracket this potential jurisdictional dispute by assuming that all enforcement
officials concede the ABA's power to render binding interpretations of ambiguous
professional norms' 177 is thus in order as a conceptual necessity, there being no
solution ultimately to the problems attendant upon separating rule-making and rule-
enforcement powers as he advocates. The legal profession's capacity to defy state
authority when necessary and to be otherwise creative and active necessarily
diminishes as compliance enforcement progressively devolves to far-flung
administrative and legislative agencies and their mechanisms. Whenever compliance
mechanisms involve non-lawyers, as would likely be the case if MDP were to
become permitted, independence is jeopardized since enforcement action, even
absent express rule making powers, nevertheless shapes the rules, and in shaping the
rules interferes with judicial prerogative of control over the legal profession whose
work is appurtenant to that of the judicial branch. Maintenance of the separation of
powers between the judiciary and other branches of government therefore mandates
and justifies the independence of the legal profession, generally. By compromising
that independence, in terms of facilitating the control of lawyers and their work by
other professions over whom the judiciary has no regulatory power, MDP
undermines the separation of powers.
In the light of the foregoing, some skepticism is in order regarding the edifice
that Wilkins constructs on the foundation of the assumption that rule making and
rule-enforcement are separable 7 ' such that the agency with enforcement powers
need not have rule-making power; an edifice that provides him the basis for the
conclusion that separation of powers as a justification for lawyer independence is not
a sufficient reason for exclusive judicial exercise of regulatory power over the legal
profession. In thus detracting from separation of powers, this argument detracts
from the independence of lawyers. But as indicated above, its impact is weakened
(BNA) No. 241, at J-l, J-2 (Dec. 14, 1976). On two of the proposed rules, the Justice
Department had this to say:
[T]he Committee briefly discussed the problem which arises when a licensed attorney,
employed on a full-time basis by a firm of certified public accountants, seeks to
represent the firm's clients in IRS proceedings. Although the Committee did not
propose a regulation to deal with that situation, it did encourage two private
associations to jointly develop dispositive rules .. . .The Department believes it
unnecessary, and inappropriate as a matter of public policy, for the IRS in effect to
delegate authority to private associations of competitors to determine conditions under
which individuals may practice before the IRS.
Id.
1761t is noteworthy that the scenario here falls short of the extreme version of shared
regulatory control advocated by Wilkins, in which special agencies would be established
primarily for the purpose of monitoring lawyers to ensure compliance with the ethical rules.
Wilkins, supra note 110, at 844-47.
177d. at 811 n.41.
...ld. at 858.
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by the underlying assumption. Thus weakened, it effectively leaves undiminished,
the case for independence of lawyers.'79
Beyond the foregoing, there is a cultural dimension to the independence of the
legal profession-a dimension which provides a distinct justification for that
independence. The idea of cultural industries has become pervasive in trade and
business regulatory circles. Underlying this idea is the notion that some industries
embody more than the bare bones of productive activity, holding for the public
something in the nature of a cultural ideal. The preservation of such industries
becomes a national imperative, among other reasons, on account of their value as a
bulwark against the blandness, homogeneity, commercialism and general anomie
inherent in runaway economic liberalism. In various countries, such cultural
industries have included farmstead agriculture, the cinematographic industry and the
print media. Even if one were to admit that the legal profession is no more than a
business as claimed in some quarters, there remains a case for its inclusion in this
class of industries in the context of the American socio-political milieu. The
independent legal practitioner, especially in his liberal advocacy mode, is an article
of faith for Americans. In conducting their daily affairs such a practitioner, even if
somewhat romanticized, is a constant element in their calculus. This flows from the
pervasive role of the law and lawyers in the American society, a factor related to the
distinctive nature and power (political and otherwise) of the American judiciary to
which the profession is appurtenant. 8 ° An independent legal profession provides the
context for the autonomy of the independent legal practitioner, whether in the
counseling or litigation roles. It therefore merits preservation as a distinct, historical
institution of social life, much like indigenous publications and film industries in
some countries. The American lawyer and his special role constitute no less a
distinctive aspect of American life than American democracy itself.
Writing in the context of international trade, Trebilcock and Howse state that,
"concerns over the impact of trade and investment liberalization on a country's
cultural sectors (e.g. film, television, radio, newspapers, magazine and book
1791t should be explained, that for the purposes of the present article, regulation of the legal
profession by the judiciary is treated as coterminous with the profession's regulation of itself
Given that judges may be viewed as ex-lawyers in the sense that they no longer offer legal
service to clients, it may be argued that they are not members of the legal profession. This,
however, would be a marginal argument, not just because judges in the United States are
invariably lawyers, but also because lawyers as a group do not conceive of judges as
belonging to a different profession as is the case in some other countries.
180 0n the distinctive nature and power of the American judiciary, see Abram Chayes, How
Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1028 (1988). Chayes
writes that,
The judicial department established by the framers was unique among nations in 1787
and, to a large extent, remains unique today. All modem societies have judges, and an
independent judiciary is a hallmark of liberal democracy. In other countries, however,
the judicial system is regarded primarily as a service provided by the government,
much like education .. .with the workaday function of resolving the disputes that
arise in the ordinary course of social and economic life. The courts in such societies
are, of course, essential organs. Unlike the judicial branch brought to life by article III
[of the Constitution], however, they are not thought to be, nor are they in fact, engaged
in the political process.
[Vol. 56:533
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  608 2008
77
Nnona: Towards a Reformed Conception of Multidisciplinary Practice
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
TOWARDS A REFORMED CONCEPTION
publishing) continue to exert considerable influence in international economic
relations as reflected in general or qualified exceptions (often contentious) for such
sectors in domestic and international policy instruments."18' That such measures are
"often contentious" underscores the opposition to them by third countries in the
context of international trade rather than their non-acceptance within the country
introducing them.8 2 These measures enjoy unsurpassed legitimacy in trade policy
circles today, and their importance can only increase as the global civil society
becomes stronger and more assertive in defense of non-economic values.
Overall, one feels drawn to Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn who said that he does
feel that for humanity ... moral authority is a necessity. The course of
world history and world culture shows us that there are, and should be,
moral authorities. They constitute a kind of spiritual hierarchy which is
absolutely necessary for every individual. In the twentieth century, the
universal tendency, not only in the West but everywhere, was to destroy
any hierarchies so that everyone could act just as he or she wants without
regarding any moral authority. This has already been reflected in, and has
influenced, the whole of world culture, and the level of world culture has
been lowered as a result. 3
In the aggregate, an independent legal profession, its flaws notwithstanding, is a
moral authority as well as a legitimate aspect of American, if not world, culture, the
demise of which would constitute a veritable recession towards moral and cultural
impoverishment.
It is necessary in relation to the cultural value of an independent legal profession
to address the oft-repeated view that many of the norms that undergird its
independence are of pretended ancient vintage, having been only recently instituted
in circumstances that evince an anti-competitive rationale.'84 Arguments of this type
frame the legal profession's core values or associated rules, including its norm of
18 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 14 (2d ed. 1999).
18 2Trebilcock and Howse describe them, for instance, as somewhat ominous and
romanticized, noting that "[t]raditional closed societies may have preserved distinctive
customs and beliefs against external influences, but only at the cost of racial, religious, and
ideological intolerance, and of significant limits on individual self-development." Id. at 13.
One can only point out that the examples here are rather extreme and predictably disposable,
since there is universal belief today that racial, religious and ideological intolerance are
unacceptable and as such, undermine any measure in which they are infused, including
measures for the protection of industries. It is noteworthy that the authors, Canadians, are not
quite critical of Canada's cultural exceptions under the North America Free Trade Agreement
for certain cultural industries. Significantly, they recognize the inevitability of differences
between nations on the balance between values of efficiency and competing considerations in
sensitive areas like cultural industries, and accept that concerns about such industries are
legitimate, even if capable of pursuit in other ways. Id. at 366.
'
83 David Remnick, Letter from Moscow, Deep in the Woods: Solzhenitsyn, a New Book,
and the New Russia, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2001, at 32.
184 See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 5, at 1626-29; Green, supra note 8, at 1115-18, 1144-45.
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independence as reflected in the ABA Model Rule 5.4 prohibition against fee
sharing, as artifices constructed with less than the public interest in mind."s5
This line of argument merits two responses. First is the fact that doctrinally,
Model Rule 5.4 and associated rules are context-specific and carefully crafted
derivatives of the age-long principle of common law and equity that obliges agents to
maintain the highest levels of loyalty in executing their office. Beyond this, they
also derive more directly from ancient statutes and the inherent powers of the courts
as applied in English courts at least since the thirteenth century. Such statutes
together with the inherent powers doctrine were the principal sources of disciplinary
authority over medieval English lawyers." 6 Though this regulatory arsenal seems
narrower than what is available today, medieval judges were able to exercise
disciplinary control over lawyers with regard to breaches of a broad range of values
paralleling today's core values. Chief of these were breaches of the duty of loyalty
as manifest in the duty to avoid conflict of interest (i.e. "ambidexterity" in vintage
parlance). The breach of client's confidences, incompetent representation,
negligence and abuse of the court's procedure or overreaching were all sanctionable
by the court under inherent powers and statutory powers, as was the unauthorized
practice of law.1"' Most notable among the statutory powers was the power to jail a
lawyer for a year and a day for ethical misbehavior, 8 a power, which by
criminalizing such conduct, indicated its accentuated perniciousness as a major
annoyance to clients and the commonwealth in the context of those times. The
protection of clients and the general public therefore lay at the root of these controls,
notwithstanding that they could also be seen as constituting turf protection by
medieval lawyers. Especially is this so with regard to the London Ordinance of 1280
which tried to create a professional monopoly of sorts by limiting to admitted
lawyers the right to hold themselves out to clients as professional lawyers. This was
done in the hope that incompetent representation and abuse of the judicial process
'
85See Wolfram, supra note 5, at 1628-31; Green, supra note 8, at 1144-45.
'S6jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 41 (1998).
1871d. at 61; See also PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 115-
16(1992).
'
88Rose, supra note 186, at 49-50. The earliest principal statutes were thirteenth century in
origin: The Statute of Westminster 1, Chapter 29 (1275), the London Ordinance of 1280 and
the Ordinance of 1292. Id. at 49. The Statute of Westminster 1, Chapter 29, prohibited deceit
or collusion against the court or any party by any serjeant (roughly equivalent to the modem
English Barrister) or other person (an ambiguous term that was interpreted by the courts to
encompass medieval attorneys-i.e. the lesser branch of the profession roughly equivalent to
the modem English solicitor). This broad prohibition against deceit was expansively
interpreted by the courts to reach many kinds of lawyer misbehavior, including breaches of the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality and duty of loyalty, though it was not always clear whether
the courts were acting under the inherent powers or under the statute. Id. at 57-62. The latter
encompassed the broad array of conflict situations reflected in modern conflict of interest
regulation: simultaneous representation of current clients adverse in the same matter,
representation adverse to former client, representation adverse to current client on unrelated
matter, representation of potentially adverse multiple plaintiffs and defendants, conflict
between client's interest and the lawyer's personal interest. See BRAND, supra note 187, at
124-25, 127, 135.
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would thereby be eliminated.' 89 The vices at which such control was aimed, whether
lawyer misbehavior or unauthorized practice, were as much a scourge for the client
as they were for the courts. The intent to secure the lawyer's independence in the
context of the circumstances in which the medieval lawyer practiced and the
temptations and vices to which he was most prone is clearly discernible. 9
These statutes and their judicial application were therefore measured responses to
the vices and exigencies of medieval law practice, 9' and were heavily animated by
the need to secure a lawyer's independence from the interests (including the lawyer's
personal interests) that competed with the lawyer's loyalty to his clients.'92 The same
concerns animate the modem prohibition against fee sharing and partnerships with
non-lawyers-prohibitions undergirding the ban on MDP. These rules are no more
than the same ancient principle of independence in the service of clients and the
public made manifest in the context of modem law practice. The law is inherently
dynamic and the law of lawyering cannot be an exception. The application of the
ancient norm of fidelity to clients as underscored by the rules on loyalty,
confidentiality and general independence must find current expression in ways that
meet the exigencies of contemporary law practice, not the least of which exigency is
the ever-threatening hegemony of high finance. Model Rule 5.4 as well as
associated rules therefore shares the same pedigree as the ancient norms they
embody and express.
The second response to the line of thinking in question is that even if one were to
admit that the key components of the legal profession's norms are recent constructs,
this point is largely irrelevant to the utility of such norms. Their utility cannot be
assessed principally on the basis of their vintage, but rather by reference to the
purposes they currently seek to attain and their fit for those purposes. Many of the
most important institutions and legal principles in use today are serendipitous
constructs; derivatives or distortions of earlier rules, as exemplified by Oliver
Wendell Holmes' treatment of the long-abandoned law of deodands and its modem
admiralty law manifestation in the form of actions in rem.'93
In sum, the case for the independence of lawyers remains strong, whether it is
grounded on the liberal advocacy ideal, the ideal of law as a public profession, the
separation of powers, cultural relevance or some permutation of these rationales.
MDP as a threat to that independence cannot be meaningfully advanced while the
case for independence remains so strong.
189Rose, supra note 186, at 63-65, 72. The London Ordinance of 1280 was tailored
specifically for lawyer regulation in a manner that makes it worthy of description as the
"earliest antecedent of modem professional regulation." Id. at 72.
190See BRAND, supra note 187, at 124-25, 127, 135.
19'See Rose, supra note 186, at 61, 65, 70 n.301, 74-76; BRAND, supra note 187, at 121-23.
192Simultaneous representation of current clients adverse in the same matter seemed for
instance to have been a rampant form of ambidexterity, as were other forms of chicanery too
blatant for today's average lawyer. Rose, supra note 186, at 70 n.301; BRAND, supra note
187, at 121-23.
193See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 25-31 (1881).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Charles Wolfram, in the context of a predominantly favorable scholarly attitude
towards MDP, observed that "[s]hockingly little has been written in opposition to
MDP."'9 4 That a debate between academicians can be thus one-sided is a curious
element of the discourse on MDP-an element that invites further inquiry into the
factors that inform the research agenda of legal academics.
While such inquiry is beyond the compass of the present article, it bears
mentioning that the effect of the lopsided character of the debates has been to
engender a palpable feeling of despondency in the minds of many of those in the
legal profession who are sensitive to the deleterious consequences of MDP. This
was especially so before the Enron Corporation affair and the subsequent accounting
scandals of 2002, which exposed the deeply corroded ethical infrastructure of the Big
5 firms in the United States and thus delegitimized their quest for MDP. This
despondency should not come as a surprise, given that the academic branch of any
discipline is supposed to be the repository of the best thinking in the field, so that the
opinions of legal academicians, while largely academic, has a more-than-academic
impact on the broader field. By critically analyzing the arguments deployed by
proponents of MDP and making a case against it, this article effects a much-needed
realignment and rebalancing of the MDP debate. This realignment is important
because, notwithstanding the lull in the debate following the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the issue is far from being settled, there being nothing
in that Act that directly addresses the legal profession's independence in the MDP
context, the protections afforded the profession thereby being only contingent and
incidental to the primary purpose of maintaining auditor independence.
194Wolfram, supra note 5, at 1626 nn.3-4.
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